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9GLOSSARY
English Swedish  Explanation
Absconding Undan­
hållande/
avvikande
A common way to resist deportation, 
which could involve going to another 
country or city and/or living hidden in 
a house or apartment or as a homeless 
person on the street.
Alien Utlänning According to the Aliens Act, a person 
who is not a Swedish citizen. A foreigner. 
Aliens Act Utlänningslagen Law regulating residence permits, 
deportation, detention etc. 
Daily allowance Dagersättning Allowance that asylum-seekers can apply 
for to cover basic expenses during the 
asylum process. 
Declaration of 
acceptance 
Nöjdförklaring If signed, the migrants declare that they 
accept the refusal of their application for 
asylum and forego their right to appeal. 
DEPA 
(Accompanied 
Deportation)
DEPA (Bevakad 
Verkställighets­
resa)
Deportation where the migrant is escorted 
by police officers or personnel from 
the National Transport Unit within the 
Swedish Prison and Probation Service.
Deportation Deportering/
Verkställighet
The removal by the state of a non-citizen 
from the state’s territory. Also known by 
different actors and in the literature as 
forced return and removal.
Deportable Verkställbar Migrants who have received a return 
decision and have no recognised 
impediments to their deportation. 
DEPU (Unac-
companied 
Deportation)
DEPU (Obev­
akad Verkstäl­
lighetsresa)
Deportation where the migrant is 
unescorted and travels alone, although 
the airline involved must be informed of 
the deportation.
Detention centre 
(pre-removal 
centres)
Förvar/ 
förvarsenhet 
(platsen)
A place where migrants are detained. In 
Sweden, detention centres are run by the 
Migration Agency and act primarily as 
pre-removal centres. 
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Detainment/
detention
Förvar Foreigners may be detained for reasons 
specified in the Aliens Act – if his/her 
identity is unclear; if it is necessary for 
the investigation of the alien’s right to 
stay in Sweden; if it is likely that the 
foreigner will be deported; and in order 
to prepare/carry out a return decision. 
Detained Förvarstagen/ 
frihetsberövad
State of being in detention, which means 
that a migrant’s movement is restricted 
to a certain facility. Under the Aliens 
Act people are often held at a detention 
centre, but they can also, if certain legal 
requirements are met, be held in prisons, 
remand centres, psychiatric units or 
hospitals.
Dublin 
Convention
/System/
Regulation
Dublinförordnin­
gen
Includes all EU Member States, plus 
Norway, Iceland and Switzerland, and is 
the mechanism by which the first country 
of arrival of the migrant is determined 
to be responsible for examining the 
application for asylum.
Escorted 
deportation
Bevakad verk­
ställighetsresa
Deportation whereby the migrant is 
escorted by police officers or personnel 
from the National Transport Unit within 
the Swedish Prison and Probation 
Service. Also referred to as accompanied 
deportation (DEPA).
Forced return 
case
Tvångsärenden Returns that are handed over by the 
Migration Agency to the Police on the 
presumption that force will be needed 
when returning these individuals.
Forced return/
removal
Tvångsvis/
påtvingat 
återvändande/’
återsändande
The compulsory and forced return of 
an individual to the country of origin, 
transit or third country, on the basis of 
an administrative or judicial decision.
Individual travel Enskild resa A mode of travel that is not subject to 
surveillance by the police or the National 
Transport Unit and where the airline is 
not notified.
LMA card LMA (Lagen om 
mottagande av 
asylsökande) 
kort 
A certificate showing that the migrant is 
an asylum-seeker with the right to stay 
in Sweden while waiting for a decision. 
The card must be returned either when 
the migrant leaves Sweden or once a 
residence permit has been granted.
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Migration Court Migrationsdom­
stolen
One of Sweden’s four administrative 
courts and one in which a rejection 
decision from the Migration Agency or 
a detainment decision or re-entry ban 
made by the Police authorities may be 
appealed against.
Migration Court 
of Appeal
Migrationsöver­
domstolen
A general administrative court where an 
appeal can be made on a determination 
by the Migration Court, located at the 
Administrative Court of Appeal. It is the 
final instance and decisions made there 
will provide guidance for decisions by 
the Migration Agency and Migration 
Courts in similar matters.
SMA’s housing 
centres
Anläggningsbo­
ende
Larger accommodation units, mainly for 
asylum-seekers, provided by the SMA but 
often run by private actors.
National 
Transport Unit 
(NTU)
Kriminalvårdens 
transporttjänst
A section of The Swedish Prison and 
Probation Service that, in most cases, 
accompanies migrants on DEPA 
deportations. The NTU is also responsible 
for escorting migrants facing deportation 
because they have been sentenced by a 
criminal court in Sweden.
Negotiation 
journey 
Förhandlings­
resa
Deportations where the Police authority 
has decided that negotiations are 
needed in order to get the country of 
origin to accept the deportee. They will 
accompany the deportee, with or without 
the NTU.
Negative 
decision (first, 
second or third)
Negativa beslut The negative decision/refusal of 
application for asylum.
first negative: decision from the SMA;
second negative: decision from the 
Migration Court; and 
third negative: decision from Migration 
Court of Appeal.
Notification of 
Deportee
‘Notification of 
Deportee’
Letter notifying the airline and the pilot 
about the deportation.
Parliamentary 
Ombudsmen
Justitieombuds­
mannen JO/ 
Riksdagens 
ombudsmän
Appointed by the Swedish Riksdag 
(parliament) to ensure that public 
authorities and their staff comply with 
the laws and other statutes governing 
their actions.
12
Police 
expulsions
Avvisning 
beslutad av 
Polismyn­
digheten
Deportations decided by the Police 
authority either at the borders or within 
the country.
Prison Fängelse Institution to which people are legally 
committed as a punishment for a crime 
or while awaiting trial. 
Proof of 
departure 
Utresebevis Certificate from the Swedish 
Migration Agency or SMA (and, in some 
cases, the police) which must be handed 
in when passing Swedish border control 
so that the Swedish Migration Agency 
can be notified that the migrant has left 
the country. 
Re-entry ban Återreseförbud Applied if an asylum-seeker whose 
application has been refused does not 
leave Sweden during the period of 
voluntary return specified; return to the 
Schengen Area is not permitted for one 
year. This ban may be extended to up to 
five years if the Migration Agency or the 
Police authority do not believe that the 
applicant will leave Sweden voluntarily.
Remand centre/
prison
Häkte Facility for temporary detainment of a 
person awaiting trial or continuation of 
their trial; administered by the Prison and 
Probation Service.
Return unit Återvändan­
deenhet
Unit at the Migration Agency in charge 
of the return process.
Return dialogue Återvändande­
samtal
Meeting to discuss the different 
practicalities regarding the return. The 
return journey to the origin country is 
planned and the migrants informed 
about the consequences if they abscond 
or refuse to cooperate. Depending on the 
case, there can be one or or more of 
these ‘motivational’ meetings, the aim of 
which is not just practical but also tries 
to convince the migrants to accept the 
return decision and return without force 
having to be used.
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REVA Rättssäkert 
och Effektivt 
Verkställighets­
arbete
Literally translated as ‘Legal Certainty 
and Effective Enforcement’. It was an 
operation carried out by the Swedish 
Police together with the Swedish prison 
service and migration service. The aim 
was to boost the effectiveness of the 
enforcement of deportations.
Supervision Uppsikt Process whereby the migrant has 
to report to the Police Authority or 
Migration Agency at certain times and 
may also have to surrender any identity 
documents.
Swedish 
Migration 
Agency
Migrationsverket The authority that considers applications 
from people who want to take up 
permanent residence in Sweden, 
come for a visit, seek protection from 
persecution or become Swedish citizens.
Swedish Prison 
and Probation 
Service (SPPS)
Kriminalvården Agency that implements prison and 
probation sentences, and is responsible 
for remand prisons and the transport 
service. 
Third-country 
national (TCN)
Tredjelands­
medborgare
Citizen of a country outside the European 
Union (EU)/European Economic Area 
(EEA).
Unescorted 
deportation
Obevakad 
verkställighets­
resa
Deportation where the migrant is 
unescorted and travels alone, although 
the airline involved must be informed of 
the deportation. Also referred to as DEPU 
(Unaccompanied Deportation). 
Unfounded 
asylum claims 
Uppenbart 
ogrundade 
ärenden
According to the Aliens Act, the 
Migration Agency is allowed to deport 
a person before the deportation decision 
has become final and non-appealable, 
if it is determined that the applicant’s 
asylum claim is unfounded, and that a 
residence permit should not be given on 
other grounds. 
Voluntary/ 
uncompelled 
return
Frivilligt/
självmant 
återvändande
According to the Migration Agency, 
returning voluntarily is when an applicant 
chooses to take the initiative to return 
voluntarily or at least accepts the decision 
not permitting him or her to remain in 
Sweden.
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MIGRANT INTERVIEWEES
Name Profile
Aamir Afghani male in his 30s. Failed asylum-seeker. In Sweden 
for two years with wife and young children. Living in1 own 
apartment in ‘hiding’. Has not been detained.
Akash Bangladeshi male in his 30s. Labour migrant. Was 
deported but came back to Sweden through family 
reunification. Is now single and a Swedish citizen living 
in own apartment. Detained for about one month each in 
prison and in a detention centre.
Ana Serbian female in her 40s. Failed asylum-seeker. In 
Sweden for a little more than two weeks with her children. 
Living in Migration Agency housing. Has not been 
detained. 
Arjana Albanian female in her 30s. Failed asylum-seeker. In 
Sweden for about three weeks with her children and 
husband. Living in Migration Agency housing. Has not 
been detained but her husband is in a detention centre. 
Bahara Afghani female in her 20s. Failed asylum-seeker. In Sweden 
for about two years with husband and children. Living in 
own apartment in ‘hiding’. Has never been detained.
Davood Iranian male in his 30s. Failed asylum-seeker. In Sweden 
alone. Living in detention centre. Risking deportation to an 
EU country (Dublin Convention).
Emmanuel Nigerian male in his 30s. Failed asylum-seeker. In Sweden 
for four years. Living in detention centre. 
Fatma Stateless woman, Kuwaiti bidoon, in her late 20s. Failed 
asylum-seeker. In Sweden for two years with parents and 
siblings. Living with family. Has never been detained. 
Hamdan Pakistani male in his 50s. Failed asylum-seeker. In Sweden 
for two years without family.  Living in detention centre. 
Ismat Afghani male in his late 20s. Failed asylum-seeker. In 
Sweden for two years with wife and children. Living in 
apartment in ‘hiding’. Has never been detained. 
Kader Afghani male in his early 20s. Failed asylum-seeker. In 
Sweden for two years alone. Living with friends in ‘hiding’. 
Has never been detained in Sweden but has in Greece. 
Mahdi Afghani male in his early 20s. Failed asylum-seeker. 
In Sweden for three years alone, arrived as a minor 
and could therefore attend school. Living with friends in 
‘hiding’. Not been detained. 
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Miranda Albanian female in her 20s. Failed asylum-seeker. In 
Sweden for two years with her husband and children. 
Living in own apartment in ‘hiding’. Not been detained.  
Mohammad Stateless male, Kuwaiti bidoon, in his late 20s. Failed 
asylum-seeker. In Sweden for two years with parents and 
siblings. Living with family. Has never been detained.
Nadir Afghani male in his 30s. Living in Afghanistan and 
assists migrants who have been deported from European 
countries, of which Sweden. Has himself been deported. 
Omar Stateless male, Palestinian, in his 30s. Failed asylum-seeker. 
In Sweden for three years alone. Living in Migration Agency 
housing. Not been detained and cannot be deported. 
Pal Albanian male in his 30s. Failed asylum-seeker. In Sweden 
for two years with wife and children. Living in own 
apartment in ‘hiding’. Not been detained.  
Rashid Afghani male in his 20s. Failed asylum-seeker. Was 
deported to EU country (Dublin Convention regulation) and 
then came back to Sweden. Is living without family with 
permanent residency. Has been detained. 
Salah North African male in his 30s. Failed asylum-seeker. In 
Sweden for 14 years; friends and family here. Living in 
detention centre. 
Salim Stateless male, Palestinian, in his late 40s. Failed asylum-
seeker. In Sweden for a little more than two years without 
his family. Living in Migration Agency housing. Not been 
detained and cannot be deported.
Storai Afghani female in her 20s. Failed asylum-seeker. In 
Sweden for two years with husband and children. Living in 
apartment in ‘hiding’. Not been detained. 
Tarek North African male in his 20s. Failed asylum-seeker. In 
Sweden for a little more than two years alone.  Living in 
detention centre. Has also been detained in remand centre 
and prison. 
Teka Ethiopian male in his 20s. Failed asylum-seeker. In Sweden 
for four years alone. Living in detention centre. 
Vlad Russian male in his early 20s. Failed asylum-seeker. In 
Sweden for two years alone. Living in detention centre. 
Has also been detained in remand centre.   
Wali Afghani male in his 20s. Failed asylum-seeker. In Sweden 
for three years with wife and child. Living in Migration 
Agency housing. Has been held several times in detention 
centres. 
Yousef Stateless male, bidoon from Kuwait, in his 30s. Failed 
asylum-seeker. In Sweden for two years with parents and 
siblings. Living with family. Not been detained.
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PREFACE 
The book that you are now holding in your hands (or reading online!) 
is not only based on the joint effort of the authors but also exists 
because of the hard work and support of many others, some of 
whom we would like to acknowledge here. This book is part of a 
project financed by the European Return Fund (ERF) and the Malmö 
Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare (MIM) at 
Malmö University, and we are grateful to both of our funders for their 
financial support. Within these organisations, we would especially 
like to thank Pieter Bevelander and Louise Tregert (MIM), and Hugo 
Rickberg (ERF).
Henrik Emilsson and Brigitte Suter were instrumental in the 
development of the initial project design and proposal, and we would 
like to thank them for their advice and help.
Throughout the project we have received backing from our Steering 
Group, which consisted of Pieter Bevelander, Peter Hallberg, Russell 
King, Erica Righard and Brigitte Suter. We thank them for their 
involvement and vital feedback on the text. 
Our reference group has provided us with invaluable insights into 
our research field, and we cannot stress enough how much they 
have meant for this study. Thanks go out to Niclas Axelsson, Ioana 
Bunescu, Anna Garphult, Håkan Nilsson, Connie Tran Hedberg, 
Lena Yohannes and Samarie Wijekoon Löfvendahl. 
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Thanks are also due to Jim Johannesson, who helped us with the law 
and policy chapter, and Angela Andersen for her assistance in drawing 
together the policy aspects. We are also extremely grateful to Jenny 
Money for her devoted work on the language of this publication. 
The field of forced return is not always easy for researchers to 
access and we would like to thank all those who have helped us to 
understand processes and contexts along the way. Migrants at risk 
of deportation are a heterogeneous and scattered group, and we are 
grateful to those who have helped us to establish contact with them, 
at times at great personal expense. 
Last, but most definitely not least, we would like to thank all our 
interviewees. We are sending you our heartfelt thanks for trusting us 
with your stories, and for sharing your time and feelings. Without 
your generosity and openness, this study would not exist. We hope 
that this book will provide a glimpse of the reality of your lives and 
help to create an understanding of and solidarity with your situation. 
Malmö, June 2015
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1. INTRODUCTION
Background and rationale
The return of irregular migrants to their country of origin is an integral 
part of the European Union’s strategy for managing international 
migration. As we write, in June 2015, the European Commissioner, 
Dimitris Avramopoulos, in reaction to the lack of agreement between 
Member States on a comprehensive European Agenda on Migration 
and to increasing irregular migrant flows through the southern 
borders, has just called on Member States to work more efficiently 
on their returns policy (Avramopoulos 2015). This demonstrates how 
the return of irregular migrants is increasingly being presented as part 
of the solution — not only of migrants remaining in Europe illegally, 
but also of the EU’s inability to deal with these flows of asylum-
seekers. Policies for the return to their origin countries of irregular 
migrants consist of both ‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’ returns. The former 
term makes reference to the return of migrants who have shown 
a willingness to cooperate with the state in their deportation. The 
spectrum of people taking this option can be quite wide: from those 
who are willing to return back to their country of origin or to a third 
country, to those who realise that, in the absence of alternatives, they 
have no choice but to accept the option. Forced return refers to the 
process of deportation by the state of those migrants who expressly 
refuse to go back to their country of origin or to a third country, and 
who actively work to avoid it.
The European Return Directive enacted in 2009 and transposed into 
Swedish law in 2012, makes two direct references to human rights. 
The first, Preamble (17) states that the detention of migrants should 
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be ‘humane and dignified’; the second, Article 8(4) puts an obligation 
on Member States to ensure that forced returns are conducted in 
accordance with fundamental human rights and in a dignified 
manner. It is clear that forced return, or deportation, from the EU, 
as a state-implemented action, must be conducted in accordance with 
human rights. However, deportation is an action which goes against 
the express will of the person being deported. As such, achieving a 
‘dignified deportation’ has its challenges. This book is an attempt 
to start the debate on what is understood by this term. What is a 
‘humane and dignified’ deportation? Is it an oxymoron in itself?
Deportation is accepted within law and policy as a legitimate activity 
of the state. It is an ‘inalienable function of the state; deriving from 
the state’s territorial sovereignty’ (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2013: 129). 
It is, today, an intrinsic part of migration management and control 
strategies. It is to this increasing tendency of states to attempt 
to control migration flows that Wong (2015: 3) refers when he 
describes our current ‘age of migration’ (Castles and Miller 2009) 
as one which is also ‘an unrelenting age of immigration control’. 
Border controls were further tightened in Europe and America 
following the horrors of 11 September 2001. These security-focused 
developments have been criticised as measures which compromise 
the human rights of non-citizens, and derive from the dichotomy 
between the state’s legitimate need to ensure national security, and its 
domestic and international obligations to protect human rights for all 
(Crépeau et al. 2007) – a dichotomy which hinges on an inherently 
asymmetrical power balance between migrants and states. Bosworth 
(2008: 210–11) further warns that the adoption of harsh rhetoric 
about foreigners in the UK undermines the agency and democratic 
freedom of British citizens. Finally, another development of the same 
theme are the ‘deterrence policies’ which are being pursued by states 
either in order to prevent large inflows of migrants, to influence 
the composition of immigrant flows or simply to get rid of those 
immigrants who are not considered to be desirable or lawful residents 
(Gammeltoft-Hansen 2014).  
In the troughs of these security-focused developments in the field of 
immigration, another field is found at the nexus between migrants, 
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the state and human rights. This is the institution of asylum, rendered 
global with the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, and remains 
a ray of hope for migrants in need of such protection. Although the 
right to seek asylum has been limited by making it difficult for migrants 
to gain passage into Western countries, international refugee law 
remains an enormous achievement for the protection of the human 
rights of needy migrants. It is now well-established that the asylum 
process is a complex system often fraught with tension and suspicion, 
and one which, more importantly, can never be foolproof. Migrants 
whose asylum application is refused often lose their right to stay in 
the country and are subject to deportation. It is therefore of critical 
importance to safeguard the international principle of ‘refoulement’, 
officially enshrined in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, which establishes the prohibition of the 
expulsion or return of an asylum-seeker or a refugee to a country 
where he or she is liable to be subjected to persecution. The situation 
is also problematic for stateless migrants, who do not enjoy the 
protection of any state, have no formal rights in any country and who, 
therefore, may be subject to perpetual experiences of deportation and 
detention (De Chickera and Fitzgerald 2010; ENS 2014). 
Looking at these issues from a sociological perspective, the asylum 
process produces groups of people who are subject to arrest, 
detention and deportation. Living in a state of deportability (De 
Genova 2002) – that is, living with the possibility, often protracted, 
of being deported – has a negative effect on migrants. In practice, 
deportation causes 
… the sociolegal production of deportable populations (that) are 
not limited to bilateral transactions between ‘host’ and ‘sending’ 
states but rather must be comprehended as an increasingly unified, 
effective global response to a world that is being actively remade 
by transnational human mobility (De Genova and Peutz 2010: 2). 
This state-sanctioned activity of forced return does not diminish the 
responsibility of the state to recognise the ‘inherent dignity’ and ‘equal 
and inalienable rights’ of all including people subject to deportation, 
as stated in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
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The inherent tension between effecting forced returns and treating 
the individuals involved with respect for their basic human rights 
makes the focus and mainstreaming of human rights in this field even 
more important. In 2005, the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe issued Twenty Guidelines on Forced Return (Council of 
Europe 2005). The Preamble recalls states’ obligation to secure for 
everyone within their jurisdiction the human rights enshrined in the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the right to freedom 
of movement. The Preamble adds that states have a right emanating 
from international law to control the entry and residence of foreigners 
on their territory and that, in exercising this right, Member States 
‘may find it necessary to forcibly return illegal residents within their 
territory’. It goes on to say, however, that there is concern about ‘the 
risk of violations of fundamental rights and freedoms which may 
arise in the context of forced return’ (Council of Europe 2005: 7). 
Although not legally binding, these are the most well-fledged human 
rights guidelines for states conducting returns.
Conversations of this sort – asking whether and how a dignified 
deportation can be conducted – need to be locally embedded. Sweden 
is a good case-study country to start with because, overall, it has 
a good asylum, migration and returns infrastructure which takes 
stock of the migrants’ basic needs. This follows from Sweden’s 
long-standing tradition of being a global leader on human rights. 
Indeed, the Swedish returns system has to be highly commended for 
giving the responsibility to a civil authority to manage the detentions 
and deportations (the Swedish Migration Agency), and for not 
outsourcing the running of detention centres and deportations to 
for-profit companies. Sweden endorses a decriminalisation policy in 
various areas of immigration. In addition, the Swedish system gives 
some financial assistance, albeit small, to irregular migrants. On the 
issue of returns, Sweden gives high priority to voluntary return and 
has managed to achieve a high percentage of voluntary returns (in 
2014, around 75 per cent of migrants were classified as voluntary 
returnees). This is higher than most other EU states. The Swedish state 
regulates this field through the Aliens Act and, in 2012, transposed 
the EU Returns Directive into its local laws. 
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The Swedish state is also committed to mainstreaming human rights 
into all its activities, as seen in the Swedish Constitution: the first 
and second chapters of the Instrument of Government  (Government 
Offices of Sweden 1974) deal with the protection of human rights. 
The first chapter establishes that public power should be exercised, 
with respect for the equal worth of all and for the freedom and 
dignity of the individual. Public authorities should safeguard, in 
particular, the right to work, to housing and to education and should 
promote social welfare, security and a good environment for people 
to live in. The second chapter covers regulations on basic rights and 
freedoms – such as, for example, positive and negative freedoms of 
opinion and physical integrity. It also includes regulations on those 
basic rights and freedoms in which restrictions may be permitted, 
on the form for decisions on such restrictions and on the general 
principles that must be observed when imposing such a restriction. 
This chapter is an example of how non-citizen foreigners have the 
same status as Swedish citizens in human rights matters, but may 
be subject to special legislation. Sweden has signed and ratified 
most of the documents involving human rights within the UN, the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Council of Europe. 
In 1995, the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was transposed into Swedish law. 
In the transposition of any European Union legislation in Sweden, 
human rights ought to be mainstreamed, as agreed by the signing 
by EU Member States of the European Charter on Fundamental 
Human Rights. Apart from national and local state authorities, 
there is an active civil society in Sweden consisting of both organised 
groups and established non-governmental organisations, as well as 
private individuals who contribute to the promotion and protection 
of human rights. Reports of the United Nations’ and the Council 
of Europe’s monitoring bodies’ highlight some shortcomings in 
the fields of immigration, asylum, detention and returns, to which 
Sweden normally responds in a timely fashion and attempts to rectify, 
demonstrating a willingness to comply with international human 
rights regulations. The European Union has drawn the attention of 
Sweden, together with that of several other states, to its failure to 
meet its obligation of enacting a forced-returns monitoring system. 
Internal criticism in Sweden has been rather sharp, pointing to the 
23
erosion of some standards and the harshening of others – such as 
re-entry bans – in compliance with the minimal standards expected 
by the EU Returns Directive. 
Any discussion of how ‘humane and dignified’ a process or a system 
is needs to start from the people who are experiencing it directly. 
The research presented in this volume looks almost exclusively at the 
migrants’ own experiences of the deportation process. Clear trends 
and patterns emerged from our analysis of the migrants’ subjective 
experiences. This book focuses on these patterns, rather than on the 
particular cases or experiences of the migrants involved in the project. 
Migrants at risk of deportation from Sweden are a heterogeneous 
group in many ways. Their countries of origin serve to differentiate 
the groups considerably. Furthermore, their motivation for coming 
to and wanting to stay in Sweden can also be very different. Their 
life trajectories vary immensely, and they are at different stages of 
their lives: some are young, others older; some are married, some 
have children, some are in Sweden together with their families or 
partners, others are separated. Many have followed several and 
varied international migration trajectories. For the vast majority of 
migrants at risk of deportation, the return decision comes after a 
long migratory path which, at times, had crossed several countries; 
significantly, the decision also comes at the end of an asylum process. 
Indeed, the vast majority of deportable migrants sought asylum in 
Sweden but their application was rejected.
Broadly speaking, the approach taken by this project was a human 
rights one. It was applied expansively and consistently to the rationale 
and motivation for the study, the theoretical framework used to guide 
the discussions was that of human rights and the methodology was 
a person-centred one which took into account the vulnerability of 
the informants whilst allowing them to bring up the issues which 
characterised their experience of the deportation system in Sweden. 
This project draws inspiration from various human rights movements 
and from the pleas of excluded/vulnerable persons that they be 
involved in the design, management and evaluation of services. Two 
key examples from human rights movements come immediately to 
mind: the disability rights movement and its empowering maxim of 
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‘nothing about us with us’ (Charlton 1998: 3), and the children’s 
rights movement which advocated for the children’s greater 
participation in matters that involved them. These movements have 
argued that it was counter-productive to enact activities and services 
intended for their ‘group’ without their involvement in the design, 
management and evaluation. Migrants who have been deported and 
those at risk of deportation are rarely given the opportunity to share 
their experiences. And yet the experience of deportation is impossible 
to conceptualise for the regular bystander, however well-meaning 
they may be. This project, by drawing out the patterns and trends 
from migrants’ subjective experiences of the deportation system, 
does not claim to fill this role – a role that can only be filled by the 
migrant him/herself – but goes some way towards bringing closer the 
experiences of migrants to policy-makers and practitioners. 
Characteristics of the deportation process/system in 
Sweden 
The emerging field of Deportation Studies is not only producing 
knowledge on the different countries’ deportation systems, thus 
providing avenues for comparative research, but is producing analyses 
of the macro-level structures which shape enforcement regimes, the 
human experience of deportation and the societal impacts of removal 
(Coutin 2015: 673). Having been born at the intersection between 
immigration and security studies in the early 2000s (Coutin 2015: 
671), it was inevitable that this knowledge and these analyses would 
also critically approach state actions and, as a result, expose gross 
structural human rights violations – violations which come about as 
a result of complex webs of laws, policies and structures. There are 
key characteristics that distinguish the Swedish deportation system 
from other deportation systems, even in the EU. This list broadly 
demonstrates a consistent policy approach based on a long-standing 
commitment to the mainstreaming of human rights.
The first characteristic is that Sweden has not outsourced the 
running of its detention centres or deportation to private for-profit 
companies. This is a route that several Western countries have taken, 
with disastrous results for migrants. As Gammeltoft-Hansen (2013) 
has argued, the privatisation of the migration control industry has 
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resulted in serious human rights violations, brought about by the 
market logic that drives private border guards. More critically, it 
is engendered by a fundamental accountability gap that arises in 
this field due to the difficulties that both human rights law and 
the institutional machinery have in accessing the ‘corporate veil’ 
(Gammeltoft-Hansen 2013: 136–45). This is very evident in the case 
of Jimmy Mubenga, who died in 2010, under restraint on a British 
Airways plane, while being deported to Angola from the United 
Kingdom. The deportation was outsourced to G4S, an Anglo-Danish 
private security firm contracted to escort deportees. In December 
2014, the jury court case ended, after four days of deliberations, with 
a majority verdict of nine to one of unlawful killing. As a result of 
this case the coroner, Karon Monaghan, wrote a 30-page ‘Rule 43 
Report’ (Monaghan 2013) – setting out recommendations to prevent 
future deaths – in which she raises serious concerns over how people 
are removed from the UK, many of which are related to this issue of 
privatisation. 
Sweden’s detention centres are run by the Swedish Migration Agency, 
an autonomous state agency that manages immigration and asylum 
issues, including the running of detention centres and the overall 
responsibility for returns (in the case of forced returns, they work 
together with the police). The civil managing of the detention centre 
as a small and low-security unit yields immediate benefits for the 
migrants. The Swedish Migration Agency does not operate the 
detention centres as a high-security unit and the staff are civilians. 
Detention centres are small, with the total capacity of the five centres 
in Sweden being between 200 and 250. To understand the benefits 
of this decision, it is enough to reproduce some of the comments in 
the last Council of Europe Committee Report on the Prevention of 
Torture (CPT) on the conditions in detention: 
• material conditions at the two centres visited were of a very 
high standard’;
• foreign nationals benefited from an open-door regime and 
enjoyed a considerable degree of freedom within the centres 
(they had keys to their rooms);
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• [the staff had] different cultural backgrounds and possessed 
a range of language skills (e.g. at the Märsta Centre, 37 
languages were reportedly spoken amongst the staff); and
• a staff member was employed to take charge of organized 
activities’ (CPT 2009, 43). 
Welfare benefits are wide-ranging and include migrants with different 
statuses, including asylum-seekers, migrants whose application 
was refused and who have therefore received a return decision and 
irregular migrants. Migrants who have been given a return decision 
and are therefore deportable have a right to state housing in the 
intervening period, and their children have the right to education. 
The financial benefits available change according to the status of the 
migrant, and decrease to the minimum level when a migrant is an 
irregular resident. Access to these services differs across municipalities. 
In particular, access to financial benefits for irregular migrants can 
be compromised if the migrant has absconded and wants to be avoid 
being apprehended, although some municipalities have come up with 
creative ways in which a migrant can access these benefits through a 
person or organisation of trust. These services and benefits go some 
way to helping migrants to meet their most basic needs.
 
Sweden’s returns policy prioritises voluntary return. The Swedish 
Migration Agency, which is responsible for the implementation of 
this policy, states that ‘Returning voluntarily means that you have 
chosen to return on your own initiative or that you at least accept 
the decision that you are not permitted to remain in Sweden and 
are prepared to comply with this and actively participate in making 
it possible for you to return’ (Swedish Migration Agency 2015f). 
Voluntary returnees could also benefit from one or more of the 
following, generally depending on the country to which they are 
being returned: financial assistance to cover the return journey, 
re-establishment funds, assistance-in-kind and connections with 
support organisations in the return country. In 2014, the percentage 
ratios of voluntary to forced returns were 74:26 (this figure from 
official correspondence with the SMA includes migrants returned 
back to their countries of origin or to third countries, and Dublin 
returnees). However, the ‘voluntary’ label is often criticised for failing 
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to correctly describe the nature of the return. In fact, voluntary return 
might entail elements of direct or indirect coercion, and migrants often 
choose this option in the absence of other viable ones. In practice, 
however, when migrants take this option, they avoid the hardship 
and risks that forced return – and the problems caused by becoming 
irregular – often entail in Sweden and on the return journey. 
A final characteristic worth mentioning is that Sweden has chosen 
and actively implements an overall decriminalisation policy. 
Although this is not an official stand-alone policy, it can be seen 
in the various decisions made in this field, some of which have just 
been presented. The decision to keep migrant detention centres as 
low-security units, to entrust the responsibility for their running to 
the Swedish Migration Agency and to prioritise voluntary return 
are three examples which contribute to decriminalisation. Another 
example is that, although the police are legally able to prosecute 
irregular migrants for not having a residence permit (for which they 
can be fined or sentenced by a law court), in the vast majority of 
cases they opt for the administrative measure of starting the return 
process. The migrant therefore avoids criminal proceedings and 
punitive measures. 
The characteristics of this system explain why Sweden is perceived 
to be one of the leading countries in mainstreaming human rights 
in this field. Indeed, the issues mentioned above show that, legally 
and politically, there are significant decisions according to which 
human rights policies have been mainstreamed. This is not a recent 
development, and is testimony to the humanitarian principles 
underpinning law and policy development in migration in Sweden 
over recent decades. 
Deportation and detention in Sweden – a very brief history
Deportation and detention have been regulated in Swedish law since 
1914 due to the introduction of the Deportation Act. The purpose 
of the law was to regulate deportation practices and to have more 
control over the foreigners in the country (Hammar 1964). The law 
also introduced regulations in the field of migrant detention, such 
as the obligation to define the grounds on which a person could 
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be detained. At this point, detainees were held in prison or in a 
remand centre and there were no regulations governing the amount 
of time a detainee could spend there. Further changes in the law 
in this area came with the introduction of the first Aliens Act in 
1927. This act required that, among other things, all migrants show 
their passports on entering the country and that migrants would 
need a residence permit if they wanted to stay longer than three 
months (Hammar 1964). The Aliens Act was amended in 1937 with 
provisions that increased the power of the state to decide on matters 
of detention (Ribbenvik 2009). The practice of detaining immigrants 
also increased during the Second World War with the establishment 
of closed internment camps (Berglund and Sennerteg 2009). 
The amendment of the Aliens Acts of 1945 and 1954 did introduce 
some changes in the law concerning detention. According to the act 
of 1945, a migrant could be detained in order to facilitate his or her 
deportation and the act of 1954 further specified the grounds on which 
a person could be detained. The law was changed again in 1976 and 
further restricted the reasons for detention. Under the newly amended 
law, it was only legal to detain a migrant if there were reasonable 
grounds to suspect (sannolika skäl) that the migrant would abscond 
or take part in criminal activities, or if his or her identity was not 
known. The laws in this area were further harmonised with the legal 
area of arrests and remand centres (Ribbenvik 2009). Since 1984, the 
issue of detaining minors under the age of 16 has been regulated and 
minors cannot be detained unless there are extraordinary reasons; in 
1997 the age limit was raised to 18 (Ribbenvik 2009). 
Further changes were made in 1989 following the adoption of the 
new Aliens Act, which effected deportations. From that point on, it 
was the predecessor of the Swedish Migration Agency – the Sveriges 
Invandrarverk (SI) – which took over some responsibility for decision-
making on expulsions and deportations that had been administered 
by the police authority. The Migration Agency was now the first 
port of call for all claims for asylum. Their new authority included 
decision-making in cases where it was obvious that there were no 
grounds for asylum, or where the individual had no right to reside 
in the country, and decisions on the deportation of persons who had 
been in Sweden for more than three months. In 1992, the Migration 
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Agency took over the responsibility of investigating asylum claims 
and this also meant that they were granted the authority to make 
decisions on some measures of control and coercion (Wikrén and 
Sandesjö 2010).  
There have also been changes in the organisation of deportation and 
detention; this follows a larger trend of moving responsibilities in 
this area from the police to the civil authority dealing with migration 
issues. Historically the Police Authority was responsible for forced 
removals and detainees were placed in police custodial units such as 
remand centres (Khosravi 2009). Since 1997, the Swedish Migration 
Agency been responsible for running detention centres and, since 
1999, has had the overall responsibility for returns, including forced 
return. In 2004, the responsibility for running detention centres was 
clarified in the law, which stated that, from then on, the Migration 
Agency would have overarching responsibility for the treatment and 
supervision of all migrants who are detained – even those migrants 
whose case is being dealt with by the police (Wikrén and Sandesjö 
2010). This means that, in Sweden, there is a civil authority that has 
the main responsibility for forced return, even though the police is 
still the executive authority in certain cases.  
A statistical snapshot of returns from Sweden and the EU
This section includes some statistical snapshots of return statistics 
from Sweden and the EU, with a clear focus on forced return. The 
aim is to give the reader a broad picture of what the general trends 
are regarding forced returns and detention. The statistics, mostly from 
the year 2014, are purely descriptive and thus we cannot say anything 
about longer trends in this area. Since migration flows can change 
quite rapidly from year to year, the picture given here may not be 
representative in a longer perspective. A thorough statistical analysis 
of this field, including comparisons between Sweden and other 
European countries and longer-term trends, would require much more 
elaboration and space, something which we are unable to do here. 
The reader should also bear in mind that return processes are 
complex; in many cases it may take years from the time that the 
return is decided upon by the authorities until the migrant is returned 
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to his or her country of origin. There are multifaceted relationships 
between inflows and outflows in the asylum system, situations in 
countries of origin, migration policy in the EU and Sweden etc. which 
all affect forced returns. Numbers that may seem odd can, in some 
cases, be explained by the fact that there are lacunae in the system. 
We have also chosen not to include Dublin cases (intra-EU return of 
migrants regulated by the Dublin Convention) or forced returns to 
countries outside Europe which are not a migrant country of origin. 
The reason for this is that the statistics to which we have access do 
not provide us with information on the nationality of the deported 
migrant, only about the country to which the migrant is deported. 
Returns and deportations in the EU statistics
A statistical snapshot of the return of third-country nationals without 
the right to stay in the EU should help to ground and understand 
the topic under discussion in this chapter. All statistics depend on 
accurate reporting. Eurostat notes that disparities in migration 
policies, as well as administrative, statistical and legal systems (legal 
acts, judicial procedure, and so on) contribute to differences among 
EU Member States. Any changes in these factors can influence the 
resulting statistics (Eurostat 2014). This should be borne in mind 
when reading the statistics.
In addition, as one can note even from the statistics given in the 
section below: Eurostat statistics and national statistics do not always 
match. Where possible national statistics from the Migration Agency 
were used in this report, but there are some instances where we used 
statistics from Eurostat. 
 
The European Commission’s (EC 2014a) report on the Return 
Directive highlights what are possibly the clearest revelations to arise 
out of the statistics – that there is a considerable gap between persons 
issued with a return decision and those who, as a consequence of this 
decision, have left the EU. There are several reasons given for this 
gap, including, in particular, the lack of cooperation from the non-EU 
country of origin or transit (problems in obtaining the necessary 
documentation from non-EU consular authorities, for example) and 
from the individual concerned (that is, the third-country national 
who conceals his/her identity or absconds). These same statistics also 
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reveal that the percentage of persons actually returned out of the 
total sum of those who have been given a return decision remained 
approximately the same between 2008 and 2012, then experienced 
a sudden increase in 2013.
Table 1.1. Return decisions in the EU and Sweden by year
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Return 
decisions 
made in 
the EU 594,600 540,080 491,310 483,650 430,230 470,080
Return 
decisions 
made in 
Sweden 17,820 20,205 17,600 19,905 14,695 14,280
Source: Authors’ compilation from Eurostat statistics:  
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ web/asylum-and-managed-migration/data/database.
Returns and deportations in Sweden
In recent years the number of persons seeking asylum in Sweden has 
increased significantly. According to the Swedish Migration Agency, 
there were about 29,600 asylum claims in 2011, a number which rose 
sharply to 81,300 by 2014. At the same time, the Migration Agency 
also reports that the number of returns, both voluntary and forced 
is decreasing. In 2012, about 11,700 migrants returned voluntarily; 
two years later, in 2014, the number had dropped to 7,600. Some 
3,100 individuals were returned by force in 2012 and 2,700 in 2014 
(Swedish Migration Agency 2015a). 
According to statistics that we received from the police2 on return 
cases in the year 2014, the total number of live cases on their files on 
31 December 2014 was 21,787. Of these, 13,807 had been handed 
over from the Swedish Migration Agency or the courts, or were police 
expulsions (polis avvisning) that occurred in 2014. Again, of these, 
833 were handed over from the courts and the Swedish Prison and 
Probation service. Around 11,500 cases were handed over from the 
Migration Agency. Police expulsions made at the sea border, the air 
border or within the country amounted to 973. The remaining 501 
cases are unaccounted for in the statistics that we were given.
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Deportation statistics are categorised as escorted, unescorted or 
individual journey deportations, where each ‘deportation’ can include 
more than one person (such as family or dependents). According 
to the statistics, there were 1,652 escorted deportations (DEPA, 
Accompanied Deportation) and 2,169 individuals were deported 
this way. The number of deportations without the Police Authority’s 
or the National Transport Unit’s escorts (DEPA, Unaccompanied 
Deportation) were 1,122 and the number of persons deported this 
way were 1,299. There were also 451 individual journeys (enskild 
resa) and 587 persons who in travelled this way. 
An increasing concern for the authorities in the area of forced return 
is that there is a growing group of migrants whose cases drag on in 
the system or who are either hard, or more or less impossible, to 
deport. These are labelled Category 3 cases in the REVA system.3 
This group contains cases where the identity of the migrant is not 
determined and thus requires investigation and those where the 
return decision involves countries to which it is hard, or very hard, to 
carry out the deportation. There were 8,579 such cases in the hands 
of the police on 1 July 2015, among whom we find 1,199 Somalis, 
646 Afghans, 479 Iraqis, 406 Iranians and 316 Ethiopians who 
cannot be deported due to their lack of cooperation. Further, there 
is a considerable group of 527 migrants who cannot be deported 
due to the fact that their citizenship is unknown  and a further 432 
stateless persons who cannot be deported for various reasons. During 
the period 1 January–1 July 2015, the police closed 5,033 Category 3 
cases and, out of these, 1,984 deportations were enforced and 2,528 
were barred. The remainder were closed either because the persons 
concerned were granted a residence permit or for other reasons 
(statistics by email from Fredrick Sundberg, 1 July 2015).
The number of migrants in the return process who have absconded 
and withdrawn their contact with the authorities has been fluctuating 
over the last three years but there have been no major changes. 
According to the Swedish Migration Agency, 6,949 individuals 
absconded in 2012, 7,803 in 2013 and 7,350 in 2014.4 
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Table 1.2. Forced returns to country of origin – the 20 biggest groups, 2014
Home country No. of individuals
Albania 192
Serbia 127
Afghanistan 99
Kosovo 89
Russia 77
Bosnia Herzegovina 69
Georgia 69
Kyrgizstan 58
Belarus 57
Macedonia 50
Iraq 47
Iran 46
Mongolia 43
Armenia 36
Vietnam 33
Azerbajdzjan 32
Romania 31
Lithuania 25
Morocco 23
Nigeria 23
Source: Swedish Migration Agency.
In Table 1.2, we show the top 20 citizenship groups who have been 
returned by force from Sweden to the country of origin. The biggest 
groups of forced returnees in this period are Albanians and Serbians, 
followed by Afghans, Kosovians and Russians. Looking at the table, 
we can also see that many of the countries of origin of those forced 
to return from Sweden are in different parts of Eastern Europe. 
Detention
According to statistics received from the Swedish Migration Agency, 
a total of 1,780 individuals were detained in 2009, with the numbers 
increasing gradually until 2013, when 3,438 individuals were detained 
(unfortunately we do not possess the statistics for 2014). However, 
the average of days spent in detention actually decreased – from 24 
days in 2009 to seven days in 2013. 
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Table 1.3. Persons detained in 2014 – 20 biggest citizen groups
Country of citizenship No. of individuals
Somalia 206
Albania 182
Afghanistan 167
Morocco 144
Georgia 131
Nigeria 124
Iraq 123
Serbia 123
Algeria 115
Syria 114
Stateless 109
Eritrea 106
Libya 105
Belarus 91
Kosovo 90
Russia 77
Unknown 76
Tunisia 70
Iran 67
Armenia 49
Source: Swedish Migration Agency.
In Table 1.3, we can see that the biggest nationality group in detention 
are Somalis, closely followed by Albanians. The third biggest national 
group are Afghans, who are then followed by Moroccans and 
Georgians. 
Public debate issues of deportation in Sweden
A number of deportation issues have been raised in Sweden in recent 
years, mainly about human rights, efficiency and how to handle 
those cases that fall somewhere in between. Although Sweden has 
a good reputation in some areas of asylum and refugee processes 
– for example when the country’s detention facilities are compared 
to those in other countries, a number of issues on the ‘humanity’ of 
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returns from Sweden has surfaced in the past two or three years. 
Here, activists and the media have played a major role in putting 
human rights on the agenda in relation to the deportation process. 
For example, the radio programme Kaliber, on Radio Sweden’s 
Channel P1, has scrutinised the deportation process from a number 
of angles such as health care in detention centres and what happens 
to migrants post-deportation; last but not least, in the autumn of 
2014 journalists from the radio station were able to confirm that the 
authorities had been sedating migrants on deportation against their 
will, something which is illegal in Sweden. Another issue that has 
been raised in the area of human rights is that the European Agency 
for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders of the Member States of the European Union – FRONTEX 
– has criticised Sweden for its lack of monitoring of forced returns, 
including not having any independent observers on board the flights 
(The Local 2014). 
The project REVA (Rättssäkert och Effektivt Verkställighetsarbete), 
funded through the European Return Fund, has been particularly 
condemned by NGOs, human rights organisations and prominent 
individuals in Sweden. REVA was an administrative project aimed 
at streamlining and making more efficient and legally secure Swedish 
processes of forced returns and improving the cooperation between 
the main actors in this area (the Swedish Migration Agency, the 
Swedish Police Authority and the NTU at the Swedish Prison and 
Probation Service). 
This unjust criticism was based on the popular belief that the aim of 
REVA was to identify and apprehend irregular migrants in Sweden 
and that its practices necessitated racial profiling, discrimination 
and surveillance. It created considerable unease not only amongst 
migrant populations but also amongst those who look different (the 
foreign-born, or members of the different minority groups). What, in 
fact, was being criticised was the long-standing responsibility of the 
police in the area of internal border controls to apprehend migrants 
remaining in Sweden in an irregular situation. The media played a 
big role in spreading this misconception to the public (Radio Sweden 
2015).  
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Another issue in the field of deportation that is getting a more 
attention from researchers and journalists is that Sweden now has a 
growing group of persons who cannot be deported and for whom the 
costs for forced return are still very high, even though the authorities 
are trying to make the cooperation more efficient. According to 
the daily newspaper Svenska Dagbladet (2013), the cost of foreign 
transport was almost 142 million SEK in 2008. The Swedish Prison 
and Probation Service reports, in its annual budget review (SPPS 
2015a: 47–8), that this cost has been decreasing – from 241,593 
SEK in 2013 to a stabilised 201,926 in 2014. These changes were 
explained by a more efficient use of personnel, with fewer policemen 
needed to accompany deportees on these forced-return trips, although 
a high level of security was still maintained.
Methodology
The choice of qualitative methods
The purpose of this project was to arrive at an in-depth understanding of 
how migrants experience the deportation process. The project sought 
to go beyond superficial reactions to the return decision or the 
system and, instead, to collect the migrants’ own interpretations of 
their situation and try to identify patterns and trends. The choice 
of qualitative and ethnographic methods was therefore important 
insomuch as a qualitative approach allows the production of ‘thick 
descriptions’. This is in contrast to a quantitative methodology, which 
generates facts and data, but does not allow the migrants’ voices to 
be heard. Secondary literature was used primarily in the mapping and 
construction of the field, and the setting out of the context. 
The main challenge encountered was the difficulty in finding migrants 
who were at risk of deportation. The group consists of marginalised 
individuals who often refuse to tell even their own friends that they 
may at any time be deported, either because they are in denial or 
because they are assessing their next move; therefore, apart from 
those held in detention centres pending deportation, they tend not 
to congregate or get together in any particular location. Those who 
live in Migration Agency accommodation are mixed in with other 
asylum-seekers and those with a different status, making it difficult 
for us to identify them. Those who are in hiding are even more 
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difficult to find – they are driven by a fear of being apprehended by 
the police and often live in temporary accommodation, both due to 
the nature of their situation and to avoid being caught. 
In addition, we were also looking for people who would be willing 
to speak to us, not about the details of their ‘case’ but about their 
experiences, feelings and emotions. There was often no time or place 
for the traditional trust-building that usually precedes these kinds of 
interview. Recommendations from trusted friends went a long way 
towards creating the appropriate environment for frank conversations. 
In the end, it was clear from the nature of the conversations that 
they trusted us and there was a sense of appreciation that we were 
listening to them.
The difficulties in accessing this ‘hard-to-reach’ group and in finding 
individuals willing to share their experiences with us meant that 
techniques such as snowball sampling – which takes advantage 
of the social networks of respondents – could not be used. In the 
absence of the social networks of migrants at risk of deportation, 
we relied on every contact we could establish, sometimes from our 
personal networks and sometimes from referrals by people in the 
field. There was no alternative to this kind of random sampling. 
However, the variation of approaches we used to make contact with 
our interviewees finally allowed us to gain access to a larger portion 
of the population and a wider variety of perspectives than if we had 
relied more heavily on ‘snowballing’ or on one access point.
In­depth interviews, participant observation and  
self­reflexivity
The primary mode of data collection was in-depth interviews, which 
were strictly open-ended. An interview guide was compiled to assist 
the interviewers, but no topics were intentionally introduced by them, 
for two reasons. First, the aim of the interview was to allow the 
migrant to bring up issues and topics that were important to him 
or her, and care was taken to avoid introducing any pre-conceived 
ideas. Secondly, we were very much aware that the migrants were in 
an extremely difficult and distressing situation and, in order to avoid 
any harm, we did not want to open or introduce issues ourselves. The 
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shorter interviews, of around an hour, were with the migrants whom 
we met in detention, but most interviews took longer – the longest 
was around five hours. Interviews sometimes involved more than one 
person, particularly when interpretation was needed. The interpreters 
were people in whom the migrant had confidence, such as brothers 
and husbands. The majority of the interviews were conducted in 
English or Swedish and all were transcribed.
Apart from the interviews with those held in detention, the recorded 
part of the interview was only a small segment of the contact we had 
with the migrants. Often there was an introduction and conversation 
before the interview, at the meeting itself, and after the recorded 
interview was over. This, together with the migrants’ experience 
in detention and transit centres, constituted the larger part of our 
participant observation. We were therefore able to observe how the 
migrants related to others, their physical composition and ease (or 
lack of it) in their surroundings and, for those whom we met in their 
homes, the conditions of their accommodation. Interviews held in 
detention centres were conducted in the visitors’ room. 
Self-reflexivity is a central tenet of ethnographic and qualitative 
work. This was important both for the individual researchers, and 
for them as a group. Understanding our positionality within the 
research, the impact the research was having on us as researchers 
and how this could influence our interpretation of the data, was 
extremely important. This field of forced returns is highly politicised 
and, in the course of the research, we were often pressured, primarily 
by activist organisations, but also other stakeholders, to state our 
views. When we refused to give our personal opinions, conflictual 
situations arose which, at times, were aimed at undermining our 
work. We, as researchers, often found the question ‘Whose side are 
you on?’ to be unfair and potentially detrimental to our research. 
Six months into the project, we also conducted a group exercise in 
self-reflexivity which was helpful in that it enabled us to process 
some of the hotter issues that had come up. We discussed how our 
role as researchers, our obligations, and the various power structures 
we were encountering could influence our research and results, and 
discussed strategies to avoid this happening.
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Due consideration was given to positionality within the research, which 
was carried out by three female researchers; most of the interviews 
were conducted by the two Swedish researchers. Being female and a 
similar age to the interviewees was to our advantage, as most of them, 
even the male interviewees, appeared to feel comfortable. When they 
were not – which was evidenced by tense body language and raised 
voices – this was more the result of the subject under discussion 
and the accompanying fear than of the presence of the researchers, 
or their gender, age or nationality. When interviews became very 
tense or sad, the interviewers used various techniques to make the 
migrants relax and feel at ease. They sometimes talked about their 
own children, or their family or experiences or, depending on the 
situation, sometimes made little jokes in order to defuse the tension. 
The nationality of the primary researchers – Swedish – might account 
for some of the comments about how nice Swedish people are, and 
for the pains taken by some of the interviewees to distinguish between 
the Swedish system – which was creating their negative situation – 
and the Swedish people, who were nice and friendly.
Context-building and networking
In order to have a contextual understanding of the deportation system, 
various meetings were arranged with key individuals working on 
different parts of the return process. These interviews yielded critical 
information about organisational procedures and processes, and about 
key terminology and its use by the different entities involved. This 
gave us a sense of the magnitude and complexity of the system, and 
of the close interdependence of its different parts. All this information 
allowed us to communicate better with the migrant interviewees and 
to understand more clearly what they were sharing with us. 
Over 50 meetings and communications were held, mostly with 
Swedish stakeholders, though some were international contacts, who 
were generally interviewed via Skype. The entities with whom we met 
up were the following: 
• Migration Agency: policy-makers and managers, and visits on 
site to three detention centres (Åstorp, Märsta and Kållered), 
where we spoke to managerial and other staff;
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• Police Authority: border police officers;
• lawyers working for asylum-seekers and detainees;
• NGOs: organisations specialised in supporting failed asylum-
seekers in Sweden (Asylgruppen, Tältaktion mot Deportation, 
Aktion mot Deportation). After some initial meetings, it was 
made clear that they did not want to participate or collaborate 
in any way with this project, primarily because the funder is 
the European Return Fund. In addition, they explained to us in 
detail why they felt, ethically, that they should not collaborate; 
• local branches of international NGOs: Swedish Red Cross; and
• leading academics in this field in Sweden.
This list also included meetings with people both outside Sweden 
who were able to give us knowledge about deportation from other 
countries, and in those countries to which migrants are returned. We 
held Skype meetings with representatives from NGOs involved in 
work with deported/deportable persons in deporting countries such 
as the UK, and in countries to which migrants are deported, such as 
Afghanistan.
Interviews and Interviewees
The interviews usually took place in the home of the interviewee 
although, occasionally, they were conducted in more public places 
such as libraries. We also visited the detention centre in Kållered, where 
we conducted seven interviews with detainees. Prior to our visit, the 
staff had given information about our study to the detainees during 
their weekly meeting, and those who were interested in participating 
signed up by letting the staff know. The staff also assisted with the 
organisation, by drawing up the schedule and bringing the detainees 
to the visiting room at the appropriate time. 
Two researchers conducted interviews with people residing in Sweden. 
Most of the interviews were conducted without an interpreter – 11 
in English, six in Swedish – though five were conducted with an 
interpreter – one in person and four by phone. In three other cases 
a spouse, sibling or friend functioned as interpreter – always a male 
interpreting for a female, as discussed earlier. Interviewers had a 
guide which consisted of key words, potential questions and themes 
to address (see Appendix 1), although the interviews were kept as 
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unstructured and open as possible. The interviews varied in length 
from one hour up to five hours, though most lasted for just one or 
two hours. Two of our respondents were interviewed on multiple 
occasions and contact was maintained with some of the interviewees 
by email, phone and social media.   
Migrants who are given a return decision and either leave voluntarily 
or are deported from Sweden can be categorised into different 
groups; the majority of those who left in 2014 were returned to 
Serbia, Albania, Syria, Kosovo and Iraq (Swedish Migration Agency 
2015a: 105). 
Our interviewees also constitute a diverse group. They share just 
one common denominator and that is that they have all, at some 
point in time, received notification that they should leave Sweden – 
something which they were adamant that they did not want to do. 
The categorisation of this group is discussed further in this chapter. 
The authorities’ categorisation was not of major importance when 
selecting our interviewees; instead the crucial aspect shared by all of 
our interviewees is that, from their point of view, they were risking 
(or had already experienced) deportation. Nevertheless the migrants’ 
point of view also merges with the authorities’ categorisation. Most 
of our interviewees have their cases with the Swedish Police Authority 
which, according to the Migration Agency’s terminology, classifies 
them as ‘forced returnees’.  
The scope of this study was to look at people either at risk of 
deportation or who have already been deported to countries 
outside the European Union. This area is regulated primarily by 
the European Return Directive. Forced return takes place to other 
EU Member States generally, but not exclusively, under the Dublin 
System. The Dublin System is regulated by the so-called Dublin II 
Convention, Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003. It includes all 
EU Member States plus Norway, Iceland and Switzerland and refers 
to the mechanism by which one state is determined as responsible 
for examining a migrant’s application for asylum. The objective 
of the system is to eliminate the phenomenon of so-called ‘asylum 
shopping’, where migrants move from one Member State to another, 
42
submitting their application for asylum in order to seek a positive 
decision or better conditions. The Dublin System is simultaneously 
designed to prevent a ‘refugee in orbit’ situation where, thanks to the 
application of the third-safe-country concept, no state deems itself 
responsible for examining the asylum application on merit. 
Rashid, one of our interviewees, had been deported to another EU 
country under the Dublin Regulation but had later returned to and 
received a residence permit in Sweden. Davood was, at the time of 
his interview, at risk of deportation to an EU country; however, he 
also feared deportation to a country outside the EU since a previous 
EU country had refused his asylum claim. These interviews yielded 
material which was surprisingly similar to that about people at risk 
of deportation to their country of origin, in particular in those aspects 
which have to do with their experience of an ‘in-limbo’ situation. 
Their narratives differed significantly in their explanation of why they 
feared that they would be returned back. However, migrants who had 
been interviewed in Sweden prior to the actual deportation often chose 
to speak at length about their experiences in Sweden and prior to their 
arrival. They spoke less about their fears of what might be awaiting 
them in their country of origin and, for this reason, the decision was 
taken to include these interviews in our empirical material.
Most of the interviewees (23 out of 26) were at risk of deportation 
at the time of their interview. Two were not; they had been deported 
from Sweden and then returned and had, at the time of our interview 
with them, gained permanent residency or Swedish citizenship. One 
was resident in his country of origin.
Ethical considerations
When researching vulnerable groups, there are considerable ethical 
considerations to be taken into account; these have been discussed 
thoroughly by the research group throughout the study, which 
received the approval of the Regional Ethical Review Board in 
Lund. The interviewers were careful not to ask questions that could 
raise potentially traumatic issues which the interviewee may not 
be emotionally able to deal with. Great efforts were made by the 
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Table 1.4. Interviewee characteristics
Characteristic    No.
Gender:
    Males
    Females
20
6
Age:
    20–30 years
    30–40 years
    40+ years
13 
9 
4
Country of origin: 
    Afghanistan
    Albania
    Algeria
    Bangladesh
    Ethiopia
    Iran
    Libya
    Pakistan
    Nigeria
    Russia
    Serbia
    Stateless Bidoons from Kuwait region
    Stateless persons of Palestinian ethnic origin
9 
3 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
2
Reason for deportation:
    Failed asylum-seeker
    Other
24
2
Living situation:
    Own housing
    Family or friends
    Migration Agency housing
    Detention centre
8 
6 
5
7
Experiences of detention or penal imprisonment  
(10 individuals*):
    Detention
    Remand centre
    Prison
10 
2 
1 
Note: *One individual can have experienced several types of incarceration.
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interviewers to be attentive and to listen carefully in order to steer the 
conversation towards issues which the interviewees felt comfortable 
speaking about. This strategy proved successful. The interview 
style chosen was also conducive to ensuring that the interview did 
not resemble any previous interviews with or interrogations by 
the authorities, something that was brought up as an important 
consideration by Hasselberg, in her (2012) study of migrants at risk 
of deportation.
It was important to ensure that the interviewees received adequate 
information about the study before deciding to participate, and 
this was usually conveyed to them both orally and in writing. The 
interviewees were also informed that they could change their mind 
about participating at any time, and that the information they 
had given would then be removed from the study – none of them 
withdrew. The researchers ensured that the interviewees realised 
what the aim of the study was and that it would not be able to 
help them in their precarious situation, at least not in any direct 
way. The benefits of our study were presented as creating knowledge 
of migrants’ experiences of the forced return process in order to 
potentially improve Swedish and European policies. Düvell et al. 
(2010: 228) claim that one of the most important ethical issues 
to consider is whether the potential social benefits of the research 
outweigh the potential social harm it may cause. We believe that our 
study provided great benefits as it allowed policy-makers and the 
general public to view issues of forced return from the perspective of 
migrants at risk of deportation. In addition we believe that no harm 
came to anyone from participating in this project – on the contrary, 
several interviewees voiced their gratitude to the researchers for being 
responsive and allowing them to share their story, which gave them 
a moment of relief. After agreeing to participate in the study, the 
interviewees signed an informal approval form which was, in most 
cases, provided in their native language. 
Another aspect of great importance was to ensure the interviewees’ 
anonymity. The names and other identifiable data have, from the 
beginning, been kept coded and in a safe. During the final stages of 
the writing process, the interviewee codes were replaced with names 
from the region that the interviewees originated from in order to 
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give the quotes a more personal feel. The list of migrant interviewees 
provided with the final text has been thoroughly examined to ensure 
that their anonymity has been preserved, and that all data have been 
removed which could potentially identify the individuals. 
Most of our interviews were conducted without an interpreter, which 
we felt was preferable since it allowed for a closer connection between 
the researcher and the interviewee – and therefore better interviews. 
Mackenzie et al. (2007: 304) also state that using interpreters can be 
‘ethically problematic’ as it makes the mutual understanding between 
the researcher and the informant more difficult to establish. However, 
this preference has restricted our study mainly to those individuals 
who speak Swedish or English, which might be seen as a limitation. 
Another is that most of our interviewees were male and, in most of 
the female interviews, a male spouse or relative was present in order 
to interpret. Both the smaller number of female interviewees and, in 
particular, the male interpreter or spouse’s presence placed severe 
limits on the extent to which our interviews yielded any gendered 
experiences. 
Limitations of the study and structure of the research 
process
There are several limitations to our study. The first of these, as 
mentioned above, is that the gender aspect is largely missing, due 
to the low number of women interviewed. The gender dimension, 
too, did not come out very strongly in most of the interviews carried 
out with women because, in most cases, the women brought their 
husbands, brothers or male friends as interpreters. Only in one of the 
interviews was there no male present. There were also no children or 
elderly persons interviewed and our material thus largely reflects the 
experiences only of young adults in their 20s and 30s. 
Another limitation of the study was that the vast majority of 
interviewees did not have any experience beyond the deportation 
process in Sweden. They therefore had never made the return trip to 
the country of origin, or experienced the reception facilities and any 
forms of re-establishment and/or re-emigration. Therefore our study 
is largely limited to the time spent in Sweden and the first steps of 
the return process. 
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The interviewees, on the whole, remained silent about their strategies 
for establishment in the country of origin. We interpreted this as a 
denial of the eventuality of return and thus, for ethical reasons, as 
explained in the relevant section, we did not introduce this topic 
ourselves. Many also stated that they did not talk about their situation 
in the home country or the events that had happened as they were on 
the run as refugees. 
The migrants we spoke to were perhaps, then, those who ‘had 
something to say’, or who were particularly desperate – the findings 
may therefore reflect this. Those individuals who engaged in open 
protest of some sort were also easier to find than those who were 
resisting the return decision in a less public way. 
There are also geographical limitations to the study. The majority 
of the returnees we interviewed were based in Scania and we were 
only able to interview detainees at one detention centre, Kållered. 
However, at this point it is almost impossible to say whether, and in 
what way, this might have affected the representation of migrants’ 
experiences of forced return. There can, for example, be differences in 
how the different detention centres are run, and the management and 
organisational culture within them, that affects the detainees situation 
in detention, but this is not something that we can comment on. 
It is also important to note that this is not a case study and that 
the authorities’ views on the different events that happened to the 
migrants in the return process are not presented. This means that we 
only present one side of the story. Firstly, the aim of the study was 
to explore the migrants’ perceptions and experiences of the forced 
return process and not to recount how the different authorities 
perceived the process. Secondly, due to security and confidentiality 
issues, it was not possible to obtain the authorities’ views on these 
events, and any documents connected to the case, if there was no 
written consent. Given the sensitive setting of the interviews and the 
need for us to gain the trust of our participants we, as researchers, 
did not feel comfortable asking for this. 
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Another limitation is that, given the vulnerable position of the 
migrants, the information that they were able to share with us 
may have been limited at times. They may have been afraid that 
information they disclosed about them and their case might be 
misused by us, even though we took pains to explain that the 
interviews were confidential and anonymous. The researchers strived 
to balance their representation of the interviewees’ experiences 
by keeping in continuous contact with the migrants and asking 
follow-up questions. Research in the field, reports, and interviews 
and meetings with different stakeholders were also carried out in 
order to triangulate our analysis.  
The various tasks in the structure of the research process were as 
follows:
I.  data collection through interviews;
II.  brief analysis of statistical data, meetings and policy reports;
III.  observation of detention and asylum/transit centres;
IV.   self-reflection on our field notes, on our role as researchers 
and on the various attitudes we encountered from gatekee-
pers etc;
V.  ‘codification’ of the interviews;
VI.  identification of the themes arising from the interviews;
VII.  categorisation of the themes; and
VIII. interpretation of the data.
The terminology and language of deportation
As described in the previous section on methodology, we have been 
mapping the research field. The extreme politicisation and sensitivity 
of the issues of deportation become clear in the following section, 
where we discuss the terms used by the different authorities and 
actors.
Return
The term ‘return’ is problematic since it implies that a migrant has 
come from one country and will now be ‘returned’ to that country, 
often referred to in the return context as the ‘home country’. However, 
the migrant’s situation is often very much more complicated. The 
migrants have often lived in or travelled through multiple countries 
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before arriving in Sweden rather than just from country A to country 
B, which may mean that they have not been in their ‘home country’ 
for many years. This situation, in addition to the often highly 
problematic situation that they have left behind, makes the concepts 
of ‘return’ and of ‘home country’ highly problematic, which is why 
we will not be using them. Instead of ‘home country’, we use ‘country 
of origin’ and, in the section ‘Our position’, we discuss how, in most 
cases, we use ‘deportation’ rather than ‘return’. 
‘Voluntary return’ or ‘repatriation’ are perhaps even more problematic 
terms. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) views 
voluntary repatriation as one aspect of its ‘durable solutions’ strategy 
which requires the full cooperation of the migrant’s country of origin. 
Returnees are invited to be ‘part of the solution’ in post-conflict 
rebuilding situations. Voluntary repatriation is based on the principle 
of voluntariness in relation to the conditions in both the country 
of origin and the country of asylum (UNHCR 1996: section 2.3). 
This would suggest that the individual should be able to make a free 
choice, in other words ‘The choice to leave must be genuine and not 
induced’ (Webber 2011: 103–4).
Webber (2011) argues that none of the voluntary return programmes 
in Europe meet the UNHCR’s criteria since the individuals in 
question are denied the means to support themselves in the country 
of asylum. The choice of return cannot be considered voluntary 
when the alternative is destitution. Blitz et al. (2005) argue that the 
context in which the voluntary return programmes are taking place 
compromises their voluntariness. The context referred to is one where 
states are using returns to appease their domestic population or 
show that their involvement in military intervention in, for example, 
Afghanistan or Iraq has created enough stability there for refugees 
to be able to return. 
In the UK, the government uses tools such as taking away migrants’ 
legal rights and welfare support to make asylum-seekers accept 
voluntary repatriation (Webber 2011: 104–5). However, Webber also 
highlights one example in the UK context of a ‘true’ voluntary return 
programme – one where refugees are able to return and spend up to 
a year in their country of origin without running the risk of losing 
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their residence permit in the UK. According to Blitz and his colleagues 
(2005), people who have a secure immigration status are those who 
are the most interested in return. Sweden also uses means such as the 
erosion of legal rights and financial support to coerce migrants into 
accepting voluntary return.
Nevertheless, the Swedish authorities use the term ‘return’ 
(återvändande) and the following section contextualises this. The 
Migration Agency divides the ‘return process’ into ‘forced’ and 
‘voluntary’ returns and clearly states that it does not deal with 
‘forced’ returns. If a person absconds or force is needed to return the 
person, the Migration Agency categorises them as ‘forced’ and their 
case is handed over to the police. The Migration Agency uses another 
term for the cases that they themselves handle – ‘uncompelled return’ 
(självmant återvändande). This is felt to be a broader term than 
‘voluntary return’ and refers to those cases where the migrant can 
be deported without force by the Migration Agency. This category 
includes migrants who are in detention. Using the Migration Agency’s 
logic, this means that persons who are detained can still be categorised 
as ‘voluntary’, a classification which differs from categories in other 
countries and in the Return Directive, where individuals who are 
detained are not considered to be ‘voluntary’. 
Although the Migration Agency wants to separate its work from that 
of the Police Authority, it is in charge of the detention centres where 
people are detained on both its own orders and those of the police. 
These latter, however, categorise the cases they receive from the 
Migration Agency as forced returns (tvångsärenden). They also divide 
the types of deportation they conduct into ‘escorted deportations’ 
(DEPA), ‘Unescorted Deportations’ (DEPU, Unaccompanied 
Deportations) and ‘individual travel’ (enskild resa). Chapter 3, on 
return statistics, provides more details of these deportations.
Finally, to complicate matters even further, ‘return’ in EU circles is often 
used to refer to intra-EU returnees under the Dublin System, whereas 
‘removal’ is used to refer to the return of third-country nationals (or 
TCNs) to their countries of origin outside the EU. This terminology 
is not found in the European Return Directive, where ‘return’ is used 
to refer to the return of TCNs to countries outside the EU.
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The different use of terms by the various authorities makes it more 
difficult for an outsider to get a clear picture of the deportation 
process. Some NGOs (such as the Swedish Red Cross) have chosen 
to adopt the terminology used by the Migration Agency – such as 
‘return’ – to diminish the confusion whereas others (e.g. Asylgruppen) 
believe that the terminology used by the Migration Agency is watered 
down and does not depict clearly enough the gravity of the activity, 
which is why they prefer a term like deportation. 
Detention 
The Swedish Migration Agency is responsible for all the migrant 
detention centres in Sweden. It is interesting to note that, in Swedish, 
the term for a migrant detention centre is förvar. Etymologically, this 
is an interesting word choice since its usage in everyday language 
is ‘placement in a secure environment for the object’s own safety’.5 
As illustrated in the definition, it is a term more commonly used 
for items, not people. In a legal context, förvar can refer to the 
detainment (omhändertagande) of intoxicated people. In our case 
förvar refers to the detainment of foreigners based on the Aliens Act 
(Chapter 10 § 1–9).
A förvar is technically an administrative detention unit as opposed 
to penal detention units such as prisons. It is, however, interesting 
to note the different perceptions of a förvar (detention centre) and 
a penal prison. For migrants, a förvar is essentially a prison. They 
do not distinguish between the two. They feel that they are being 
‘punished’ for not having a residence permit by being kept in a 
detention centre and eventually deported to their country of origin. 
Policy-makers and staff members of detention centres, on the other 
hand, understand that there is a clear and tangible difference. For 
example, security levels are much lower and staff members wear 
civilian clothes. Migrants’ failure to distinguish between a detention 
centre and a penal facility is perhaps not surprising, however. Both 
share the fundamental restriction to basic freedom, as discussed 
further in Chapter 6, where the issue of criminalisation is analysed 
in more detail.
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The detainees are being held (frihetsberövade) but have not received 
a sentence; instead the Police Authority, the Migration Agency or 
the Migration Courts have made a decision to detain them. This 
restriction of freedom is an administrative action not a criminal 
one. The distinction between a prison and a detention centre, and 
the different interpretations of what these two actually constitute 
is crucial for this study. From our observations the discrepancies 
between how the detention centre staff and the detainees view the 
space is particularly interesting.
Choices in terminology
The International Organization for Migration defines deportation as 
‘the act of a state, in the exercise of its sovereignty, in removing an 
alien from its territory to a certain place after refusal of admission or 
termination of permission to remain’ (IOM 2004: 18). In addition, 
it defines forced return as the compulsory return of an individual 
to the country of origin, transit or third country, on the basis of an 
administrative or judicial act (IOM 2004: 18). Generally, depending 
on the focus of the discussion, deportation and forced return are 
also referred to by the different actors as removal, expulsion or 
refoulement. This book mostly uses deportation and forced return 
interchangeably.
The terms deportation and forced return are used because they 
denote the relationship of the migrants with the state, the possible 
use of force, the migrants’ unwillingness to cooperate and the gravity 
of the situation. These terms frame the activity of forced return or 
deportation on the spectrum between non-movement and movement, 
as the antithesis of being allowed to settle, to remain. It is different 
from the forced–voluntary dichotomy in the ‘returns’ paradigm, 
which is fraught with problems deriving from the questioning of 
the ‘voluntary’ nature of voluntary returns. The term deportation 
also somewhat distances itself from EU law and the policy-framing 
of deportations within the irregular migration regime or broader 
Schengen and EU borders (Ripoll Servent 2013: 47). 
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Deportation is therefore the activity in which persons are removed 
against their will. They have made it very clear to the authorities 
that they do not agree to being sent back, will not collaborate in 
organising their return and are ready to resist in any way possible. 
The deportation process is conceptualised by this study as starting 
from the moment when the individual receives their return decision 
and decides to resist it; the process ends with the reception phase/
facilities in the country of origin. Deportation from Sweden is often 
another phase in the longer migratory process, since most forced 
returnees originally applied for asylum in Sweden. 
The migrants whose perspectives we are presenting in this study 
are referred to as a group in a variety of terms. We will be using 
the terms ‘irregular’, ‘deportable’ and ‘undocumented migrants’ in 
order to make the text consistent and not confuse the reader about 
which group we are talking of. However, in the empirical material 
presented in Chapters 4–6 the terms ‘paperless’ and ‘in black’ will 
be found; these terms have not been altered since they are part of 
our quoted material and are used by the interviewees to characterise 
their situation. 
‘Irregular’ and ‘undocumented’ are the preferred terms rather than 
‘illegal’. The latter has extremely pejorative connotations and is often 
used not in a strict legal sense but to label and criminalise a whole 
group of people. Holgersson points out that, up until 2010, the term 
‘illegal immigrants’ was not used in the Swedish Parliament, although 
this changed with the entry of the right-wing populist party, the 
Sweden Democrats, who used the term frequently in their parlimentary 
addresses (Holgersson 2011: 127). Holgersson also discusses the 
term papperslösa (undocumented), which emerged during the 1990s 
through a movement where persons risking deportation wanted to 
undermine the category ‘illegal’ and be seen as ‘de-facto citizens’ 
(2011: 130). The term undocumented does not bear a negative label 
and refers to any situation in which an individual, generally an 
asylum-seeker or an immigrant, finds themselves when they do not 
have a valid entry or residence permit. Irregular is used in the same 
way as undocumented, but tends to convey the even broader message 
that a person might have the right permits for one aspect of his or her 
life and not for another. These conflicting situations in which some 
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migrants find themselves, at times through no fault of their own, can 
have serious repercussions. In this book, both ‘undocumented’ and 
‘irregular’ are used interchangeably.
Persons who are undocumented and at risk of deportation belong to 
an extremely heterogeneous group whose only common denominator 
is their risk of deportation. For example, their living situations differ 
widely (see Chapter 5). Some of the migrants are living underground, 
‘in hiding’, which the Migration Agency and the police call 
‘absconding’. The term ‘living in hiding’ is not unproblematic since 
it risks erasing important aspects of these people’s lives, and creates 
an understanding of them as separate from the rest of the population 
and passive (Holgersson 2011: 112). The level of activity among those 
we interviewed was quite varied, some being very restricted by their 
circumstances whereas others participated in several social activities 
and were not greatly restricted by their hiding from the Swedish 
authorities. We have avoided creating or reproducing labels as far as 
possible, but this descriptive label (‘in hiding’) is pertinent, particularly 
when discussing migrants’ psychosocial wellbeing in Chapter 5.
Outline of the book
The heart and soul of this book are Chapters 4 to 6, which analyse and 
discuss the empirical qualitative material of the migrants’ experiences 
of forced return. The extensive use of the migrants’ voices in their 
quotations brings the reader closer to the participants. In order to 
understand these chapters, however, it is important to have enough 
information about the context: forced migrant returns in Sweden and 
the EU. This book is therefore designed to provide the necessary legal, 
policy and institutional context of forced return from Sweden – an 
arduous task but one which is necessary if the reader is to grasp 
the complexity of the system and the various actors involved. The 
book ends with a brief concluding chapter which draws together the 
empirical findings and systemic conclusions.
Chapter 2 starts by laying out the European and national legal 
context: the European Return Directive and the Swedish Aliens Act. 
The former had a direct impact on the latter, which was amended 
in order to enable Sweden to transpose the Return Directive into 
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its national legislation. The European Return Directive, together 
with the Swedish Aliens Act therefore provide the legal and political 
framework necessary to understanding forced return in Sweden. 
The European Return Directive was criticised by a number of 
organisations for failing to mainstream human rights principles 
and therefore not providing adequate standards of protection for 
individuals being returned. This criticism serves as an analysis of 
the Directive from a human rights perspective and goes some way to 
conveying the policy direction taken by the EU, which has a direct 
impact on Sweden. Chapter 3 complements the legal chapter by 
providing a brief description of the various institutions involved in 
this ‘returns project’ at both European and national levels.
The original empirical material presented in this book is split into 
three separate chapters which deal with the issues involved from 
different perspectives. Chapter 4 discusses migrants’ interactions and 
preoccupations with the various aspects of the system. Migrants feel 
that the system is ambiguous and imbued with arbitrariness. This 
lends itself to feelings of injustice, helplessness and sometimes anger, 
feelings which are difficult to address, particularly when the system 
has select discretionary spaces. These spaces of discretion can be 
complicated due to the securitisation of the forced return field, as 
well as the fact that the authorities approach this process from a very 
different angle. The latter are under pressure to implement return 
decisions and to increase their efficiency. Migrants who are in a state 
of deportability find different ways of resisting the system. The most 
common, amongst migrants who refuse to be returned, is that of 
absconding which, in turn, creates other problems for the migrants 
and puts even greater strain on their relationship with the authorities. 
Chapter 5 demonstrates how the ‘state of deportability’ is an ‘in 
limbo’ situation which has negative repercussions on migrants’ 
psychosocial wellbeing. Migrants felt a sense of helplessness and a 
lack of control over their situation and their future. This exacerbates 
the distress caused by the decision to be sent back which, in the case 
of forced migrants, creates an ironic situation whereby migrants, in 
spite of the danger and difficulties of living ‘in limbo’, often prefer to 
extend the situation in various ways in order to avoid being sent back. 
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This chapter also highlights the plight of the so-called ‘undeportable 
deportables’ – those, such as the stateless, who have been given a 
return decision but who remain in Sweden because the state is not in 
a position to execute that decision. Their situation, which we term 
‘super limbo’, becomes particularly acute and distressing.
In Chapter 6, we move on to discuss an issue that creates immense 
distress for all migrants at risk of deportation – criminalisation. 
Migrants at risk of deportation from Sweden clearly conveyed that 
they felt they were unjustly treated like criminals.  As a result, they 
perceive detention as punishment, even though technically, in law and 
policy, this is envisaged as an administrative measure. As expected, 
the culmination of criminalisation often happens when migrants 
are detained and therefore when they are at their lowest ebb. This 
chapter discusses the issues brought up by the migrants in light of 
the global tendency to criminalise migrants, including those at risk 
of deportation.
Finally, Chapter 7 draws together the conclusions from the preceding 
chapters, thus giving a unique insight into how migrants in Sweden 
experience the first part of the forced return process, prior to the 
actual journey and return. It also reflects on the findings from a 
human rights perspective, which may serve to inform or guide 
decisions made in this field by the various state authorities involved.
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2.  THE REGULATION OF RETURNS 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS:  
THE EUROPEAN RETURN 
DIRECTIVE AND THE ALIENS ACT
Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of the legal and policy 
framework governing the return of third-country nationals in the EU. 
This will serve to locate the Swedish experience within the European 
one. The chapter starts with an empirical snapshot of the return 
of TCNs in the EU. Returns are not new to EU Member States; 
however, since the Return Directive came into force, some areas of 
returns have been harmonised, allowing for the production of better 
statistical data. This is then followed by a detailed presentation of 
the EU Return Directive which is implemented across the majority 
of EU Member States – including Sweden, where it was transposed 
into national legislation in 2012. 
The Returns Directive was criticised for not mainstreaming or 
protecting already-agreed-to human rights principles and standards. 
This critique is particularly pertinent for our research. By highlighting 
those aspects where the Directive fails to protect the core human 
rights principles of TCNs who have received a notification of return, 
this chapter provides an indication of the balance between the state’s 
legitimate right to impose return and human rights principles. With 
the transposition of the Directive, some of the human rights standards 
safeguarded in Sweden’s Aliens Act were lowered or limited. This 
inevitably prompted adverse reactions to the amendments and to the 
Directive by internal human rights organisations.
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EU policy and legislation 
The EU policy trajectory on immigration and asylum
EU policy development on immigration and asylum has been 
consistently addressed in the last quarter of a century, demonstrating 
an intense awareness by EU Member States of the need to reach 
agreement and common paths towards its better management. This 
commitment is the most clearly seen in the repeated and developing 
plans to address these issues in the various multi-year programmes of 
the Council of the European Union. These multi-year action plans and 
agreements provide the background to the development of European 
law and serve, albeit in part, to explain the legal developments, some 
of which also led to the enactment of the European Return Directive.
The communitarisation of migration and asylum policies was determined 
by the Amsterdam Treaty which has been in force since 1999. In 
2004, the Hague Programme attempted to provide a new framework 
for the management of migration. The EU has been seeking a more 
comprehensive approach to dealing with migration, including the return 
of migrants who do not have legal grounds to stay in the EU. In the 
Hague Programme, the Council of the European Union (2004) expressly 
called for the ‘establishment of an effective removal and repatriation 
policy based on common standards for persons to be returned in a 
humane manner and with full respect for their human rights and dignity’. 
The urgent need to establish minimum standards for  return procedures 
can be seen in the following paragraph, which specifies that the Council 
should start discussions in ‘early 2005’ and, in a later section, that a 
European Return Fund should be established by 2007: 
The European Council considers it essential that the Council 
begins discussions in early 2005 on minimum standards for 
return procedures including minimum standards to support 
effective national removal efforts. The proposal should also take 
into account special concerns with regard to safeguarding public 
order and security. A coherent approach between return policy 
and all other aspects of the external relations of the Community 
with third countries is necessary as is special emphasis on the 
problem of nationals of such third countries who are not in the 
possession of passports or other identity documents (Council of 
the European Union 2004: 14).
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Another development in 2005 was the Global Approach to Migration 
and Mobility (GAMM), which was an attempt to establish a 
comprehensive external migration policy based on common political 
principles and solidarity. The GAMM is the overarching framework 
of EU external migration and asylum policy. Using a rights-based 
approach, the GAMM aims to enhance the mobility of third-country 
(non-EU) nationals across the EU’s external borders. The framework 
defines how the EU conducts its policy dialogues and cooperation 
with non-EU countries, based on clearly defined priorities and 
embedded in the EU’s overall external action, including development 
cooperation (EC 2011a).
The 2008 European Pact on Immigration and Asylum was also 
adopted by Member States and contains a set of political objectives 
and strategic guidelines for the development of European immigration 
and asylum policies (Council of the European Union 2008: 4). It 
involves commitment to act in the following five key areas, which 
are further elaborated in the European Pact:
1.  to organise legal immigration, taking into account the priorities, 
needs and capabilities determined by each Member State, and to 
encourage integration;
2.  to control illegal immigration by ensuring the return of illegal 
immigrants to their country of origin or a country of transit;
3.  to make border controls more effective;
4. to construct a Europe of asylum; and
5.  to create a comprehensive partnership with countries of origin and 
transit to encourage synergy between migration and development.
The Hague Programme was followed by the Stockholm Programme, 
which ran between 2010 and 2014 (European Council 2010). 
The entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009 
introduced several changes to EU law and policy-making which had 
repercussions on the implementation of the Stockholm Programme. 
A particularly important change, which had an impact on the 
content of the Return Directive, was that the joint decision-making 
process initially introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, and made more 
effective by the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty, became the main legislative 
procedure of the EU.
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The European Return Directive agreed by EU Member States in 2008 
entered into force at the end of 2010. It governs a broad range of 
issues, in particular an obligation to return irregular migrants, their 
treatment during expulsion proceedings, re-entry bans, procedural 
rights and the grounds and conditions for detention (EC 2013). 
The European Return Directive was accompanied by the Decision of 
the European Parliament and of the Council to establish the European 
Return Fund in 2007 – Decision No. 575/2007/EC of 23 May 2007 
(EP/CEU 2007). The European Return Fund started operating in 
2008 with a total budget of 676 million euros for the five-year 
period between 2008 and 2013. All EU Member States contribute 
to this fund except for Denmark.6 The fund seeks to improve return 
management as well as to encourage the development of cooperation 
between EU countries and countries of return (EC 2004). Each EU 
state implements the fund through annual national programmes on 
the basis of multi-annual programming. In 2011 the Commission, 
even though it was under no obligation to do so,7 issued a report 
on the calculations made for the budget years 2007–11 (EC 2011b).
In March 2014, as part of the obligations listed in Part IV of the 
Directive, the European Commission published a Communication 
on EU Return Policy. This report presents the changes to EU 
return policy, analyses of its impact and presents ideas for future 
developments (EC 2014b). It is an important tool for analysing 
the impact of the Returns Directive (Peers 2014). The Commission 
states that, in order to face the challenge of irregular migration, a 
holistic approach is needed which would include actions such as 
an efficient border management and the strengthening of the fight 
against smuggling and the trafficking of human beings. The return of 
those third-country nationals who have no legal grounds for staying 
in the EU and no need to be granted protection is deemed essential 
to the credibility of EU legal migration and asylum policies. Return 
policy is closely related to readmission policy, both of which form 
part of the external asylum and migration policy, the GAMM. This 
‘external’ dimension of return policy is key to the implementation 
of voluntary return, the reintegration of returnees in countries of 
origin and the identification and documentation of returnees. More 
specifically, five main areas for action were identified and listed in the 
Commission’s Press Release (EC 2014b: 2) accompanying the report.
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• Ensuring a proper and effective implementation of the existing 
rules/the Return Directive: The Commission will continue to 
address all shortcomings identified in the Communication 
with the Member States. It will pay particular attention to the 
implementation by Member States of the provisions of the 
Directive which relate to the detention of returnees, safeguards 
and legal remedies, as well as the treatment of minors and 
other vulnerable persons in return procedures. It will make use 
of the Schengen evaluation mechanism to assess compliance 
with the rules in the field of return and enhanced forced return 
monitoring.
• Promoting more consistent and fundamental rights-compatible 
practices: The Commission will adopt a ‘Return Handbook’ 
containing common guidelines and best practices. It will 
support the efforts made by the Council of Europe towards 
codifying detailed detention standards.
• Developing further dialogue and cooperation with non-EU 
countries: Return and readmission issues will continue to be 
consistently addressed, in a balanced way, in cooperation 
dialogues with non-EU countries, such as the Global Approach 
to Migration and Mobility, and Mobility Partnerships. Efforts 
to build capacity in non-EU countries will be strengthened, e.g. 
to improve their ability to provide assistance and reintegration 
support to returnees.
• Improving operational cooperation between Member States 
on return: The Commission will use the European Migration 
Network as a cooperation platform, especially for gathering 
and sharing information in the field of voluntary return.
• Enhancing the role of FRONTEX in the field of 
return: FRONTEX’ coordination role in the field of joint 
return operations should be further increased, ensuring that 
common standards related to humane and dignified treatment 
of returnees are met. Trainings should be organised on return 
issues.
A series of European Courts of Justice (ECJ) rulings have clarified 
a number of key aspects of the Directive (e.g. detention), with a 
significant impact on Member States’ implementation of the Directive 
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itself. A detailed assessment of the impact of the Return Directive on 
Member States’ return policies and practices and an overview of the 
ECJ jurisprudence is given in Part IV of the 2014 Communication 
(EC 2014a).
The European Return Directive
Officially called the Directive ‘on common standards and procedures 
in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country 
nationals’, the European Return Directive, as it is more popularly 
known, was passed on the 16 December 2008 (Council of the 
European Union 2008b). The aim of this Return Directive is stated 
in Article 1:
This Directive sets out common standards and procedures to be 
applied in Member States for returning illegally staying third-
country nationals, in accordance with fundamental rights as 
general principles of Community law as well as international law, 
including refugee protection and human rights obligations.
The preamble to the Directive lays down some fundamental principles 
which underpin the legislation as a whole. These should be taken into 
account to fully understand the provisions set out in this Directive. 
ECRE (2009: 3) highlights the following points.
• Paragraph (6) asserts that ‘decisions taken under this Directive 
should be adopted on a case-by-case basis and based on 
objective criteria implying that consideration should go beyond 
the mere fact of an illegal stay’. 
• Paragraph (8) of the Preamble asserts that it is legitimate for 
Member States to return irregularly staying third-country 
nationals, ‘provided that fair and efficient asylum systems are 
in place which fully respect the principle of non-refoulement’. 
• Paragraph (16) provides that detention is justified only ‘if the 
application of less coercive measures would not be sufficient’, 
while Paragraph (17) emphasises that persons in detention 
‘should be treated in a humane and dignified manner with 
respect for their fundamental rights’.  
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• Paragraph (22) provides that the best interest of the child 
and respect for family life should be a primary consideration 
of Member States when applying the Directive, whereas 
Paragraph (23) asserts that its implementation should be 
‘without prejudice to the obligations resulting from the Geneva 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees’. 
• Respect for the rights included in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union is reaffirmed in Paragraph (24). 
• Paragraph (19) provides that ‘the exchange and promotion of 
best practices should accompany the implementation of this 
Directive and provide European added value’.
The Directive is split into five chapters. The first starts by outlining 
the scope and key definitions of the Directive. As stated in Article 2, 
the Directive applies to third-country nationals staying illegally on 
the territory of a Member State. Member States can choose not to 
apply this Directive to TCNs who are refused entry or are subject to 
return due to criminal sanctions, or as a result of a criminal offence. 
In Article 3(3) of Return Directive, return is defined as:
• the process of a third-country national going back — whether 
in voluntary compliance with an obligation to return, or 
enforced — to:
• his or her country of origin, or
• a country of transit in accordance with Community or 
bilateral readmission agreements or other arrangements, 
or 
• another third country, to which the third-country national 
concerned voluntarily decides to return and in which he or 
she will be accepted.
Definitions are the key to better understanding legislation and the 
policy approach underpinning it. The 2008 Directive, in Article 3 
and apart from the definition of return mentioned above, lists a few 
other definitions: 
• ‘third-country national’ means any person who is not a citizen 
of the Union; 
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• ‘illegal stay’ means the presence on the territory of a Member 
State of a third-country national who does not fulfil, or no 
longer fulfils the conditions of entry; 
• the ‘return decision’ means an administrative or judicial 
decision or act, stating or declaring the stay of a third-country 
national to be illegal and imposing or stating an obligation to 
return;
• ‘removal’ means the enforcement of the obligation to return, 
namely the physical transportation out of the Member State; 
• ‘re-entry ban’ means an administrative or judicial decision or act 
prohibiting entry into and stay on the territory of the Member 
States for a specified period, accompanying a return decision;
• ‘risk of absconding’ means the existence of reasons in an 
individual case which are based on objective criteria defined by 
law to believe that a third-country national who is the subject 
of return procedures may abscond; 
• ‘voluntary departure’ means compliance with the obligation to 
return within the time-limit fixed for that purpose in the return 
decision; and
• ‘vulnerable persons’ means minors, unaccompanied 
minors, disabled people, elderly people, pregnant women, 
single parents with minor children and persons who have 
been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of 
psychological, physical or sexual violence.
The Directive requires that Member States take due account of the 
best interests of the child, family life, and state of health of the third-
country national concerned. All Member States should respect the 
principle of non-refoulement.
The second chapter of the 2008 Directive, in its various articles, deals 
with the minimum standards and procedures required during the 
process of termination of an illegal stay. This includes the conditions 
under which a return decision is issued (Art. 6), the provision of an 
appropriate period for voluntary departure (7), the enforcement of 
the return decision by the removal of the third-country national (8), 
reasons for the postponement of the removal (9) and the return and 
removal of unaccompanied minors (10), and establishes a minimum 
re-entry ban into Member States (11).
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The Directive lays down standards for addressing the cases of third-
country nationals who refuse to comply with the return decision and 
are therefore at risk, or subject to, forced return. These fall under 
Article 8, which deals with the enforcement of the return decision 
(termed ‘removals’). The Directive is clear that Member States 
shall take ‘all necessary measures to enforce the return decision’ if 
the obligation to return has not been complied with in the period 
granted by law. Member States may adopt a separate administrative 
or judicial decision or act ordering the removal. 
In the case where a TCN resists removal, Article 8(4) states that 
Member States ‘as a last resort’ may take ‘coercive measures’ to effect 
the removal as long as such measures ‘shall be proportionate and 
shall not exceed reasonable force’. These measures should comply 
with ‘fundamental rights’ and be implemented ‘with due respect for 
dignity and physical integrity’.
 
Where Member States use — as a last resort — coercive measures 
to carry out the removal of a third-country national who resists 
removal, they shall be implemented as provided for in national 
legislation in accordance with fundamental rights and with due 
respect for the dignity and physical integrity of the third-country 
national concerned.
Removals by air should take into account the Common Guidelines 
on security provisions for joint removals by air annexed to Decision 
2004/573/EC. This Decision lays down the rules for the organisation 
of return flights for third-country nationals who are the subject of 
removal orders. It concerns, in particular, the specific tasks of the 
authorities designated by the organising Member States as well as 
common tasks (European Council 2004a). The Common Guidelines 
deal with security provisions, the health of the persons to be deported, 
the code of conduct for escorts and the use of coercive measures. 
Security provisions for joint removals by air concern five phases: the 
pre-return phase, the pre-departure phase in departure or stopover 
airports, the in-flight procedure, the transit phase and the arrival 
phase (European Council 2004a: Annex). Finally, the Directive 
(2008a: Art. 8.6) puts an obligation on Member States who ‘shall 
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provide for an effective forced-return monitoring system’. We provide 
more detail on this topic in the last section of this chapter.
The Directive states that removal shall be postponed if it violates the 
principle of non-refoulement, and for as long as suspensory effect 
is granted in accordance with Article 13(2). Removal may also be 
postponed for an appropriate period taking into account the specific 
circumstances of the individual case. Consideration needs to be given 
to (a) the third-country national’s physical state or mental capacity, 
and (b) technical reasons, such as a lack of transport capacity, or the 
failure of the removal due to a lack of identification.
The third chapter of the Directive (Article 12) deals with the following 
procedural safeguards: the form communicating the decision, remedies 
made available to the third-country national, and safeguards pending 
return. There are details with regards to the communication of the 
decision in writing and the amount of information given, which can 
be limited in cases where the return decision is based on a threat 
to national security. It is also specified that generalised information 
sheets explaining the main elements of the standard form should be 
made available in different languages. 
Article 13 describes the remedies that are afforded to third-country 
nationals to appeal against or seek a review of decisions related to 
return.
The following principles shall be taken into account as safeguards 
for third-country nationals pending return:
(a) family unity with family members present in their territory 
is maintained;
(b) emergency health care and essential treatment of illness 
are provided;
(c) minors are granted access to the basic education system 
subject to the length of their stay; 
(d) special needs of vulnerable persons are taken into account 
(Art. 14).
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The fourth chapter deals with detention for the purpose of removal. 
Article 15.1 sets out the scope for detention:
1.  Unless other sufficient but less coercive measures can be applied 
effectively in a specific case, Member States may only keep in 
detention a third-country national who is the subject of return 
procedures in order to prepare the return and/or carry out the 
removal process, in particular when:
(a) there is a risk of the returnee absconding or
(b) the third-country national concerned avoids or hampers 
the preparation of return or the removal process.
In addition, Article 15 adds that ‘Any detention shall be for as 
short a period as possible and only maintained as long as removal 
arrangements are in progress and executed with due diligence’.
Detention must be ordered in writing by the administrative or judicial 
authorities, with reasons being given in fact and in law. In the case 
where detention is ordered by the administrative authorities, the 
Directive (Art. 15.2) puts the following obligations on Member States 
to either:
(a)  provide for a speedy judicial review of the lawfulness of 
detention to be decided on as speedily as possible from the 
beginning of detention; or
(b)  grant the third-country national concerned the right to 
take proceedings by means of which the lawfulness of 
detention shall be subject to a speedy judicial review to be 
decided on as speedily as possible after the launch of the 
relevant proceedings. In such a case Member States shall 
immediately inform the third-country national concerned 
about the possibility of taking such proceedings. The third-
country national concerned shall be released immediately 
if the detention is not lawful.
Article 15(3) states that detention shall be reviewed at reasonable 
intervals of time either on application by the third-country national 
concerned or ex officio and, in the case of prolonged detention 
periods, reviews shall be subject to the supervision of a judicial 
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authority. Detention ceases to be justified if a reasonable prospect 
of removal no longer exists and, in this case, the person concerned 
shall be released immediately (Art. 15.4). The third-country national 
shall not be detailed for more than 18 months (Arts 15.5 and 15.6). 
The fifth chapter outlines provisions relating to the reporting of the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
implementation of this Directive and other proposals, and deadlines 
on the expected transpositions of this Directive into national laws. 
Indeed Member States were required to ensure that their domestic 
legislation complied with the Directive by 24 December 2010, 
except for legislation concerning Article 13(4) on legal assistance 
and representation, which had to be in place by 24 December 2011.
The Directive currently applies to all EU Member States except 
the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark. It also covers Iceland, 
Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein within the meaning of the 
agreements concluded between the European Union and these latter 
countries as regards their association with the Schengen acquis. 
The European Return Directive: a critique from human rights 
advocates
The European Return Directive has faced serious human rights 
criticism from various migrant and human rights organisations, and 
experts in the field, who hold the ‘perception that it took an unduly 
harsh approach on these issues’ (Peers 2014). This chapter looks at 
some of the main issues of contention which impinge on the human 
rights of third-country nationals who are the subjects of this Directive. 
Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to delve into the 
details of the critique by NGOs and experts, or to legally analyse the 
Directive (for a longer analysis, see Baldaccini 2009; Olmos Giupponi 
2009). It is, however, important to understand the general climate in 
which the Directive was drafted and negotiated, particularly because 
there had been ample dialogue on and awareness of both ‘why’ 
human rights considerations were important in this area of operation 
and ‘how’, in practice, they could be included in the Directive.
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The Return Directive constituted the first major piece of legislation 
in the field of immigration and asylum to be decided under the 
co-decision procedure in which the European Parliament legislates on 
equal footing with the European Council.  There was hope that the 
European Council’s predominantly state-centred approach would be 
counter-balanced by the European Parliament. This is, indeed, what 
happened: the European Parliament managed to introduce some 
measures into the Directive (Peers 2008), but these were not enough 
to satisfy NGOs and experts, who had laid out the minimum criteria 
for the protection of the basic human rights of third-country nationals 
who were the subject of this Directive. Professor Liza Schuster, in her 
2008 article, rather forcefully sums up the disappointment which 
characterised the critique:
The Directive is shameful because it so clearly strips away some 
of the protections afforded migrants in some member states, 
encouraging them to adopt the worst practices across the Union. 
Why? Why couldn’t the EU raise, rather than lower the standards 
and conditions of detention and deportation?
 
Professor Steve Peers, an expert on EU law, comments on Statewatch 
in April 2008, during the negotiations between the European 
Parliament and the Council that:
 
The EP and the Council have to decide whether their endlessly-
repeated support for the principles of fairness, human rights and 
human dignity is a genuine commitment, or simply empty rhetoric.
Leading non-governmental organisations, recognising that this 
Directive could throw a dark shadow over the whole migration and 
asylum field, had been not only monitoring the process but also vividly 
involved in the discussions.  The European Council on Refugees and 
Exiles (ECRE)8 adds that it was ‘profoundly disappointed’ that its 
recommendations and those put forward by other NGOs and the 
UNHCR were not taken into account either by the Council or the 
European Parliament (ECRE 2009). Amnesty International (2008) 
had also issued a press release:
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We believe that the text approved on Wednesday 18 June by the 
European Parliament does not guarantee the return of irregular 
migrants in safety and dignity. On the contrary, an excessive 
period of detention of up to one and a half years, as well as an 
EU-wide re-entry ban for those forcibly returned, risks lowering 
existing standards in the Member States and sets an extremely bad 
example to other regions in the world.
… 
At the same time, the text lacks sufficient guarantees for 
unaccompanied minors and contains weak provisions with regard 
to judicial oversight of administrative detention. Finally, it allows 
specific derogations on detention conditions in those Member 
States confronted with so-called emergency situations. 
… 
The added value of this EU-directive is therefore hard to see. At 
the same time, it risks promoting prolonged detention practices 
in EU Member States and impacting negatively on access to the 
territory.
… 
Amnesty International urges Member States currently applying 
higher standards not to use this directive as a pretext to lowering 
them.
The perception was that the message that this Directive sent out was 
harmful. By choosing to start the harmonisation of laws in the area 
of migration and asylum with the Return Directive, and by failing to 
mainstream long-acknowledged human rights principles, the EU both 
reinforced the exclusionary and radical philosophy popularly called 
‘Fortress Europe’ and repudiated the human rights philosophy. This 
concern is articulated by ECRE, which urged ‘Member States to abide 
by their commitment to refrain from using the Directive as a pretext 
to justify the adoption of harsher return measures’ (ECRE 2009). 
The Return Directive was lambasted not for taking a state-centric 
approach, but because it failed to balance this state-centric approach 
with adequate protection of the human rights of the third-country 
nationals involved. 
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Finally, an indication of the magnitude of concern from a human 
rights perspective can be gleaned from the strong criticism that came 
from quarters that do not generally engage with the merits of EU 
legislation. In 2008, right after the text of the Directive had been 
agreed upon, a press release from the United Nations announced that 
ten independent experts from the UN Human Rights Council had 
voiced their concerns over shortcomings in the Directive’s fundamental 
rights safeguards. In the letter, the human rights experts reminded 
EU governments that ‘irregular immigrants are not criminals’ and 
that, as a rule, they should not be subjected to detention at all. 
Member States are encouraged to look into alternatives to detention 
and detention must be for the shortest time possible. In addition, 
the experts encouraged Member States to strengthen the procedures 
for challenging the legality of detention by establishing time limits 
for judicial review, to allow appeals of decisions related to return, 
including re-entry bans. And that removal should be suspended in 
all these circumstances. Their final point was concern about the 
effect which the re-entry bans could potentially have on vulnerable 
groups (UN 2008). The following section will go through in more 
detail some of the main principles that have failed the ‘human rights’ 
mainstreaming test.
The European Return Directive: where it fails to protect the 
human rights of migrants
The Directive, in Paragraph 24 of its Preamble, stresses compliance 
with the principles laid out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU. Although this Charter includes many human rights standards 
which are accepted internationally, it is not, unfortunately, binding 
in EU law. As such it does not carry the force of law.
The Directive offers some guarantees by way of restraining some 
of the more repressive practices found across the EU. Indeed, it 
reiterates throughout certain well-known obligations of Member 
States, namely: 
a)  the prohibition on refoulement and collective deportations; 
b)  to take account of the ‘best interest of the child’, of ‘family life’ 
and the state of mental and physical health of the person to be 
returned.
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Pertinent international human rights obligations that Member States 
have signed up to, as set out in ECRE (2009) are:
a) The principle of non-refoulement: Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. In addition, the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights has expanded the scope of protection against 
deportation by interpreting Article 3 of the 1950 European 
Convention of Human Rights as prohibiting expulsion where 
there is a risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, or 
of execution.
b) The right to liberty and security: Article 7 of the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 3 of 
the 1984 Convention against Torture, Article 5 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights. 
c) The prohibition of collective expulsions: Article 4 of Protocol 
No. 4 ECHR 
d) The best interest of the child: Article 3 of the 1989 United Nation 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) provides that 
the best interest of the child should be a primary consideration 
in all actions concerning children.
Substantive safeguards against expulsion 
Overall, the Directive is considered to be too weak with regards to 
substantive safeguards against expulsion and detention.  One of the 
first points made by ECRE (2009) is that the Directive stipulates a 
period of return, ranging from seven to 30 days, a period which is 
far too short to be at all effective. 
In the case of expulsion, many human rights under the European 
Convention on Human Rights are ‘non-derogable’. These rights are 
so fundamental that Goodwin-Gill and Newland (2003) state that 
they may not be derogated, not even in exceptional circumstances 
and regardless of any situation of emergency. Olmos Giupponi (2009: 
11), drawing on a United Nations (UN 2008) document on the rights 
of non-citizens and Goodwin-Gill and Newland’s (2003) chapter, lists 
the following core, fundamental human rights which must, in any 
case, be respected:
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• The right to life;
• The right to liberty and security of the person;
• The prohibition of torture, or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment;
• The prohibition of genocide;
• The prohibition of slavery;
• The prohibition of racial discrimination;
• The right not to be convicted or punished under retroactive 
laws;
• The right to private life and family;
• The freedom of conscience, thought and religion; and
• The right of access to a due process of law.
Detention, up to 18 months
The Directive permits the detention of migrants, for the purposes of 
return, for up to 18 months. There is a period between the adoption 
of the removal order and its enforcement when the third-country 
national may be detained if it is deemed that he or she may abscond 
or represents a threat to public order.
In international human rights law, in order for detention to be 
considered non-arbitrary there are a number of requirements which 
should be fulfilled. Amnesty International (2007: 3), in a detailed 
research guide on the issue of the detention of migrants, asylum-
seekers and refugees, states that international human rights law:
a) contains a presumption against the detention of migrants; 
b) places clear restraints on the usage of detention;
c) requires that where detention does take place, the conditions 
are humane;
d) expects adherence to the principles of non-discrimination and 
proportionality, and therefore respect for the human rights of 
detainees; and
e) expects there to be special attention given to standards relating 
to particular groups of concern, including children and other 
vulnerable groups. 
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The Directive has been criticised for not meeting these core human 
rights standards, since detention is allowed as both a judicial and 
an administrative measure. This judicial or administrative detention 
can be extended up to a period of 18 months. Olmos Giupponi 
(2009: 12) argues that the Directive thus opens up the possibility 
of the deprivation of freedom of migrants, even while their asylum 
applications and residence permits are under examination.
  
The re-entry ban – mandatory and potentially up to five years or 
more
According to the Directive, there is an obligation on Member States to 
impose a re-entry ban into European territory. These general re-entry 
bans can be as long as five years when applied following return 
decisions, and longer if the third-country national represents a threat 
to national security (ECRE 2009). Baldaccini (2009) aptly describes 
re-entry bans as ‘very blunt instruments’. They are attractive from a 
public-policy point of view because they are seen as effective tools of 
deterrence against irregular stay; however, arguably the opposite can 
happen. Irregular migrant numbers are pushed up by migrants who 
go underground to extend their stay in the EU country for as long as 
they are able to remain undetected, and those who are deported will 
probably increase the number of illegal entrants. 
Re-entry bans can lead to unacceptable situations, such as the 
prohibiting for those who have made a life in an EU country to return 
back to the host country and resolve their legal situation. Secondly, 
removal and a re-entry ban are akin to a double punishment for 
the same offence. Third, this kind of re-entry ban does not take 
into consideration what would happen should there be a change 
in the conditions in the country of origin, and the person needs to 
seek asylum. Although the Directive’s provisions on re-entry bans 
are without prejudice to the right to international protection in EU 
Member States, re-entry bans will make it difficult for any person 
persecuted following removal to seek asylum.
Finally, Member States retain considerable discretion in the decision 
regarding whether to ban or not, and for how long. Third-country 
nationals tagged with a re-entry ban are listed as ‘unwanted aliens’ 
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on the Schengen Information System, the database that enables 
Member States to exchange information on persons who are to be 
refused entry. Baldaccini reports that, prior to the passing of this 
Directive, there were already inconsistencies and problems created 
by the divergence between national approaches to listing ‘unwanted 
aliens’ – the decision to enforce mandatory re-entry bans will simply 
compound this problem (Baldaccini 2009; Olmos Giupponi 2009). 
Minors and vulnerable groups
The Directive opens up the possibility of detaining TCNs, including 
families, unaccompanied children and other vulnerable persons. 
Detention can be for up to 18 months, for reasons beyond the 
migrants’ control (ECRE 2009).
The Aliens Act
The Aliens Act (Utlänningslagen) is the main law covering non-
Swedish citizens’ rights to enter, stay, work and/or seek asylum in the 
country. It also covers the circumstances under which a non-Swedish 
citizen can be refused entry (avvisad) or be expelled (utvisad), 
together with the most important procedural regulations governing 
the administration of migrants by the authorities and courts. The 
term ‘alien’ (utlänning) is not defined in the Act but refers to citizens 
of other states and to stateless persons. As only Swedish citizens, 
according to internationally recognised judicial principles, have the 
unconditional right to be in Sweden, the purpose of the Act is to 
protect aliens from arbitrary treatment. The Act also gives extensive 
rights to enter, stay and work in Sweden to large groups of aliens, 
most notably to citizens in the Nordic countries and in the EU and 
European Economic Area (EEA) states, and to refugees and other 
persons in need of protection who are seeking asylum (Wikrén and 
Sandesjö 2014).
Since 2006, several changes have been made in the law to enable 
the implementation of EU directives on freedom of movement for 
union citizens, on labour migration from EU members and third 
countries, and on asylum-seekers. Directives regarding asylum-
seekers are numerous and regulate minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of persons either as refugees or as in need of 
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subsidiary protection (alternativt skyddsbehövande), the content of 
the protection granted, the procedures for granting and withdrawing 
protection, the right for families to reunite, and the procedures for 
returning illegally resident third-country nationals. In addition to 
these directives, the Dublin Regulation prescribing that the country 
where an asylum-seeker’s first application is made must examine 
the application is legally binding and directed to in the Aliens Act. 
Sweden is, in addition to the standards of the EU directives, granting 
residence permits to a broader group of foreigners otherwise in need 
of protection (övriga skyddsbehövande), and also allowing foreigners 
to stay in Sweden on the grounds of exceptionally distressing 
circumstances (synnerligen ömmande omständigheter) (Wikrén and 
Sandesjö 2014).
Documents and permits
Early in the Aliens Act it is made clear that ‘An alien entering or 
staying in Sweden must have a passport’ (Chapter 2, Section 1) and ‘a 
visa unless he or she has a residence permit or has long-term resident 
status’, where a visa is a permit to enter and stay in Sweden when 
the length of stay is a minimum of three months and not longer 
than one year (Ch. 3). A residence permit is a permit to enter and 
stay in Sweden either for an unlimited length of time (permanent 
residence permit) or a pre-determined amount of time – a temporary 
residence permit (Ch. 2.4). Furthermore, with the exception of those 
who have permanent residence permits (Ch. 6.1), foreigners wishing 
to work in Sweden are required to have a work permit (Ch. 2.7). This 
section describes each of these types of document according to the 
Aliens Act, including the larger exemptions from these requirements. 
Additionally, the provisions on detention, refusal of entry, and 
expulsions are also described.
Visas and residence permits
Residence permits should normally be applied for and granted before 
entering Sweden; however, this rule does not apply to foreigners 
seeking protection (Ch. 5.18). When requested by a police officer, 
foreigners staying in Sweden have to present passports or documents 
showing their right to remain in Sweden. Aliens must also visit and 
provide information about their stay in Sweden when summoned by 
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the Migration Agency or the Police Authority. The Police Authority 
may round up foreigners who have not responded to the summons, 
and those who would not obey if a summons were sent. These kinds 
of control may be carried out ‘if there is good reason to assume that 
the alien lacks the right to remain in this country or there is otherwise 
special cause for controls’ (Ch. 9.9).
Within the Aliens Act, the term ‘asylum’ is defined as ‘a residence 
permit granted to an alien because he or she is a refugee’ (Ch.1.3). 
Refugees and persons otherwise in need of protection who are in 
Sweden are entitled to a residence permit which should be permanent 
or lasting for at least three years, unless concerns for public order and 
security or national security justify that the residence permit last for 
a shorter period or not be granted (Ch. 5.1). 
Residence permits may be granted on the grounds of ties to Sweden. 
This makes it possible for members of a nuclear family to reunite with 
family members who are residing in Sweden or have been granted a 
residence permit (Ch. 5.3, 3a). If the relationship is exclusively for 
the purpose of obtaining a residence permit and, in certain cases, if 
the applicant cannot be supported by the relative in Sweden (Ch. 
5.3b, 3c, 3d, 17, 17a, 17b), these may be grounds for not granting 
a residence permit. If it cannot be clarified in other ways, and if 
the persons to be tested are informed of the purpose of the analysis 
and have given written consent (Ch. 13.15), then DNA analysis may 
be carried out during an investigation in cases concerning residence 
permits on the basis of family ties in order to clarify whether or not 
such a biological relationship exists.
Foreigners, in particular children, may be allowed stay in Sweden, 
even if a residence permit cannot be granted on other grounds, if 
there are exceptionally distressing circumstances related to serious 
health issue, adaptation in Sweden or the situation abroad (Ch. 5.6). 
Temporary residence permits can be granted in a wide range of 
situations in addition to those mentioned above. Examples may be 
when the foreigner’s expected way of life makes it doubtful that he or 
she would be granted a residence permit (Ch. 5.7), when the foreigner 
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wishes to work, study, visit or do business (Ch. 5.10), when there 
are temporary hindrances to the enforcement of a refusal-of-entry or 
expulsion order (Ch. 5.11), when a paternity investigation is needed 
(Ch. 5.13), or when the ‘alien’ is involved in a criminal investigation 
or court proceedings (Ch. 5.15).
Work permits
If the employment lasts for more than three months, a residence 
permit is also required (Ch. 5.10). A work permit may be granted to 
an foreigner who has been offered employment if the employment 
allows the foreigner to support him- or herself and if the salary and 
other terms of employment are ‘no worse than the terms that follow 
from Swedish collective agreements or practice within the profession 
or sector’ (Ch. 6.2). If a foreigner works without a work permit, his 
or her temporary residence permit may be cancelled (Ch. 7.3).
Exemptions from documents and permits
The Aliens Act makes several notable exceptions to the requirements 
for entering, staying and working in Sweden. Nationals of the Nordic 
countries are not affected by the requirements of passport, visa, 
residence permit and work permit.9 Nationals of non-Nordic EU 
Member States and EEA countries do not need a passport for entry 
but only when staying, and have a ‘right of residence’ which exempts 
them from the demands of having a visa, residence permit or work 
permit (Ch. 2.8, 8a, 8b, 8c; Ch. 3a.1, 3). The EU Blue Card is an 
alternative to work and residence permits which can be granted to 
third-country nationals who have been offered a high-skilled, high-
salary employment for at least one year (Ch. 6a.1). 
Another major group who are exempt from the normal procedures 
for entering and staying in Sweden are ‘aliens’ seeking protection 
there. These persons are divided in three categories: 
1. refugees with well-founded reasons to fear persecution due to 
race, nationality, religious or political beliefs, gender, sexual 
orientation, or affiliation to a particular social group, and who 
cannot obtain or do not, because of fear, want protection from, 
their own state (Ch. 4.1); 
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2. persons in need of subsidiary protection who are at risk of a 
death sentence, corporal punishment, torture or other inhumane 
or degrading treatment or punishment, or as a civilian at serious 
risk of injury due to armed conflict (Ch. 4.2); and
3. persons otherwise in need of protection who cannot return to 
their country of origin because of armed conflict, other severe 
opposition, or environmental disaster (Ch. 4.2a). 
Detention
The Migration Agency, the Police Authority, a court handling a case, 
or, in some cases, the government may decide that a foreigner should 
be supervised or detained (Ch. 10.12, 13, 14) (and, in some cases, the 
government Ch. 10.15). Supervision (uppsikt) means that a foreigner 
has to report to the Police Authority or Migration Agency at certain 
times. The foreigner may also have to surrender his or her identity 
documents (Ch. 10.8).
The rules for detainment (förvar) differ for children and adults. An 
adult may be detained on arrival if his or her identity is unclear 
and it is still impossible to assess the person’s right to enter or stay 
in Sweden, or if it is probable or ordered that the foreigner will be 
refused entry or expelled and there are reasons to assume that the 
foreigner may otherwise go into hiding or turn to crime (Ch. 10.1). 
Children may be detained if it is probable or ordered that they will 
be refused entry with immediate effect and there is an obvious risk 
that they may go into hiding and therefore supervision would not be 
sufficient. Another example is that the supervision of the child(ren) 
was not sufficient to warrant the enforcement an expulsion order 
(Ch. 10.2). Children may not be separated from their custodians and, 
if they have no custodians in Sweden, they may only be detained on 
exceptional grounds (Ch. 10.3).
The length of detainment is limited. Unidentified adults may be 
detained for 48 hours on arrival in Sweden in order for their rights to 
enter or stay in the country to be assessed. In other cases, the normal 
maximum time is two weeks, unless a refusal-of-entry or expulsion 
order has been issued, which normally means a maximum time of 
two months (Ch. 10.4). Children may not be detained longer than 
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72 hours though, if there are exceptional grounds, this detention 
may be prolonged by another 72 hours (Ch. 10.5). The Aliens Act 
also specifies intervals at which detainment should be re-examined 
(Ch. 10.9). A detention or supervision order that is not re-examined 
within the prescribed period expires (Ch. 10.10).
When in detention, the foreigner has limited freedom of movement, 
but should be treated humanely and with respect (Ch. 11.1). Medical 
treatment should be given if necessary, just as it would be to other 
persons seeking asylum or protection. The detainee should be given 
the opportunity for activities, recreation, physical training and time 
outdoors. Visits are allowed unless they hamper activities related to 
the detention, and they may be monitored if security reasons demand 
it, unless the visitor is a lawyer – and the lawyer does not demand 
supervision (Ch. 10.1, 3, 4, 5, 6). Adults can be isolated from other 
detainees if it is necessary for order and security, or if he or she 
is a danger to himself, herself or others (Ch. 10.7). The Migration 
Agency is the authority responsible for enforcing detention orders 
(Ch. 1.18), arranging suitable premises for detention, and overseeing 
the treatment and supervision of the detainees (Ch. 10.2).
Refusal of entry and expulsion
It is the Migration Agency’s task to examine, inter alia, the issue of 
the refusal of entry for asylum-seekers and their family members. 
In other cases, the Police Authority may also refuse entry, unless 
they are in doubt as to how to proceed (Ch. 8.17). A foreigner must 
be given an opportunity to speak and justify his or her need/desire 
to enter Sweden before a refusal-of-entry, expulsion, detention or 
supervision order is issued, unless it is unnecessary when deciding 
the asylum case. At the hearing, any circumstances that need to be 
clarified should be investigated carefully and the foreigner should 
have the opportunity to express his or her point of view and opinion 
on the circumstances invoked in the case (Ch. 13.1, 2, 3, 4). 
Foreigners may be refused entry to Sweden for reasons such as giving 
false information, lacking a valid passport or permits, lacking the 
funds to support him- or herself, or being convicted of a crime. If it 
is obvious that there are no grounds for asylum or a residence permit, 
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refusal of entry may be enforced immediately by the SMA (Ch. 8.19). 
Foreigners lacking passports, visas or permits may be expelled from 
Sweden, even if they were not initially refused entry (Ch. 8.6). Refusal 
of entry or expulsion orders should be issued immediately upon 
rejection or withdrawal of applications for residence permits (Ch. 
8.16, 17).
Expulsion may also be a consequence of criminal offences punishable 
by imprisonment, if the foreigner is assumed to continue committing 
crimes or if the committed crime was very serious (Ch. 8a.1). When 
considering expulsion, the court must take into account the foreigner’s 
ties to society and to his or her family. Refugees may only be expelled 
after committing exceptionally gross offences and if they represent 
a serious danger to public order and security (Ch. 8a.2). Sentenced 
criminals and the prosecutor (åklagare) must also declare acceptance, 
and expulsion and refusal of entry should not be enforced when a 
prosecution process is going on. The orders are enforced after serving 
the prison sentence, unless the sentence is to be served in a prison 
abroad (Ch. 12.8, 9).
Foreigners refused entry or expelled with immediate effect must leave 
the country as soon as possible; when enforcement is not immediate, 
the time-frame varies between two and four weeks. If the foreigner 
does not voluntarily leave the country, the Migration Agency or the 
Police Authority should enforce the decision (Ch. 12.14, 15) The 
Migration Agency may turn over responsibility for enforcement to 
the police if the foreigner has gone into hiding and cannot be found 
without assistance or if there is likely to be the need for force to be 
used (Ch. 12.14). A refusal of entry is often enforceable even if an 
appeal has been filed against it but, if the foreigner is seeking asylum 
or is the relative of an asylum-seeker, the foreigner must declare that 
he or she accepts the refusal-of-entry order if that order has not 
become final and non-appealable (Ch. 12.6, 7). 
Enforcement may be suspended – known as a stay of enforcement 
(inhibition) – in several situations of appeal and re-examination 
(Ch. 12.10, 11, 12, 13, 13a, 16) and when new circumstances and 
impediments such as those listed in the previous paragraph above, 
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come to light (Ch. 12.18, 19, 20). Enforcement of a refusal of entry 
or expulsion order is never allowed if it is to a country where there is 
‘fair reason to assume’ that the foreigner may suffer from, or become 
sent to, another country practicing the death penalty, corporal 
punishment, torture or other inhuman treatment. Foreigners are also 
not allowed to be sent to countries where they may be persecuted 
unless, by committing exceptionally severe crimes, they have shown 
that they are seriously endangering public order and security or 
national security, and the persecution is not of a particularly severe 
nature (Ch. 12.1, 2). Persons seeking protection from armed conflict 
and environmental disasters should not be sent back to their countries 
of origin (Ch. 12.3) and children may only be expelled if they are 
received in the country of return by family members, a guardian or 
an institution well capable of taking care of children (Ch. 12.3a). 
The Aliens Act also stresses that, in cases involving a child – defined 
as a person under 18 years of age (Ch. 1.2) – ‘particular attention 
must be given to what is required with regard to the child’s health 
and development and the best interests of the child in general’ (Ch. 
1.10). It is also stipulated that, when assessing questions of permits 
and where a child will be affected by a decision, ‘the child must be 
heard, unless this is inappropriate. Account must be taken of what 
the child has said to the extent warranted by the age and maturity 
of the child’ (Ch.1.11).
Decisions made by an authority administrating migration may 
normally be appealed against. In general, the decisions of the Police 
Authority are appealed against via the Migration Agency, decisions 
of the Migration Agency in one of the migration courts, and those of 
a migration court in the Migration Court of Appeal (Ch. 14.2, 3; Ch. 
16.9). The Aliens Act contains extensive information on the grounds 
for appealing the different decisions made by the various authorities, 
and on the procedures of the courts (Chs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18). By 
signing a declaration of acceptance (nöjdförklaring), a foreigner 
agrees to forego his or her entitlement to appeal against a refusal-of-
entry or expulsion order, and withdraws any current appeals and/or 
applications for various permits and travel documents. However, it 
is not possible to withdraw the declaration of acceptance itself (Ch. 
15.1, 2, 3).
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Visas, residence permits and work permits may, with exceptions, be 
withdrawn if the foreigner knowingly lied or concealed facts in order 
to obtain a permit, works without a work permit, is a convicted 
criminal, no longer resides in Sweden, or is refused entry or expelled 
by another EU/EEA state (Ch. 7.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). Towards the end 
of the Aliens Act there is a list of penalty provisions for offences 
against the Act. A foreigner can be fined for remaining or working in 
Sweden, or entering from a country outside the Schengen Convention, 
without the appropriate permit. Foreigners may be imprisoned for 
up to a year if they return after being expelled following the serving 
of a prison sentence and are not refugees or in need of subsidiary 
protection. Persons employing foreigners without work permits may 
be sentenced to a fine or a year in prison, and must also pay a charge 
to the state (Ch. 20.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12). The Aliens Act also criminalises 
the planning, organising and carrying out of various forms of human 
smuggling and related activities (Ch. 20.7, 8, 9). 
Human rights critique of the Aliens Act
The principle of non-refoulement is a prohibition against sending 
persons to countries where they may suffer from, or become sent to 
another country practicing, the death penalty, corporal punishment, 
torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment (Wikrén and 
Sandesjö 2014: 31–2). According to the United Nations’ Committee 
against Torture, Sweden violates the principle of nonrefoulement, 
and the Committee urges Sweden to pay greater attention to the 
risks faced due to ethnicity and religion in the destination country 
before enforcing deportation, to improve the identification and 
investigation of torture victims and even, in exceptional cases, to 
refrain ‘from the use of diplomatic assurances as a means of returning 
a person to another country where the person would face a risk 
of torture’ (UNCAT 2014: 4). In a joint submission to the United 
Nations, 32 NGOs and the United Nations Association of Sweden 
also put forth a critique against the use of diplomatic assurances, 
along with a recommendation to Sweden to ‘avoid the use of general 
country information to fully guarantee respect for the principle of 
non-refoulement’ (Svenska FN-förbundet 2014: 10).
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The Swedish Network of Refugee Support Groups or FARR 
(Flyktinggruppernas Riksråd), an umbrella organisation for groups 
and individuals working to strengthen the right to asylum, considers 
Swedish asylum policy to be contradictory. On the one hand, they 
see Sweden as one of the most generous and humane of developed 
countries in their dealings with asylum-seekers yet, on the other, 
they find it remarkable that the country is one of those which most 
frequently expels migrants and which has been criticised the most 
often (20 cases) by the UNCAT for deciding to expel someone despite 
knowing that there is the risk of torture in the destination country 
(FARR 2014).
FARR points out that the sections in the Aliens Act on the stay of 
enforcement of expulsion have several problematic features. A stay 
of enforcement is the result of a decision, according to Chapter 12, 
section 18 of the Directive, by the Migration Agency when it becomes 
aware of hindrances to the expulsion. After this, the Migration 
Agency also undertakes a new investigation into the foreigner’s 
application for a residence permit but, according to Chapter 12, 
section 19, the Migration Agency may only take into consideration 
any new circumstances and evidence if the foreigner has a ‘valid 
excuse’ as to why he or she has not presented these facts during 
earlier investigations. A consequence of this is that the foreigner must 
be able to prove that, for example, traumatic experiences made it 
impossible to talk about these facts earlier. Furthermore, additional 
evidence for circumstances examined in an earlier investigation is 
usually not accepted, even if that additional evidence could have 
been decisive in that earlier investigation. If the new circumstance or 
evidence indicates a risk that the foreigner may be exposed to torture, 
the death penalty, or inhumane or degrading treatment, the Migration 
Agency or the Migration Court has to consider it, although in reality 
this does not always happen. For these reasons FARR (2014) sees 
these sections as a violation of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
In their 2014 concluding observations on the sixth and seventh 
periodic reports of Sweden, the UN Committee against Torture 
expressed their concern that the maximum time in detention may 
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be up to a year, that detention may last longer than necessary, that 
it is used even if it is not a last resort measure and that it is much 
more common than supervision. They are also critical of the fact 
that asylum-seekers may be detained in prison for security or other 
exceptional reasons. 
The Swedish Red Cross (2014) expressed the same critique in its 
complement to the Swedish periodic reports that the organisation sent 
to the Committee against Torture. In 2012, the Red Cross presented 
a study of 953 decisions and rulings regarding detention, supervision 
and placements by the Migration Agency, Police Authorities and 
courts. They found that:
• there was a lack of implementation of the principle of 
proportionality in decisions and assessments;
• the alternative to detention – supervision – was not used to 
the extent intended by the legislator and that, in an absolute 
majority of the cases, there was no assessment or discussion of 
whether supervision or detention should be used;
• there was rarely an overall assessment in decisions regarding 
detention pending the enforcement of deportation, which 
meant that there was often an unnecessary use of detention in 
cases when other circumstances counterbalanced any expressed 
reluctance to leave Sweden; and
• the concept of segregation of violent or self-harming 
detainees was not implemented in practice as intended, with 
consequences such that self-harming behaviour became a 
justification for placement in correctional institutions or 
remand centres, or for police arrests, since the Migration 
Agency’s detention units were unable to deal with persons who 
were a danger to others or to themselves (Swedish Red Cross 
2012).
FARR’s positions on detention include a critique against the fact 
that suicidal detainees are placed in custody and that detainees 
sometimes lack access to adequate medical treatment; while FARR 
welcomed the fact that detention facilities are altered to reduce the 
need for custodial sentences, they also point out that new places are 
not enough, and that the treatment of the detainees also matters. 
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FARR (2014) also objects to the fact that supervision is underused, 
that decisions to prolong detention are sometimes taken without 
assessment when an effort to carry out an expulsion has failed, and 
that detainees have their freedom curtailed even if they are neither 
suspected of or sentenced for committing a crime, nor are a danger 
to others’ or their own health.
In 2013 there was a very intense debate on the Migration Agency’s, 
the Police Authorities’ and the Prison and Probation Service’s REVA 
project (Rättssäkerhet och Effektivt Verkställighetsarbete or Legal 
Certainty and Effective Enforcement) which aimed to increase the 
expulsions of immigrants without permits, and was intended to 
fulfil Sweden’s obligations under the Schengen Convention. The 
main activities were designed to make the administration within the 
authorities more effective, although this also included more identity 
controls of persons in public spaces (Radio Sweden 2015). FARR 
(2014) criticises the police for having unjustifiable reasons – such 
as appearance – for approaching a person in order to check their 
identity, and for using other types of control (for example traffic 
controls) as a pretext for identity checks instead of, as the Aliens 
Act allows, controlling a person’s identity when the main purpose of 
approaching that person is to control something else. FARR (2014) 
also believes that the Police Authority should formalise and adjust 
its policies on where they carry out controls, since police checks near 
(not just inside) societal institutions may cause foreigners to refrain 
from seeking help and other services from those institutions. FARR 
(2014) goes on to critique the fact that, when it is impossible to 
enforce an expulsion for practical reasons – because the foreigner is 
unable to leave Sweden voluntarily or that the destination country 
refuses to allow the person to enter but does not formally state this 
refusal-of-entry to the foreigner or to the Swedish Police Authority 
trying to enforce the expulsion – the foreigner may potentially find 
him- or herself confined in Migration Agency accommodation 
without any possibility of obtaining a residence permit or a permit 
to work or study (except children, who may attend school). 
The ways in which the principle of the best interests of the child is 
present in the Migration Agency’s procedures and daily work has 
been scrutinised in a number of scientific reports. In Anna Lundberg’s 
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(2009) report on the asylum process (her topic differs from that of 
this chapter, but her argument can be equally applied to the return 
process) she describes it as an open concept which allows Migration 
Agency officials to decide on the best actions to take to protect the 
best interests of the child, and what those interests may be. According 
to her, it is only under the most favourable of circumstances that 
children’s needs are met according to the human rights that the 
international community has proclaimed, since Article 3 in the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child is formulated in such a way 
that the best interests of the child is something that public authorities 
have to consider, but are not obliged to guarantee. A similar argument 
is put forth by Hans E. Andersson (2010) in a scrutiny of the tension 
between the Convention on the Rights of the Child and a regulated 
immigration. The Aliens Act insists that the best interests of the child 
be at the same time a primary consideration and weighted against 
other interests of society, such as the regulation of immigration.
As Andersson (2010) again states, the principle of the best interests 
of the child is most prominently present in the Aliens Act in Chapter 
1, section 10, which establishes that ‘in cases involving a child, 
particular attention must be given to what is required with regard 
to the child’s health and development and the best interests of the 
child in general’. In light of this, children diagnosed with apathy 
(uppgivenhetssyndrom) after receiving an order of expulsion from 
Sweden have caused considerable concern among organisations and 
professionals overseeing the ‘best interests of the child’ principle. 
The Ombudsman for Children in Sweden (Barnombudsmannen 
2005) position is that asylum-seeking children’s right to health as 
established in the Convention on the Rights of the Child means that 
children with severe withdrawal behaviour should never be deported. 
These children are referred to as children with apathetic behaviour. 
Elizabeth Hultcranz and Anne-Liis von Knorring, both physicians 
and professors, reminded us in 2012 and 2014 that these children 
still exist even if their numbers peaked as far back as 2004; when a 
family with a child with apathetic behaviour was expelled in 2014 
they stressed the importance of doctors who provide the requisite 
certificates making it clear that the condition is life-threatening, that 
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it can only be cured by creating a safe situation for the child, and 
that nasogastric feeding tubes are only life-supporting and not a 
cure, thus obliging the Migration Agency to grant a stay execution 
of the expulsion until further investigation has been carried out. In 
a discussion about the health of asylum-seekers, in which apathetic 
children are included, FARR (2014) criticises the fact that the 
Migration Agency does not take into account that treatment, even if 
it does exist in the destination country, may not be available to the 
returnee due, for example, to poverty or discrimination.
Concluding comments
This chapter has provided an overview of the various policy initiatives 
within the EU, the European Return Directive and ancillary legislation, 
as well as human rights critiques from different institutions. From 
this brief overview, it is relatively easy to ascertain the main policy 
direction taken by the EU.
EU policy and legislation are geared towards the expulsion of irregular 
migrants. The rationale is that persons without a lawful permit to stay 
should be removed to their country of origin. This is not surprising: 
it is an accepted activity in liberal-democratic theory and in line with 
international law. Human rights considerations are not a guiding 
force. They are simply acknowledged by the Directive without any 
elaboration. Some EU institutions, such as the FRA and, even more 
recently, FRONTEX, are embarking on efforts to streamline human 
rights principles in the field of migration management and border 
control. The outcome of these efforts still needs to be assessed. 
Clearly, however, a decision to include more substantive articles on 
the protection of the human rights of returned migrants in the Return 
Directive would have been a stronger safeguard. 
Sweden, as from 2012, transposed the European Return Directive 
into its national legislation, primarily through amendments to the 
Aliens Act. Sweden has been criticised by the EU primarily for failing 
to implement the provisions requiring an independent monitor on 
return flights organised by Member States for their own deported 
persons or coordinated joint flights for other Member States, too. 
International human rights monitoring bodies and internal observers 
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have reported on shortcomings in the system, some of which can 
result in human rights violations. The main lament remains that 
the transposition of the European Return Directive to Swedish law 
meant that, from a human rights perspective, there was no substantial 
improvement of the law and some rights were limited.
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3. KEY INSTITUTIONS
Introduction 
In this chapter, the key institutions involved in the forced-return 
process in Sweden are presented and their role in the process is 
explained. Since the European Return Directive was transposed into 
Swedish law in 2012, new institutions have been added to those 
already existing in the Swedish context. What the role of these new 
institutions is in the process will also be explained in this chapter.  
Institutions and systems pertinent to the implementation  
of the European Return Directive 
The following ancillary regulations and entities make it possible to 
implement the European Directive in the different Member States. 
These regulations, since the transposition of the Directive to Swedish 
law, make them also applicable, directly or indirectly, to Swedish law. 
Visa Information System
The Commission’s analysis of the implementation of the Returns 
Directive comments that the Visa Information System (VIS) 
Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 is expected to become a significant 
tool for the identification and documentation of returnees.10 One 
of the objectives laid out in Article 2(e) in the VIS Regulation is 
‘to assist in the identification of any person who may not, or may 
no longer, fulfil the conditions for entry to, stay or residence on 
the territory of the Member States’. Articles 19(1) and 20(1) allow 
access by migration authorities to certain VIS data for verification 
and identification purposes. Article 31(2)7 allows these data to be 
transferred to or shared with a non-EU country, to prove the identity 
of third-country nationals for the purpose of return (EC 2014a: 3).
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Schengen Information System
The European aspect of Return Directive re-entry bans is facilitated 
by the Schengen Information System (SIS). According to the European 
Commission’s communication to the Council and Parliament, 
‘Schengen-wide re-entry bans are primarily preventive’ (EC 2014a: 
4). During the period 2008–13, an average of approximately 700,000 
Schengen-wide re-entry bans were stored in the system. 
The SIS will not solve the problems of identification and 
re-documentation for irregular migrants who have come into the 
European Union without a visa, or who have simply entered without 
documents and claim a false or real identity that cannot be verified. 
The Commission states that, for such cases –which take up new and 
significant migration-authority time and are a major challenge to 
return management – ‘new, innovative solutions’ must be found 
‘based on increased cooperation with non-EU countries and in full 
respect of fundamental rights’ (EC 2014a: 4). 
FRONTEX Joint Return Operations
Apart from helping border authorities from the different EU countries 
to work together, FRONTEX also, upon request, organises Joint 
Return Operations. FRONTEX plans, coordinates and implements 
joint operations conducted using Member States’ staff and equipment 
at the external borders (sea, land and air). Third-country nationals 
from several Member States are brought to a destination airport in a 
third country and embark on the same FRONTEX-coordinated flight. 
The role of FRONTEX is that of an intermediary which coordinates 
with the various national authorities wanting to participate in a joint 
return flight. FRONTEX does not have any background information 
about the individual cases of the returnees. The only personal data 
that FRONTEX processes are those required for the purpose of a 
joint return operation and which are deleted no later than 10 days 
after the end of the operation (FRONTEX 2015).
FRONTEX Fundamental Rights Officer
In 2012, the position of independent FRONTEX Fundamental 
Rights Officer was created and the first officer was appointed on 17 
December of that year. The officer’s role is to monitor, assess and make 
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recommendations on the protection and guarantees of fundamental 
rights in all FRONTEX activities and operations, including those 
related to Joint Return Operations. The Fundamental Rights Officer 
should have access to all information on issues that impact on 
fundamental rights for all FRONTEX activities (FRONTEX 2014).
The FRONTEX Code of Conduct for Joint Return Operations
In addition, a FRONTEX Code of Conduct for Joint Return 
Operations was adopted on 7 October 2013 (FRONTEX 2013), 
which deals with effective forced-return monitoring procedures 
and the respect of returnees’ fundamental rights and dignity during 
return operations. The forced-return monitor is tasked with duties 
under Article 8(6) of the Directive and is an independent outside 
observer who frequently represents an NGO or another independent 
monitoring body entrusted by a Member State with forced-return 
monitoring tasks. A full chapter, Chapter IV, of the Code of Conduct 
is dedicated to human rights monitoring (FRONTEX 2013: 14–15). 
This function is carried out on most flights by observers from 
international organisations, NGOs or national authorities. The code 
specifies that the monitors must have access to all relevant information, 
including the travel documents of returnees and information about 
any special conditions, including pregnancy or illness. The code 
also clearly specifies that medical personnel are required on every 
flight and that, if the escorting officers are not able to communicate 
with the returnees, there should be interpreters on board. It stresses 
that the use of force should be avoided or limited to the minimum 
and emphasises the importance of cooperation with returnees. All 
participants in FRONTEX joint operations are also obliged to report 
any incidents which they believe violate the Code of Conduct during 
a return flight. The code foresees that the monitor will be given all 
the necessary information in advance of the operation and will be 
involved in the return process from the pre-return phase (internal 
briefings) until the post-return phase (the debriefing). As well as 
access to all information, the monitor will also have physical access 
to any place. The observations/reports of the monitor will be included 
in the reporting on the Joint Return Operations. Even though this 
is not expressly required under current legislation, the Commission 
states in its Communication (EC 2014a: 3) that, given the visibility 
and sensitivity of such operations, an independent monitor should be 
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present in each Joint Return Operation. The Commission adds that 
the revision of the Code of Conduct will be considered as a matter 
of priority.
A common European forced-return monitoring system:  
the way forward?
The Commission, in its Communication on the Return Directive, 
reports that there are plans to establish a common European 
forced-return monitoring system in line with Article 8(6) of the 
Return Directive. It has commissioned the International Centre for 
Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) to research possible ways of 
harmonising the different approaches to monitoring taken by Member 
States. The project seeks to develop objective, transparent criteria and 
common rules for monitoring, and to provide a pool of independent 
monitors to Member States who may also be used in Joint Return 
Operations. The project will also address the challenges and needs 
of European states by developing an objective and comprehensive 
monitoring system focusing on the strict observation of the human 
rights standards of returnees and the safety of the staff implementing 
such returns (ICMPD nd).
Institutions involved in the deportation process in Sweden
Apart from the European institutions mentioned above, a number of 
Swedish authorities and actors are, in different ways, involved in the 
forced-return process, the most important of which are the Swedish 
Migration Agency, the Police Authority and the National Transport 
Unit – a branch of the Swedish Prison and Probation Service.
A process of cooperation between different authorities
In the following section, the different actors in the deportation process 
and their various responsibilities are presented. It is important to note 
that, in the Swedish deportation process to other countries, there are 
many different actors and authorities involved, functioning both on a 
national level – such as the Swedish Migration Agency and the Police 
Authority – and on an international level – such as FRONTEX. The 
process is also reliant on cooperation between the Swedish authorities 
and the different authorities in the receiving countries – such as the 
local border-police units. Although the Swedish Migration Agency 
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has overall responsibility for the process, it is important to note that 
enforcement of different parts of the process can lie in the hands 
of either the Police Authority or the National Transport Unit. The 
process is hard to describe, since it may vary greatly from case to 
case. It can be a very short or a very long process and the use of 
force varies, to a great extent, from case to case. The cases also differ 
depending on which authorities – who have different discretionary 
powers – are involved. 
It is also important to note that, in contrast to Australia, the United 
States and many Western European countries, the different parts 
of the migration control structure (such as detention facilities or 
transportation services) have not been outsourced to private companies 
(Menz 2013: 108–24). However, note that the main authorities in 
the deportation process, i.e. the Swedish Migration Agency and the 
Police Authority, have undergone a number of organisational changes 
in recent years. In order to make these bureaucracies more efficient 
and to increase the legal certainty, programmes were introduced to 
implement the Lean Production concept11 in 2010 (National Police 
Board 2013: 73; Swedish Migration Agency 2010: 9).  However, 
according to police guidelines, the deportation should be enforced 
in the following way: 
Enforcement of a decision on deportation shall be carried out in 
a humane and dignified way. The foreigner’s basic rights shall be 
catered for and particular concerns should be taken into account 
regarding the age, sex and physical as well as psychical health 
conditions and also other circumstances that may affect the 
foreigner (National Police Board 2014: 2).
The Swedish Migration Agency
The Swedish Migration Agency or SMA is part of the deportation 
process in a variety of ways, even if return cases where force is 
deemed to be necessary are handed over to the police. At the return 
unit (Återvändandeenhet) the migrant is given the decision that he 
or she has no legal right to stay in Sweden through what is called 
‘the return dialogue’ or återvändandesamtal. Here, the civil servant 
discusses the return with the migrant, who is then asked to sign a 
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copy of the return decision and sometimes a declaration of acceptance 
(nöjdförklaring) whereby he or she states that the return decision is 
accepted. When this is done, the migrant no longer has the right to 
make another appeal to get the decision reversed (Swedish Migration 
Agency 2015b).    
The agency is also responsible for running detention centres in 
Sweden, an activity regulated in Chapters 10 and 11 of the Aliens Act 
(Wikrén and Sandesjö 2014: 540–82). Currently, there are detention 
units in five different places throughout Sweden – in Åstorp, Kållered, 
Flen, Märsta and Gävle. Both voluntary and forced returnees can be 
detained on different grounds, a decision which can be taken by the 
Migration Agency, the Police Authority or the courts, depending on 
where the case is being processed (Swedish Migration Agency 2015c). 
The use of pre-removal detention centres is regulated by the Aliens 
Act (Ch. 10.1–3) as well as by the European Return Directive. The 
Migration Agency also has a special unit – the Embassy Coordination 
Unit – which has the responsibility of cooperating with the different 
embassies in order to obtain passports and other travel documents. 
The different services that the migrants in the return process can 
access, even when the case is in the hands of the police, are also the 
responsibility of the SMA – which is in charge, too, of the running and 
subcontracting of accommodation for migrants in the asylum process, 
including returnees who do not want or do not have the possibility 
of staying with family or friends. Yet another of its responsibilities 
is the issuing of the LMA (Lagen om mottagning av asylsökande) 
card – a certificate stating that the bearer is an asylum-seeker who 
has the right to stay in Sweden while waiting for a decision. The card 
has to be returned either when the migrant leaves Sweden or when 
he or she has been granted a residence permit (Swedish Migration 
Agency 2015d).
The SMA is also the authority responsible for the administration 
of allowances to which asylum-seekers are entitled if they are not 
in possession of their own economic resources. This is a general 
daily allowance (dagersättning) which is supposed to cover the basic 
necessities and differs depending on whether or not the migrant lives 
in an asylum or transit centre where food is supplied. There is also 
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an allowance that can be granted if the migrant has specific needs 
that cannot be covered by the general allowance, but this is only 
granted in very special circumstances (Swedish Migration Agency 
2015e). However, the likelihood of being granted an allowance will 
be reduced if the migrant does not cooperate in clarifying his or her 
identity, absconds or will not assist the authorities with the various 
elements of the deportation process (Swedish Parliament 1994). As 
the actual amount of money received from this allowance has not 
changed since 1994, it is, in practice, currently far below subsistence 
level. 
The Police Authority
When a migrant absconds or the SMA makes the judgment that 
it is no longer possible to apply the return decision without using 
force, the case is handed over to the local Police Authority. After this 
decision is made, the SMA has (if possible) to notify the migrant that 
the case has been handed over to the Police and why. The case is then 
handled by the Border Police units within every local police district. 
If the agency decides that the person has absconded, the first step 
for the police is to officially declare the person as missing. If the case 
has been passed to the police because the agency decides that force is 
likely to be needed, the police are called and they will take over the 
case. The police also handle cases where migrants are deported due 
to criminal activities. The Migration Agency is never involved in this 
process (Swedish Police Authority 2014: 55–6).    
As mentioned earlier, the different Border Police units in Sweden 
have been working towards implementation of the concept of ‘lean 
production’ in their organisations in order to make the deportation 
process more efficient. This means that incoming cases are labelled 
as Categories 1, 2 or 3 depending on how complex the cases are 
perceived to be. Category 1 cases are those where the deportation can 
happen fairly quickly and not much work is needed. In this category 
we also find Dublin cases. At the opposite end are Category 3 cases – 
judged to be complex and needing considerable work, and where the 
receiving countries are ‘very difficult or impossible’. The deportation 
of foreign ex-offenders and the so-called 8:6 cases (persons without 
the right to claim asylum) are prioritised within each category, as are 
detainees (Swedish Police Authority 2014: 35–8). 
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According to a report from the National Police Board (2013: 17) on 
the processing of forced returns, there are problems with the way 
in which cases are handed over by the SMA to the Police Authority. 
Indeed, the report concludes that, when cases are handed over, 
there is generally little dialogue between the agency and the police 
(National Police Board 2013: 26). Communication at this juncture 
in the system is of critical importance, and a lack of it can affect 
cases in which there are special circumstances that need to be taken 
into account – such as when there are children with disabilities in 
the family or individuals with mental problems. There are also legal 
issues regarding the determination of identity of migrants in the 
deportation process. According to the Police Board, there has been 
a tendency to hand over these cases too early in the process and the 
quality of the investigation is also judged to be too low (National 
Police Board 2013: 17).    
Once the police take over a case, they conduct further investigations 
before making their decision on how to handle the situation (National 
Police Board 2014: 4–9). The police can decide to detain a migrant 
if certain criteria in the Aliens Act are fulfilled. One example of this 
is when there are strong reasons to believe that the migrant will 
abscond or will take part in criminal activity. The migrant may also 
be detained if he or she lacks a passport or other identity papers. 
Migrants who are detained have the right to a legal representative, 
according to Chapter 18 of the Aliens Act.12 The aim of the law 
is that detention should not be used other than under very special 
circumstances, particularly as the police also have the alternative 
of keeping the migrant under supervision – i.e., the migrant has to 
report to the police according to a certain schedule. Keeping a person 
under surveillance is basically no less problematic than actually 
detaining them; however, this measure is supposed to be used, 
whenever possible, instead of detention, when dealing with migrants 
who are considered to be at risk of absconding or of obstructing the 
deportation. A report from the Swedish Red Cross (2012: 6–7), where 
different cases were studied, concluded that, when it comes the use of 
detention, the decision to impose its use, were not always made by 
the SMA, the police and the different migration courts (which are all 
entitled to make the decision to detain someone) for the right reasons. 
Furthermore, in the process of estimating the possible reactions of a 
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migrant – such as the risk of absconding or obstructing an imminent 
deportation – verbal expressions of non-cooperation are often given 
a lot of weight, which can result in the lack of an unbiased judgment 
of the situation. The report also concluded that, in the majority of 
cases, the monitoring of migrants was often not considered as a viable 
alternative to detention (2012: 57–8). 
A migrant can also be incarcerated in other premises than a detention 
centre. This could be a remand centre, a prison or a police arrest, 
but the authorities (the SMA, the police or a court) can, according 
to the Aliens Act (Ch. 10.1–3), make such a decision only if certain 
criteria are fulfilled, such as when an individual is deported because 
of a crime (brottsutvisning) or the person cannot remain where he or 
she is incarcerated for security or other extraordinary reasons (Ch. 
10.8). The law also states that, even if there are security concerns, 
the migrant should, where possible, be kept in other areas of the 
detention centre (Ch. 10.20).  
Once the case is entrusted to the Border Police, they start working 
on the execution of the deportation as soon as possible. There are 
a number of different steps in this procedure, such as checking that 
the migrant has a valid passport, verifying with the authorities in 
the receiving country that there is no obstacle to repatriating the 
migrant, ensuring that the migrant is not a criminal with a warrant 
through Interpol, and planning the journey to the country of origin 
with the migrant. It might also be the case that the police will have 
to coordinate many elements of the deportation if the flight is done 
via FRONTEX. If the migrant lacks a passport, the Border Police 
will work through the Embassy Coordination Unit which is located 
at the Central Unit of Border Control (not the one located at the 
SMA). Through this unit, the police try to get the valid passport 
or other travel documents that would make the repatriation of the 
migrant possible. 
Different security concerns are also raised throughout the process 
and the police have to decide on whether to proceed with an 
unaccompanied deportation – a DEPU – or an accompanied one – 
a DEPA. In a DEPU the returnee is unescorted, though the airline 
concerned must be informed of the deportation. In a DEPA the 
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returnee is escorted by police officers or personnel from the National 
Transport Unit. However, in some cases the deportation is labelled 
‘individual travel’ (enskild resa) and the migrant is not surveilled 
by the police or the National Transport Unit and no notification is 
made to the airline (National Police Board 2014: 2). Furthermore, 
decisions have to be made as to whether handcuffs or other restraints 
should be used in order to meet security concerns during flights or 
other transportation (2014: 6–7). Once the deportation is completed 
and the migrant is returned to the country of origin the police must 
file a report and return the LMA card to the Swedish Migration 
Agency. At the border the police also have to ensure that the migrant 
can be handed over to the local authorities without fear of violence 
(National Police Board 2014: 20–21). 
The Swedish Prison and Probation Service/National Transport 
Unit
According to the regulations, attended deportations should be 
undertaken by the National Transport Unit unless there are special 
circumstances.13 When the police escort a deportee it is usually for 
three reasons: negotiation with authorities in the country of reception 
is needed, security aspects or the migrant is detained and the National 
Transport Unit lacks the resources to undertake the deportation when 
it is needed (National Police Board 2013: 21–2).   
Therefore, in most cases, it is the National Transport Unit – a section 
of the Swedish Prison and Probation Service – which will accompany 
the migrants on DEPAs, i.e. deportations where the authorities deem 
it necessary for the deportee to be escorted. The National Transport 
Unit also accompanies migrants who are facing deportation because 
they have been sentenced in Sweden. It should be noted here that, 
even if the National Transport Unit is involved in carrying out 
the deportation, it is still the Police Authority that is in charge of 
enforcing the decision (National Police Board 2014: 13–15). 
Airports and airlines
Airports and airlines are today part of the deportation system, since 
they are responsible for flight security issues and for transporting 
migrants to different destinations. At the airport, the police or 
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personnel from the National Transport Unit have to notify the 
security controllers that the individual in question is a person being 
deported. Furthermore, when a migrant is to be escorted by the 
Police Authority or the National Transport Unit, the captain of the 
plane has to be notified about the deportation in a letter called a 
‘Notification of Deportee’. If the deportation is a DEPU, a Document 
Envelope is handed over to the captain of the aircraft. The Document 
Envelope contains the passport of the person to be deported, the 
ticket and the Notification of Deportee. In the case of an individual 
travel (enskild resa), the migrant will be given the proof of departure 
form (utresebevis) which he or she will hand over to passport control 
at the place of exit. During the flight, it is the captain of the aircraft 
who is responsible for safety and security on board. This means that 
the captain has discretionary powers to decide what measures need to 
be undertaken, in cases of coercion or violence, in order to maintain 
security on board (National Police Board 2014: 17–19). 
Authorities in the country of reception
It is important to note that the deportation process is not necessarily 
completed when the migrant is back in the country of origin. If the 
Police Authority or the National Transport Unit is accompanying the 
migrant, they also have to make sure that they will be readmitted into 
the country they are being returned to. The responsibility of the Police 
Authority does not end until the migrant is officially readmitted. 
Although the police in Sweden may have the necessary documents 
and decide that the migrant to be deported will be readmitted, the 
situation may change once the migrant is at the border of the country 
of origin (National Police Board 2014:  19–20). The authorities in the 
country of origin may still refuse to accept the individual. 
Therefore, if the police decide that negotiations are needed in order to 
get the country of origin to accept the migrant, they will accompany the 
deportee, either together with the National Transport Unit or without 
them. These so-called ‘negotiation journeys’ (förhandlingsresa) are 
not regulated and the various regional Police Authorities in Sweden 
work on these issues in different ways. According to a report by 
the National Police Board (2013: 21–2), none of the local Police 
Authorities have any written guidelines or routines in this area, 
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indicating, for example, when the deportation should be labelled a 
negotiation journey or who is responsible for making any decisions. 
According to police guidelines on deportation, if the authorities in 
the country of reception are seen by the personnel accompanying 
the deportee to be treating the migrant in a way ‘that is not coherent 
with the Swedish common sense of justice’, the deportation should 
be reconsidered and the migrant brought back to Sweden (National 
Police Board 2014: 20).  
Obstacles to enforcement  
Persons who are in the deportation process do not always end up 
being deported and the process may be stopped at any time, either 
temporarily or completely – in which case the deportation is cancelled 
altogether since the migrant may have his or her case reopened (Ch. 
12.8). A broad range of potential obstacles to enforcement often 
comes into play, such as the migrant not being accepted back into the 
country of origin, the conditions in the country of origin making it 
questionable whether it is safe for the migrant to return or even the 
migrant having health problems. 
Intermediaries 
Apart from the authorities mentioned above, there are also a number 
of other actors who intervene in the return process. These actors work 
in different ways to protect the migrants’ rights in the deportation 
process; this can include the provision of care for different mental or 
physical conditions, or simply of relief and humanitarian help.  
Legal representatives can still play a role in the deportation process 
after the asylum decision is taken. In some circumstances, if the 
migrant has been informed that he or she is being detained, a lawyer 
may be employed. The role of legal representatives, when it comes 
to protecting migrants’ rights on detention issues, is regulated in 
the Aliens Act (Ch. 18.1). If the migrants’ rights are violated in the 
process of return, legal representatives can, in some instances, have 
a vital role to play. 
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Detained, irregular and other categories of migrant in the asylum 
process all have the right to healthcare, the provision of which 
cannot be postponed (Swedish Parliament 2013: 407). Therefore 
interactions between the health-care system and the migrants can 
be another, and quite important, element in the process, since it is 
not uncommon that migrants at risk of deportation, especially if 
they are detained, mutilate themselves in order to delay or stop their 
deportation. Sometimes, of course, nurses and doctors are required 
to accompany the persons who are to be deported on the flight back 
to the country of origin. 
Very often, NGOs play an important role in supporting the migrants’ 
rights to and claims for welfare in the deportation process. This 
could range from visiting transit living quarters or detention centres, 
providing clothes or organising daytime activities for children, to 
raising awareness campaigns in support of people who are facing a 
deportation order. 
Another entity which can conduct inspections and independent 
investigations in cases where it is suspected that a migrant may 
have been subject to unfair treatment by the authorities is the 
Justitieombudsmannen, or the Parliamentary Ombudsmen. The 
Justitieombudsmannen, made up of four independent ombudsmen, 
are appointed by the Swedish Parliament to ensure compliance with 
the law. The ombudsmen are specifically tasked with ensuring that 
public authorities and courts comply with the provisions of the 
Instrument of Government concerning impartiality and objectivity 
and that the public sector does not infringe on the basic freedoms 
and rights of the citizens. The supervision of the ombudsmen includes 
ensuring that public authorities deal with their cases and in general 
carry out their tasks in accordance with existing legislation. The 
ombudsmen’s enquiries are prompted both by complaints filed by 
the public or initiated by the ombudsmen themselves. Inspections 
are regularly made of the various public authorities and courts in 
the country (Parliamentary Ombudsmen 2015).
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Summary
The main actors in the deportation process in Sweden are the Swedish 
Migration Agency, the Police Authority and the National Transport 
Unit. The SMA is responsible for communicating the return decision 
to the migrants. It is also in charge of running detention centres. If 
the SMA judges that force is needed, or if the migrant has absconded, 
the case is handed over to the police, who are then responsible for 
carrying out security assessments and planning the deportation. If the 
police decide that the deportee needs to be escorted, it is the National 
Transport Unit, a branch of the Swedish Prison and Probation 
Service, which accompanies the deportee unless there are particular 
reasons why it should not. Since the European Return Directive was 
transposed into Swedish law in 2012, new institutions – such as 
the Visa Information System and the Schengen Information System 
– were also added to the process. The Swedish authorities in the 
deportation process also cooperate with FRONTEX – for example, in 
joint return operations. Apart from these actors, legal representatives, 
NGOs, health-care personnel and the Parliamentary Ombudsmen all 
play an important role in the process in different ways, providing help 
and serving to protect migrants’ rights. 
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4.  MIGRANT INTERACTIONS WITH 
THE ‘DEPORTATION SYSTEM’: 
COMPLEXITY, GREY AREAS OF 
DISCRETIONARY SPACE AND 
GRADUAL RESTRICTIONS?
Introduction 
Migrants at risk of deportation often feel that they have been unfairly 
treated, due to a perception that there are areas of arbitrariness in 
the system and, that, in general, the system’s complexity leads to 
a lack of transparency. This picture is partly confirmed in reports 
that discuss the different parts of the deportation process such as 
the use of detention (Swedish Red Cross 2012) and the processing 
of deportation cases by the Border Police Units (National Police 
Board 2013). If we look at the amount of time that migrants in the 
deportation process actually spend interacting with the authorities 
and public officials, these meetings often constitute a very small part 
of this time. Years can pass without migrants having a single meeting 
with the SMA or the police. In spite of the relatively short time 
which the migrants spend interacting with the system, for them these 
interactions are highly significant and given a lot of importance. What 
we found surprising was the depth and level of migrants’ reflections 
about the details of their interactions with the authorities and the 
different processes they went through. It transpires very clearly from 
our interviews that these interactions with the authorities have a 
big impact on the migrants in a multitude of ways, extending for 
months or years after the removal decision has been taken. Often, 
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the migrants feel that the process is unfair, although, in our analysis, 
it was difficult to separate their sense of unfairness and injustice at 
the decision from the extent to which this conditions all their other 
interactions with the system. 
Chapters 9 and 10 of the Aliens Act states that a migrant who no 
longer has a legal right to stay in Sweden has to cooperate with the 
authorities regarding the return and that, if necessary, the state has 
the right to use control  and detention as means to effectively carry 
out the deportation. This does not mean, as discussed in Chapter 2 of 
this volume, that this process is not regulated or that the authorities 
have unrestricted powers. Indeed, the law clearly states that, although 
migrants may lose some rights under certain circumstances, this 
process cannot be arbitrary (Ch. 1.8). Trying to understand how 
migrants who go through the process of deportation experience and 
understand their interactions with the authorities is important from 
different perspectives. It can provide insights into how the migrants 
actually perceive the process in practice and whether or not these 
experiences relate to the intentions of the Swedish Aliens Act and 
the European Return Directive to ensure that the deportation process 
is ‘humane and dignified’. It can also provide information on any 
potential shortcomings in the implementation of these laws and 
regulations and discuss why and where in the process the migrants’ 
human rights may be lost. 
It is not surprising that migrants, who do not want to be returned to 
their country of origin, protest in different ways against the return 
decision. These acts of resistance, such as absconding or verbal 
and physical protests, are interpreted by the authorities as a lack 
of cooperation. In turn, this sometimes leads to further negative 
repercussions for the migrants, such as the withdrawal of economic 
support or incarceration. Another important aspect of migrants’ 
interactions with the authorities is the fact that the asylum system 
and deportation process are complex. This renders the different 
interactions between civil servants and migrants complicated. Due to 
their lack of knowledge of the system, migrants may have a hard time 
understanding why certain decisions are being taken and why the 
processes they are involved in will unfold in a certain way. However, 
105
something which will be apparent in Chapter 5, which discusses the 
migrants’ ‘in limbo’ situation, is that this lack of understanding may 
be due to a mental block, or a limited capacity to comprehend due 
to shock, trauma or mental-health problems. 
This chapter presents, in an organic way, migrants’ reactions to, and 
reflections on, key aspects of the system. What emerges is that, from 
a human rights perspective, the key principles of fairness and justice 
are not always reaching the migrants. Another important point is that 
the process of deportation, for many migrants, is characterised by 
their weak position vis-à-vis the authorities, even though they offer 
different forms of resistance. Their attempts at resistance are geared 
towards rejection of the decisions made as well as towards expression 
of the way in which they feel that they have been treated. This 
resistance, in turn, leads to further repercussions from the authorities, 
which mean that the migrants’ lives gradually become restricted in 
different ways. These repercussions may include the withdrawal of 
financial support, the need for the migrant to report to the police 
on a regular basis, incarceration or even violence. In analysing this, 
the chapter identifies and discusses those grey areas where these 
restrictions may be decided upon, and where arbitrariness may occur, 
in the decision-making of organisations in the deportation process. 
The chapter also highlights those areas where misunderstandings and 
confusion between migrants and the authorities occur, and argues 
that this should be considered a problem for which a solution must 
be sought. In brief, therefore, the main arguments put forward in 
this chapter are:
• that migrants’ lives gradually become restricted if they, in 
different ways, resist decisions taken by the authorities, and 
complain about how they have been treated;
• that there are key nodes where arbitrariness may occur due to 
discretionary space – i.e. the power that bureaucrats have ‘in 
determining the nature, amount, and quality of benefits and 
sanctions provided by their agencies’ (Lipsky 1980: 13) in the 
decision-making of authorities in the deportation process; and
• that migrants often experience the different interactions that 
they have with the authorities, and the decisions that the latter 
make, as unpredictable and hard to understand.
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This chapter is organised in the following manner: in the first section, 
migrant’s perceptions of the first steps of the deportation process 
– how the decision is communicated and the return dialogue – are 
presented and discussed. In the second section, migrants’ different 
attempts to resist the return decision are described and discussed, as 
are the ways in which discretionary spaces and security concerns may 
lead to arbitrariness in the decision-making of the authorities in the 
deportation process. These are important nodes, where discretion is 
used, and arbitrariness may occur – such as labelling the migrant as 
non-cooperative and handing the case over to the police, cutting down 
or withdrawing the allowance paid to asylum-seekers or deciding to 
use detention or other forms of incarceration. In the penultimate 
section, we discuss how the migrants perceive their interactions with 
the system when the deportation processes are either very short or 
extend over long periods of time. These extreme cases highlight, 
among other things, the problems of communication and perceptions 
of unjust treatment that are experienced by the migrants in relation 
to the deportation system. In the final section, the overall results are 
summarised and conclusions are drawn. 
The asylum process, the decision and ‘the return dialogue’
Events leading up to the decision
As stated earlier in this volume, the deportation process can be 
long and complex. One way of looking at it is that it starts when 
the migrant receives the first negative decision and when the legal 
possibilities of staying in Sweden are diminished. However, events 
before the decision also seemed to influence the way in which 
migrants perceived the deportation process. Since all the migrants 
we interviewed had high hopes and expectations of finding refuge in 
Sweden, they were all severely disappointed, frustrated and, at times, 
in shock when they found that there were very few or no legal options 
that would allow them to stay. 
One recurrent theme in the interviews was that the migrants generally 
felt a great deal of frustration, anger, sadness and disappointment 
with the way in which their cases had been handled. Many felt that 
they have not been heard properly and that the Migration Agency did 
not treat their case in a fair way. For some of the migrants this meant 
107
that they had very little time in which to explain their situation. For 
others it was the problem of being called a liar and being questioned 
over and over again – for example, regarding their identity or the 
different aspects of their situation. They were also left with the feeling 
that they had been treated with indifference, and not with respect, 
during interviews with the authorities. Pal, for example, emphatically 
states: 
Pal:  She [the investigator] did not care about what we said 
in any way. It was like she found it amusing and she 
was laughed at what we told her.
IntervIewer: Why do you think she laughed?
Pal:  [It was] everything what we said, my wife, and me 
she did not find it serious, she did not think it was 
important… Both she and the lawyer gave us a bad 
treatment because all they wanted was to do their job 
and to go home as soon as possible. They did not care 
about the fact that they had a person in front of them 
who wanted to tell them, who has suffered.
Many of the migrants talked about their image of Sweden as a human 
rights-friendly country and that this had led them to believe that, with 
their individual problems and backgrounds, they would find a safe 
haven if they ever managed to get here. Many of our interviewees 
also expressed feelings of discrimination by nationality and gender, 
and thought that other migrants were treated in a more benevolent 
manner than they were. Some think that it is wrong of Sweden to give 
people hope that they will be able to stay when they will not. They 
would have liked Sweden to disclose more information about their 
process beforehand. Wali said that it would be better if Sweden was 
up-front about the fact that they do not want people to come so that 
migrants can chose a different country. 
 [If] the Swedish government does not want to accept asylum-
seekers … they [can] write and say [it] in TV, write in newspaper 
that ‘We do not accept people’ and nobody will come to Sweden, 
nobody will accept these problems here like me. 
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This shows a myopic view of asylum in Sweden, since it is blatantly 
untrue to say that Sweden does not accept asylum-seekers. In the last 
year alone – 2014 – the SMA received 81,300 applications for asylum. 
Out of these, 32,500 asylum-seekers had their claims accepted during 
the year, a further 10,400 were rejected and the remainder of the 
applications were pending (Swedish Migration Agency 2015a). 
 
Receiving the decision and the return dialogue
After the SMA has made the decision to deport a migrant, the 
individual in question is called to a meeting where he or she is given 
the negative response and the decision is explained. Here, the migrant 
has the choice to accept the decision and return ‘voluntarily’ or to 
appeal to the Migration Court (Migrationsdomstolen). 
To begin with, what we find in the interviews is either that none of 
the interviewees seems to have expected a negative decision, or that 
they have, in some way or another, blocked out any negative thoughts 
about how the process of asylum might end. This is also confirmed 
in interviews with a border police officer and an NGO official. It is 
not clear to us if this is because many of them actually think that 
they have a good chance of being allowed to stay or if denying the 
risk of being rejected is just a coping strategy – an ‘in limbo’ state 
of mind – that will get them through the process.  Migrants’ first 
reaction, on receiving a negative decision, is often the feeling that 
no one has really listened to them and that they (the civil servants at 
the SMA) did not understand or care about their situation. What is 
more, the migrants are convinced that it is not possible and just not 
an option for them to go back. Ana, a middle-aged woman of Eastern 
European descent, explains how she reacted when the decision was 
communicated to her: 
And after two weeks they call me and say that they have a 
decision. And they say that I must go. And then I say, ‘No, you 
know what is going on with me? Why don’t you need me to 
explain everything? You just ask me a couple of questions and 
then nothing more? Did you not read what I gave to you?’. 
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Wali, a man, who did abscond with his family from Sweden to 
Denmark and then to Germany (from where he was sent back to 
Sweden) after having received a negative decision, explains how 
he felt when the Swedish Migration Agency informed him that the 
options to appeal further were exhausted: 
When the Migration Agency said that ‘We will deport you’ we 
said that ‘We can’t go’… They [the SMA, the Migration Court and 
the Migration Court of Appeal] took all three decisions in about 
nine months but they want to deport us back to Afghanistan in 
2013. But because I had a problem and because of that we came 
here and we cannot go back to Afghanistan because of that. We 
don’t have any way of thinking about that, to go back, because 
of that we escaped from here to Denmark and once to Germany 
but they sent us back to Sweden.  
Being informed of the return decision is critical to the migrants. 
Some migrants feel that the decision should have been communicated 
in a more sensitive way; others complained that an inadequate 
explanation was given to them. Yousef explains how he perceived 
the situation when the negative decision was communicated to him 
and his siblings: 
One hour, they gave us one hour and she [the decision-maker at 
the SMA] has papers [with our family’s cases]. I said ‘Ok, what are 
the reasons for refusing my refuge?’ She said ‘I will not tell you, 
the lawyer will tell you. You only sign the paper that you have 
received the negative [decision] from Migration [the SMA]’. I said 
‘I will not sign. My rights are for you to tell me why you refuse 
[our asylum claims], I will not sign’. She said: ‘No I will not read 
it for six persons now because I don’t have time. I have one hour.’ 
After the return decision is announced, the migrants are asked to 
sign a document that states that they have been informed of the 
decision. They can also be asked to sign a declaration of acceptance 
(nöjdförklaring) which, if signed, means that they have accepted the 
decision, and waived their right to appeal. These documents are in 
Swedish and a translator is usually present. The migrants are also 
110
informed about the possibility of appealing to the Migration Court 
within three weeks. At this meeting the migrants’ legal representative 
is usually not present in person but a copy of the decision is sent to 
him or her.
At a later point, the migrant is called to a return dialogue meeting 
(Återvändandesamtal) where different practicalities regarding the 
return are discussed. At this point the journey back to the country 
of origin is planned and the migrants are informed about the 
consequences if they abscond or refuse to cooperate. Depending on 
the case, there can be one or several return dialogue meetings. The 
aim of this or these ‘motivational’ meeting(s) is not just practical but 
is also an attempt to get the migrants to accept the return decision 
and to leave without force having to be used. According to a civil 
servant working at a return unit, return issues occasionally also 
surface when the decision is transmitted to the migrant so, in practice, 
the distinction between these two meetings is not always that clear. 
In many of the interviews, different issues surfaced which were 
connected with the signing of documents once the decision had been 
transmitted to the migrant. One of these issues was that the migrants 
felt awkward about signing a document referring to the decision 
taken on their application because it was in Swedish and they could 
not always fully understand it. Another issue was that they did not 
really accept the decision, and therefore did not feel comfortable 
about agreeing to it in writing. There were also those, like Ana, who 
did not want to sign it but who did not dare to not do it, since she 
feared that this would cause further problems for her in an already 
precarious situation. 
When there are no more possibilities for appeal, and the migrant has 
received the so-called ‘three negatives’ (i.e. negative decisions from 
the SMA, the Migration Court and the Migration Court of Appeal 
or Migrationsöverdomstolen), the applicants are often faced with the 
reality of what could happen to them should they fail to cooperate. 
In several of our interviewees’ explained how the SMA warns them 
that, if they do not cooperate, the case will be handed over to the 
Police Authority. This is often, as we discuss in Chapter 6, when the 
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migrants start to feel the weight of ‘criminalisation’, as did Yousef, 
who talks in the next quote about how this caused him considerable 
stress and fear since he did not know what to expect: 
‘If you’re not cooperating with us, we will send your case to the 
police’ [warning by the decision-maker at the SMA]. Ok, what 
will the police do with us in Sweden? Will they put us in prison? 
Ana describes her reactions to the fact the she might eventually 
become a police case and explains that the threat of the potential 
involvement of the police does not scare her: 
And then she [official at the SMA] says: ‘If you don’t cooperate 
I will call the police’ and I tell her ‘Okay, call the police; in my 
country the police have been torturing me for 18 years. It is not 
strange for me and you can call them now’.  
It is interesting to note that some migrants clearly perceive the 
handing over of their case over to the police as a threat and not just 
as a fact, something which came out very strongly in our interviews. 
This scenario was also confirmed by a border policeman whom we 
interviewed. But the tactic of trying to use the police as a threat in 
order to persuade migrants to leave the country ‘voluntarily’ can 
make interactions between migrants and the police more complicated 
in the later stages of the process since the former may be even more 
frightened and aggressive.  
Sweden has actively implemented a policy of encouraging migrants 
who do not have the necessary permits to take up the voluntary-
return option. This is portrayed as the more humane option out of the 
voluntary–forced spectrum although, in fact, the distinction between 
voluntary and forced return can sometimes be rather blurred. In fact, 
some 37 per cent of all returns in 2014 (Swedish Migration Agency 
2015a) were labelled as ‘voluntary’. This means, in practice, that 
migrants may avail themselves of some financial benefits,14 organise 
their trip back and therefore ‘cooperate’ with the authorities. None 
of our interviewees who have actively refused to return voluntarily, 
have seen this as an option. Ismat expresses his feelings about the 
money that was offered: 
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What’s money? I didn’t come here for money. I had a good job 
in Afghanistan, a good life in Afghanistan. I don’t need money; I 
came here because my life was in danger. 
Appeals
Some migrants took the opportunity of appealing to the Migration 
Court and the Migration Court of Appeal. Many of the migrants still 
seemed to have high expectations, even though they had failed their 
asylum application at the Migration Agency. They thought that they 
would receive a different decision when they had their cases examined 
by the courts.15 However, interacting with the lawyers and the courts 
was a road to new disappointments. Again many of our interviewees 
felt that no one was listening to them and that the process was unfair. 
Their contacts with lawyers also varied, as is discussed further in this 
chapter. In the next quote, one of the interviewees, Kader, describes 
appearing in court at the end of a long and tedious process where 
there were no good options left:
You can explain your situation there [in the Migration Court] too 
but you know that the court, it’s just like you know, a waste of 
time. [It’s] kind of a procedure, first you have to do an interview 
with Migration [the SMA], after that you got negative from 
Migration [the SMA], after that you go to the court... This is the 
process, you have to walk this way and at the end of this way you 
have to throw yourself down the mountains.
When a decision has been reached by the courts, a letter is usually 
sent to the legal representative, whose responsibility it is to explain 
the decision to the migrant. Some of the migrants, after receiving 
the second and the third negative decisions, also talked about the 
rumours abounding that the Police Authority was keeping an eye on 
them; other migrants had also warned them about an increased risk 
of deportation. One of our interviewees, Ismat, a young Afghani who 
lives in Sweden with his wife and child, talked about these rumours, 
which claimed that, after the third negative decision, the police 
is more present and migrants need to be on the alert. This clearly 
instilled fear in him and he did not dare to go to the meeting at the 
SMA: 
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Some people told me that after the third negative, the Migration 
[Agency] called people up and they took someone. They [the 
people mentioned in the rumours] were caught and they were to 
leave and be deported. At the third negative, when the Migration 
[Agency] invited us to come to [them] we wanted to talk [to them] 
but we were very afraid, that they would catch us… 
The right to a fair hearing  
Sweden has institutionalised its appeal procedures in a bid to 
ensure that migrants and asylum-seekers’ right to a fair hearing is 
safeguarded. This distinguishes Sweden from other countries, where 
migrants are not given the right to appeal, or to make a judicial 
appeal. The right to a fair hearing, however, greatly depends on the 
key figure of the lawyer. The varying levels of professionalism of 
the interviewees’ lawyers has long been a cause for concern (see, 
especially, Feien and Frennmark 2011) as this can have a serious 
impact on how much, in practice, migrants can enjoy the right to a 
fair hearing.
Teka is careful to lay the blame not on his lawyer but on the 
system. Others complained directly about their lawyers. Mahdi was 
particularly upset by the lack of communication and of interest that 
his first lawyer demonstrated. The lawyer, Mahdi explained, did not 
bother to inform him of the decision until Mahdi himself contacted 
his lawyer three months later. The decision had been taken one month 
earlier, but the lawyer claimed that he had been too busy to call. 
This upset Mahdi greatly: ‘[I said to him] …“this is my life, how 
could you do this?” He just said, “This is the way it is”.’ Mahdi was 
further aggrieved by the perception that his first lawyer appeared to 
be far more interested in the payment associated with representing 
him: He [the first lawyer] only likes money…, my new lawyer, he 
really wants to help me he does not like money, but others [do]. 
Clearly, Mahdi felt that his second lawyer was on his side and was 
trying to represent him in the best way he could.  The second lawyer 
engaged with Mahdi’s story and explained to his client how he would 
present the case, which made Mahdi more hopeful and decreased the 
aggravation he felt. Mahdi described the second lawyer thus: ‘He 
is very kind, he will help me, I hope’. This reaction was prompted 
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not just by the fact that his lawyer actually listened to him, but that 
the listening translated into practice, too. Mahdi told us that, at 
their first meeting, when he had ended up undocumented, the second 
lawyer informed him that he would lodge an appeal. Three weeks 
later, Mahdi received a phone call from the lawyer, who announced, 
‘Congratulations, you have a new hearing [in your asylum case], 
you’re no longer undocumented (papperslös)’.
Other migrants complained bitterly about the service they got from 
their lawyers. Aamir was never able to meet his lawyer. For Aamir, a 
good lawyer should be a source of assurance. He decries this failing: 
‘This is the job of my lawyer to see me and tell me “Everything is 
safe, you can tell [the SMA] everything”. He [my lawyer] didn’t come 
and I was scared’. When he asked to have his lawyer changed, the 
SMA told him that the court did not allow any change in lawyer. 
Aamir felt under-represented in the system and was not hopeful for 
the future progression of his case. He articulates his thoughts in the 
following manner: 
Just open my case, give me one chance I want to speak face to 
face with my lawyer, it’s not a big wish. … If they’ll decide I 
cannot stay in Sweden, just tell me why. It is not good for me that 
I haven’t seen my lawyer, or the court. It would have been better 
if I could have gone to court. I could have told the court directly. 
It is not good and I cannot accept it. Everything is like a show to 
me, everything is just show, not true, just show. Having a lawyer 
by phone, is that a joke? The court is that a joke? The decision 
is a joke to me. 
Aamir seemed to believe that the lawyer went to court. Our sources 
tell us, nevertheless, that, if a person does not get summoned, the 
Court is processing his or her case from the information it has on file.
Others are happy with their lawyer. Yousef, a Kuwaiti bidoon, 
categorically states in the next quote how happy he is with his lawyer, 
who is rigorous, takes an interest and, overall, appears to offer a very 
good service. 
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My lawyer is a very good lawyer. All lawyers in Sweden are not 
the same. My lawyer meets me before I get the interview. When 
I tell people [other asylum-seekers] they say ‘You’re lucky’. He 
meet with me before and he knows my case, he asks me about 
special details, and he sits down with every person [in the family] 
alone… Every time he sits with each person separate, separate. He 
asks Migration [SMA] and the Migration [SMA] gives us tickets 
to visit our lawyer in Malmö two times…
He considers himself lucky because his friends complain that they 
only met once with their lawyer who either did not take an interest 
in their case, did not believe them or were just not accessible. His 
explanation gives an insight into migrants’ experiences with lawyers, 
which confirms the dominant narrative amongst migrants of lawyers 
offering a less-than-professional service, often meeting their clients 
very rarely.
Resistance, security concerns and discretionary space 
Policy implementation and discretionary space
As discussed earlier in Chapters 2 and 3, the deportation process 
is very complex due to the fact that many different authorities are 
involved and there are policies at different levels – the EU level, the 
national level and the organisational level - that are supposed to 
be implemented at the local level. At ‘street-level’, SMA officials, 
policemen, nurses, doctors or National Transport Unit officials should 
be putting these policies into practice. They are what Michael Lipsky 
(1980) would call ‘street-level bureaucrats’ – i.e., public employees 
who interact directly with citizens or clients and who have a certain 
degree of discretionary space, or autonomy, in their daily work when 
they implement the different policies. According to Lipsky (1980: 
13), the discretionary space is, as mentioned in the introduction to 
this chapter, the power that these bureaucrats have ‘in determining 
the nature, amount, and quality of benefits and sanctions provided 
by their agencies’. The main reasons why these bureaucrats have 
discretionary space are because they have to make decisions based on 
a limited amount of information, and because their interactions with 
citizens (or, in this case, non-citizens) are too complex to be guided 
in detail by rules and regulations. This discretionary space, and the 
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degree of autonomy that goes with it, is a double-edged sword. On 
the one hand this space may be used to make better decisions and/or 
to solve problems in a more efficient way, since there is some degree 
of flexibility. On the other hand, the discretionary space may lead 
to wide variations in the implementation of the different policies, 
variations that can be so substantial that the principle of equal 
treatment is questioned in practice. 
The individual civil servants in the deportation process have to balance 
different, and sometimes conflicting, goals in their daily work. This is 
not unique but is a common aspect of organisational life, especially 
in public-sector organisations (Brunsson 2007). However, the 
complex and sensitive nature of deportation issues puts a particular 
responsibility on decision-making in everyday life because the 
consequences for the individual migrant are severe. According to laws 
and organisational policies such as the Foreign Act and the directives 
that the state gives to the different authorities, the deportation 
process should be efficient, be characterised by the security of law, 
be ‘humane and dignified’ and take account of the different security 
perspectives (Swedish Migration Agency 2015a: 9; Swedish Police 
Authority 2015: 11; SPPS 2015a: 10). Sometimes decisions, such as 
the perceived need to use force, have to be taken instantaneously. 
At other times, decisions may involve difficult dilemmas when the 
individual police officer or SMA official has to balance efficiency 
and humanitarian concerns. In addition, there are different pressures 
from actors who are not strictly a part of the deportation machinery 
– these may be activists claiming that migrants’ human rights have 
been violated, politicians with an interest in making the deportation 
process more efficient, or the media drawing attention to parts of the 
deportation process which might not be functioning well. 
Following the work of Arlie Hochschild (1979) on the role of emotions 
in organisations, it can also be argued that emotion management and 
emotional labour are a crucial aspect of the work of civil servants 
in the deportation process. They, or other personnel who have the 
authority to make and execute decisions in the process of deportation, 
have to handle their own feelings of empathy, indifference, disdain or 
fear,  have to remain professional and have to ensure that the security 
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of law is not jeopardised by their personal judgment. They ‘are 
required to manage their own feelings in order to create displays that 
affect others in desired ways’ (Ehrlich Martin 1999: 112). This work, 
however, is not only about controlling emotions, and the display 
thereof, but also about interpreting migrants’ emotional expressions. 
As an example of the emotional elements to the work of civil servants 
and medical staff in the deportation process, Nicholas Fischer (2014) 
discusses how self-mutilation in French detention centres is causing 
stress and anxiety among civil servants and NGOs – feelings that 
have to be controlled by the individual as well as by the organisation. 
Civil servants in the deportation process are meeting individuals, on 
a daily basis, who are often in a state of depression, who are under 
high levels of stress, are in shock, are disappointed, seem confused 
or uncomprehending or who appear to be angry and who may even 
become violent. In the deportation process, interpreting and using 
these emotional expressions, along with other information they have 
on the case, will be a part of public officials’ discretionary space, 
since they will use this knowledge to determine the likelihood that the 
migrant will abscond, will resist the decision or may be a danger to 
him/herself or others. These interpretations of emotion can influence 
decisions in the deportation process, such as the potential need to 
detain or to use force.  
Resisting the decision
Resistance to the deportation decision can take various forms – inter 
alia, verbal protests, absconding, hunger strikes, self-mutilation or 
violent resistance. Our interviewees have all resisted their negative 
decisions, albeit in different ways, and this has, at times, had critical 
implications for them. For some of them, resistance led to their 
cases being transferred to the police while, for others, the resistance 
continued throughout the process in the form of hunger strikes, 
public protests or perpetual absconding. However, the opportunities 
to protest and resist were also constrained by the generic threat of 
repercussions from the authorities and by what resources the migrants 
could themselves access in the form of personal contacts who could 
help them, media coverage or financial support. 
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Absconding is a common way to resist deportation and many of 
our interviewees did so, once, or even several times. Returning to 
their country of origin was not seen as a possible option for them as 
individuals or families, as the quote from Wali in an earlier section 
made clear. Absconding could mean moving to another country or 
city and/or living hidden in a house or flat or as a homeless person in 
the street somewhere. But escaping deportation by absconding also 
puts the migrant at risk of further repercussions from the authorities 
– such as detention. One of the men we interviewed, Pal, was living in 
hiding with his wife and children in Sweden, helped by some Swedish 
natives. He spoke of his constant fear of the police and of how he 
does not even dare to have the TV on at night because of the fear that 
the police will notice him and that he and his family will be arrested:
Outside [my house] there is a nightclub that is open until quite 
late at night. It’s stuck in my head that the police might find us 
[because of this]. In the nighttime I don’t watch television, I sit all 
night by the window, watching cars driving by…the police come 
to the nightclub sometimes because people are drinking and it 
makes me nervous.
Others did abscond to other European countries to apply for asylum 
there, or to hide, only to get caught and deported back to Sweden 
again, under the rules of the Dublin Convention. Finding themselves 
in this situation, they were disappointed by the fact that they could 
not, due to the Dublin Regulation, apply for asylum in another 
European country. 
Not only is absconding something that puts the migrant at high risk 
of being detained if found by the Police Authority, in the long run it 
also requires resources. One of our interviewees, Ana, told us that, if 
she had had the resources, she would have run away but that this was 
not possible since she did not have any contacts, money or a place to 
stay. Her protests were more modest: 
Today they gave me the papers when I need to go and a time for 
airplane and I just…how can I tell you? I just destroyed the papers 
and I told them that I will not go back. 
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How the reactions of the migrants – when the decision is given to 
them and during the deportation process – are interpreted by the 
authorities is crucial in many ways. Being labelled as a migrant ‘who 
does not cooperate’ can have serious implications for the individual. 
When the migrant protests the decision by absconding, the rules are 
clear: the case is referred to the police and the allowance is removed 
entirely. 
Those migrants who, at some point in the process, protest verbally 
by stating that they cannot, or will not leave or cannot provide 
any ID are in a grey area of the authorities’ discretionary space. By 
protesting, the migrants are at risk of arbitrary treatment and of 
losing what few rights they have left – such as the right to move freely 
or a part of the small allowance that asylum-seekers receive. As was 
explained in Chapter 3, it is the individual civil servant at the SMA 
who has to make the decision as to whether or not ‘force is needed’. 
Nevertheless, trying to pass judgement in such circumstances is 
understandably difficult, since the migrants who are in this situation 
often react with shock and anger in the heat of the moment (even 
though he or she may eventually cooperate); it may also no longer be 
possible for the SMA to continue handling the case.  
After the decision is taken that the migrant has to leave the country, 
he or she is in a very vulnerable state; however, there still remain 
some avenues of protest for them in a last bid to claim their rights. 
Help from friends and social networks or NGOs, media contacts and 
coverage in the press and on social media or TV, or the support of a 
skilled lawyer, may all prove to be very important for the individual at 
this point. As will be discussed in the ‘in limbo’ Chapter 5, appearing 
in the media made some migrants feel safer.   
Becoming a police case
According to police officers with whom we have spoken, it is quite 
common that migrants who end up having their case passed on to 
the Police Authority do not realise that they are ‘a police case’ until 
they receive a phone call or visit by a police officer who explains 
the situation. However, even after migrants have been contacted by 
the police, they may still not understand that this means that they 
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have no legal right to stay and may be deported at any time. For 
example, one woman whom we interviewed, Arjana, whose husband 
was already detained, kept asking if her children could go to school 
in Sweden, although she had been told that her deportation was 
imminent. She appeared to be in too much shock to fully understand 
and take in the seriousness of her situation. 
When they learn that their case has been handed over to the Police 
Authority, some migrants are taken aback, saying that they do not 
understand why this as happened, since they are not criminals and 
that they have done nothing wrong, a situation which is discussed 
further in the next chapter. It is also interesting to note that it is not 
always obvious for the migrants which of the authorities has their case 
– some of the migrants whom we interviewed were unsure whether 
their cases were with the SMA or with the police.  According to one 
police officer, quite often when cases are handed on to the police 
it turns out that there has been a mistake or a misunderstanding – 
maybe a failure of communication between the authorities and the 
migrant, which led to the latter missing a meeting and being reported 
as missing. The same officer said that, quite frequently, migrants 
who, at first, resisted the decision in some way or another, eventually 
change their mind and begin to cooperate. Often, the deportation 
then takes place without the use of force or physical coercion, even 
with those cases dealt with by the police. 
Security concerns and discretion
What makes the discretionary issues in the area of deportation even 
more complicated is the security perspective, which is always a factor 
to be considered in the deportation process since migrants may harm 
others or themselves in a last attempt to try to stop the process. 
Furthermore, since some categories of migrants risking deportation 
have a criminal record or are, for one reason or another, considered 
to be dangerous, security issues often take precedence over other 
concerns in the deportation process. 
Verbal threats, outbursts of anger and even violence are not uncommon 
reactions from migrants when they learn of the deportation decision, 
or when an SMA or police officer comes to escort them to the airport 
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or a detention centre. According to police officers whom we have 
talked to or interviewed, it is not uncommon for children or spouses 
to be held hostage by the father/husband in the family. The problem 
is that some of the interactions between migrants and the authorities 
(whether it be the SMA or the police) often, but not always, happen 
behind closed doors, such as in the SMA’s offices, in detention centres 
or in a person’s home, where there are no other witnesses. It is often 
difficult to ascertain what really happened and it is hard for the 
migrants to feel any satisfaction afterwards if they have been treated 
in an unjust manner. 
For example, a young interviewee named Tarek claims that he was 
falsely accused of violent resistance towards a civil servant and was 
then sentenced to 40 days in prison (though he was never actually put 
there but in the remand centre). However, since the only witnesses 
were the colleagues of the person who had accused him, he had no 
opportunity to make a complaint or to protest at what he felt was 
unfair treatment:  
I was sentenced without any evidence or any witness. I was 
convicted without there being any evidence against me. These 
persons, they got their colleagues who witnessed in their favour. 
This civil servant was working as a guard. He was beating me but 
when he witnessed he said that it was me who beat him.
Another situation where security concerns and human rights are 
sometimes at odds with each other is when the identity of the 
migrant is unknown or unclear, usually due to a lack of valid identity 
documentation. It is known that, in some cases, migrants might 
throw away their identity documents and lie about their identity 
in order to increase their chances of staying. From the authorities’ 
perspective it is regarded as important that the identity of those who 
enter the country be known. However, for some stateless refugees 
this is problematic, since it is difficult for them to prove their identity 
without having a nationality and a citizenship. Mohammad, a 
stateless migrant from Kuwait, explains: 
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We have identity without nationality… I sent everything, 
documents from Kuwait, and then he [officer at the SMA] does 
not believe me. There are documents from lawyers and court from 
Kuwait but everything is treated the same [they don’t believe it].
In the end, Mohammad’s application for asylum was declined by the 
SMA, which decided that the documentation provided by Mohammad 
and his siblings was evidence that their situation in Kuwait did not 
provide sufficient grounds for asylum to be granted. Interestingly, 
Mohammad also talked about security problems when determining 
the identity of stateless persons without a passport; he assured us that 
there are ‘false bidoons’ in Sweden who claim to be stateless persons 
from Kuwait, when in fact they are not: ‘They [the authorities] need 
to know the truth. In Malmö, people are saying they are stateless 
from Kuwait but they are not, it is a security problem in Sweden’. 
Incarceration
Once a migrant’s case is with the Police Authority, control of the 
individual can be more or less stringent depending on the results 
of the risk and security assessment carried out by the police. The 
migrant may be put ‘under supervision’, which means that he or 
she has to report regularly to a particular police station; other than 
that, the individual may move around freely. However, the police 
may also decide that the migrant should be detained because he or 
she is likely to abscond or because there is another security concern 
which the law stipulates must be taken into account. This is another 
discretionary space, one where security concerns weigh heavily. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, the Swedish Red Cross (2012) laments the 
lack of transparency in this area. The organisation notes that the 
grounds for detention were often not documented thoroughly enough 
and therefore the decision-making in this area lacked transparency. 
Some of our interviewees described the shock and surprise that they 
felt when the police came and took them into detention or another 
unit of incarceration. For some, it happened so quickly that they did 
not even have time to take their clothes or other personal items with 
them. For others the surprise and shock were because being taken 
by the police to the detention centre was not something that they 
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had expected. As is described in more detail in Chapter 6, the Police 
Authority may use more or less force in carrying out any removal to 
a detention centre. In the next quote, Hamdan describes his feeling 
about the moment when the police came and took him to a detention 
centre: 
Hamdan:  They [the police] said that I might abscond if I’m not 
kept in detention. 
IntervIewer:  What was your first reaction when you were taken 
to the detention centre by the police?
Hamdan:  This is the first time in my life that I have been 
incarcerated. I did not expect such an inhuman 
treatment. They could only have told me that I 
should help them to get travel documents or that 
they could help me with getting those documents. 
They should not have to lock me in. I said to the 
police that I would cooperate but they did not really 
listen and I could get a few things and then they took 
me here. 
Once a migrant has a history of absconding, this fact will be taken 
into account in subsequent risk assessments and he or she is more 
likely to be detained again. Several of our interviewees had been 
detained on more than one occasion. Having a criminal record is not 
reason enough for a person to be detained, but it is another factor 
which the authorities will consider in the risk assessment. For those 
who have a criminal record, the risk of being placed in a remand 
centre instead of being detained is even greater, since this decision can 
be made without further reasons being given. This increases the risk 
of arbitrary decision-making, according to the Swedish Red Cross 
(2012). It is important to note that conditions in a detention centre 
are quite different to those in a remand centre. For example, people in 
the latter are not allowed to listen to the radio, watch TV or read the 
papers, nor are they allowed to spend time with their fellow inmates. 
There are also restrictions on communication with people outside the 
remand centre – visits or phone calls, for example – since this has to 
be approved in advance by the prosecutor (SPPS 2015b).  
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Some of our interviewees who had been detained also described 
their feelings of anger at being detained or incarcerated in a police 
arrest or remand centre. Tarek, a young male asylum-seeker, ended 
up in a circle of incarceration in different premises. After a series 
of very complicated interactions with the authorities, where he felt 
mistreated, he was involved in a fight with a guard and was then 
sentenced to 40 days in prison. However, he did not spend any time 
in prison but was placed in a remand centre for about 18 months, 
after which time he was moved to a detention centre. He describes it 
as a one-way process where there is no end other than being locked 
up and from where it is impossible to make one’s voice heard: 
I was placed in a room. I cannot talk to anyone, I cannot see 
anyone. I have absolutely no rights there. The criminals who are 
in prison, they have better conditions than me… I refused to eat 
sometimes for 20 days, sometimes a month, sometimes 40 days. 
At one time I hungerstriked for 50 days. I lost 8 kilos... I said, 
‘Either set me free or take me to that place [detention centre] or 
let me die’. I fled from the war to France last time and they said 
‘Either you seek asylum or you have to leave the country’. But 
here they say ‘Either you seek asylum or you have to go to prison’. 
And after you have sought asylum you get rejected and again you 
are in prison. So whatever you do you end up in prison… And 
if the staff does something wrong, there is no way that you can 
complain. They never get any punishment.
For the migrants, being detained and thus losing their freedom 
meant that they were running out of options to extradite themselves 
from their current situation and that they were in the hands of the 
authorities. One migrant, Vlad, described detention as a tool with 
which the police can put further pressure on him to provide valid 
identification; in the next quote he explains what this kind of pressure 
feels like, and describes detention as a space where resistance is very 
limited: 
This is not animal cruelty (‘djurplågeri’) it is human cruelty 
(‘människoplågeri’), it is like that. [The authorities] try to put 
mental pressure on me until I open up, I give them something. It is 
like that, they say it themselves, ‘You will be here until you give us 
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your identity [documents]’, but it [the identity documents] doesn’t 
exist. You cannot escape, you cannot fight with the staff – it is not 
possible. I can do nothing, just sit. It is not so easy.
Confusion, contradiction and silence
The fast track to deportation
Not all migrants have a realistic possibility of appealing the decision 
on their case. If the case has been labelled as one where the asylum 
claim is apparently unfounded (Uppenbart ogrundade ärenden) 
(Aliens Act Ch. 8.19), the deportation can be carried out even before 
the decision has acquired legal force (vunnit laga kraft). These cases 
can also be ‘fast-tracked’ by the authorities to avoid the cost and 
inconvenience of a long asylum process for someone who cannot 
stay and whose deportation the authorities are working to make 
happen as quickly as possible. This process makes the asylum system 
more efficient and less costly, and enables the speedy removal from 
Sweden of migrants who have no right to stay. In this category of 
asylum-seekers, the vast majority come from countries of the Western 
Balkans such as Serbia, Kosovo or Albania. In 2014, only 4 per cent 
of asylum-seekers from these countries were granted asylum (Swedish 
Migration Agency 2015a: 65). 
This issue of ‘fast-tracking’ came up in some of our interviews and 
migrants in this situation feel discriminated against. They find that 
the system is contradictive and cruel, since they are told that they have 
rights (one of which is to appeal the decision within the timeframe 
of three weeks); however, the possibility of exercising these rights is, 
in practice, very limited by the lack of resources such as networks, 
time or the possibility of getting a legal representative. Furthermore, 
the short timeframe leaves very little opportunity for the migrants to 
prepare for the return, even less to digest and process the negative 
decision. 
Two of our interviewees raised the issue of migrants having to leave 
without any real opportunity to appeal against the decision or being 
informed that they have to leave before the decision on any appeal 
is communicated to them. This can happen if the SMA judges that 
the asylum-seeker apparently has no real grounds for seeking asylum 
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(uppenbart ogrundade ärenden). However, this left the migrants very 
distressed and they reacted to the decision with shock and anger. 
Ana who, at that point, was two days from her planned deportation, 
vents her feelings of frustration and despair about the process in this 
next quote: 
They are giving me the decision on Monday and I must leave on 
Friday. Why do I have to leave the country on Friday? What is 
happening? … I have three weeks [to appeal the decision] and 
you tell me that you can put me in a plane before three weeks? 
And they say, ‘Yes, we have the right to do that’ and I am telling 
them, ‘Your law is like the law in my country’. They are doing 
the same, you have rights and after that you don’t have. ‘You are 
telling me that I have the right to complain but after that you say 
that you are putting me on a plane’. That is the law without law.
Decisions, silences and resignation  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, there are categories of migrants 
who live in a state of deportability for a very long time due to the 
state’s inability to deport them for one reason or another. Within these 
categories we find stateless refugees, persons with unclear identities, 
those with criminal records, individuals who come from countries 
or regions to where people cannot be deported at a particular point 
in time because the countries/regions are deemed to be too unstable 
or unsafe, and people who appear to have simply been forgotten or 
lost in the system. It may also be the case that the country of origin 
will not, for various reasons, accept some individuals. And at times 
the deportation cannot happen if the migrant does not cooperate. 
For many of these migrants, their interaction with the system was 
particularly confusing since it seemed absurd to them that they were 
repeatedly told by the authorities that they would be deported, even 
though both parties knew that the authorities were not able to.
Several of our interviewees did receive the decision (or decisions) 
that they had no right to stay in Sweden and expected either to be 
deported or that at least something would happen in their case – but 
neither event occurred. Some of these individuals have been trying 
for a long time to obtain an answer, or at least to have some kind of 
127
dialogue with the authorities, but without success. Instead they ended 
up in a state of frustration where it was not clear to them what was 
happening. Omar, a Palestinian stateless refugee, tries to explain his 
situation: 
Two years ago the Migration Agency stopped my case [i.e. did not 
take any action] and for two years I have nothing here in Sweden. 
I have no contacts with the Migration Agency; I have no contacts 
with the police… I don’t understand. I just go to the Migration 
Agency, what can you do? What will they do with my case, who 
knows anything about it? I don’t know. Who can do [anything 
about it]? I don’t know. Who’s in charge? I don’t know... They 
have no contacts with me, they send me letters with money and 
that is all. 
Mohammad, also a stateless refugee but from the bidoon group, was 
even told by the Police Authority that he was not likely to be deported 
in the near future, and received no further answers from the SMA: 
He [the police officer] tells me everything, I sat with him, he says 
‘Nobody will send you to Kuwait’. They have many files (at the 
police) with stateless people without solution…We speak for three 
hours [with the SMA] and then we get nothing, ‘Just OK, we 
wait’, that was seven months ago.
In this category of persons – those who did not have the possibility of 
staying legally in Sweden, but who could not be deported either – are 
not just stateless refugees but also other types of migrant. One of our 
interviewees, Salah, had ‘received his negative decision’ more than 
ten years ago but seemed to have been forgotten by the authorities. 
Since Salah did not want to be deported, he had not confronted 
the Police Authority or the SMA about his situation, nor was he in 
hiding. His LMA card was continuously reissued and he received 
money every two weeks (which means that the authorities did know 
of his whereabouts). When he came to Sweden, it was still possible 
to open a bank account with just the LMA card as proof of identity 
(it is not possible nowadays). He claimed to have been working and 
paying taxes and he had a car and an apartment but was stopped one 
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day by an internal border control. He was then detained because they 
said that he was notified as missing; he was told that he was staying 
illegally in Sweden and would be deported. He explains his feelings, 
the situation, his inability to understand what was happening to him 
and the further problems that the period of detention created for him: 
They [the SMA] give me the refusal, they pay me, they pay me, 
they change my LMA card. There is no problem at all. I don’t get 
it. … I was never afraid, never afraid. I have told them: ‘Whatever 
you need, I am here’. I have given them the address... I don’t get 
it. Like they…ahhh. They fuck up my job, my car, everything, 
my apartment, and my safety – what will I do? If they release me. 
What will I do?  Will I tell my boss, say that I have been at the 
detention centre (förvaret)? No… 
While the migrants whose asylum applications had been fast-tracked 
and who were deported just a couple of weeks after they arrived in 
Sweden had reacted with shock and anger, some of those who had 
been in Sweden for a very long time eventually reacted with a sense 
of resignation and desperation, especially if they were incarcerated. 
Tarek, a young man who had spent 17 months on remand and 
some further months in detention (where he was at the time of the 
interview) waiting to be deported stated that he had given up and 
that he just wanted to go back to his country of origin: 
I have regretted that I have come to Sweden. I have become evil 
because of my stay here. They have made me evil, I was not evil, 
it is them who have made me suffer so much... They have put me 
through psychological torture that no human can deal with… I 
have told them…release me and I’ll go back. I’ll leave the country. 
Vlad vents his feelings of resignation about his situation:
IntervIewer: Do you think that they can deport you?
vlad:  Now it is like I don’t give a damn. Let them do what 
they want, just let them. I said: ‘Send me to Ghana [not 
his country of origin] (laughter), send me anywhere, 
just not Russia [country of origin] and don’t let me stay 
in here [in detention]. Send me wherever you like’.
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Finally, we have Emmanuel, who had remained in Sweden without 
documents for about four years. He stated that, as mentioned in 
the following ‘in limbo’ chapter, when he was reported to the police 
because he did not have a valid bus ticket, he was already tired 
of living in Sweden without a legal status. He did not want to be 
deported but was desperate for change:  
I did not resist the arrest. When I was with the bus controller, I 
wanted to give them my number so they could help me call the 
police because I had already written to them [the police]. I was 
fed up. I was ready for them… I wrote to them to reconsider my 
application in the country. I don’t want to be illegal because I 
know [being] illegal is not good for a human being especially in 
Sweden that’s why I wrote to them.
Conclusions
This chapter has provided much food for thought, and five main 
conclusions are offered below.
•  The first conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter is that it 
is important for the authorities to remember that the migrants and 
the authorities both enter this process from completely different 
points of departure and that events that seem logical from the 
authorities’ perspective may be incomprehensible to the migrants 
and vice versa. 
The migrants appeal depending on their individual circumstances and 
their right to seek asylum according to international agreements. The 
authorities on the other hand, have the task of deciding who is in 
and who is out and, once the decision is made, of implementing the 
return of migrants who do not have a legal right to residence. They 
are also under a strong pressure – from politicians and sections of 
the general public – to make these processes more efficient in order 
to avoid bottlenecks in the asylum and reception systems. There is a 
strong ‘logic of enforcement’ in the system where the aim is to make 
returns and deportations happen as fast and as efficiently as possible. 
This goes hand-in-glove with a ‘logic of deterrence’, where the aim 
is to signal clearly – for example, by using detention or force – that 
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those whose applications are not accepted should not be encouraged 
to stay. However, even though there have been frequent attempts 
to standardise the different processes and to increase cooperation 
between the authorities, there are still discretionary spaces that lead 
to variations in the decision-making and omissions between different 
actors in the treatment of cases. From the migrants’ perspective, it is 
hard to understand the logic in certain events and the processes they 
go through are sometimes experienced as incomprehensive, arbitrary, 
unpredictable, unfair, cruel or even downright absurd. 
•  The second conclusion that can be drawn is that events that 
happened either before the deportation process began, or in the 
early stages of the process, can influence interactions between 
migrants and the authorities in the later stages of the process. 
It is crucial that the authorities and lawyers treat the migrants in a 
respectful and professional manner so that the latter feel that their 
voices have been heard properly. If the individual feels that he or 
she has been treated in a rude or unprofessional manner during the 
asylum process or when the decision is communicated, it will be hard 
to achieve a sense of trust and cooperation later on. Here, special 
concern should be given to the documents that the migrants are asked 
to sign; if it is not possible to translate these documents into the main 
languages of the migrants, a thorough explanation should be given of 
what the migrants are committing to in signing the documents. In this 
way, common myths and misperceptions can be avoided. It can also 
be counter-productive to use the Police Authority as a threat. To build 
on the migrants’ own negative images of the police force may create 
further problems at later stages of the process, when the police seek to 
establish cooperation with the migrants. It is also unacceptable that 
the police should be used as a lever to make migrants sign documents 
– especially as the latter are unsure about what they are actually 
signing, but are too afraid to protest. 
•  A third conclusion is that, in the asylum and deportation processes, 
it is obvious that lawyers play a crucial role as safeguards and 
protectors of migrants’ rights. Their professionalism, and the 
respectful manner in which they treat, and communicate with, 
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their migrant clients, have, of course, a positive influence on the 
cases they are handling and the migrants’ right to a fair hearing 
in practice. 
This positivity and respect are also important because they affect the 
level of trust that the migrants have in the system and the authorities. 
It is crucial for migrants to feel that their voices have been heard, and 
that their lawyers have shown them respect and made them aware of 
important decisions promptly. 
•  A fourth conclusion is that it is important to ensure that migrants are 
not ‘unnecessarily punished’ for expressing their disappointment 
at a negative decision, or for offering different forms of resistance. 
Security concerns and discretion in the decision-making processes 
must be employed, and documented, in a careful manner to avoid 
arbitrary decision-making and to increase the transparency in the 
system.
The intersections between emotions and security concerns must be 
acknowledged. How civil servants interpret migrants’ different ways 
of expressing their (often negative) feelings heavily influences the 
security assessment and decision-making processes of SMA workers 
and police officers. It is therefore important that the role that 
emotions can play is acknowledged and that the various civil servants 
in the deportation process have the wherewithal to avoid making 
prejudiced judgments. From our interviews with migrants and with 
civil servant in the various authorities, together with different reports 
which we received, we have been able to identify important areas of 
discretionary space where there is a risk of arbitrary decision-making. 
The area of what, in practice, constitutes ‘non-cooperation’, ‘the risk 
of absconding’ or ‘cases where coercion is needed to enforce the 
return decision’, needs to be discussed and clarified. Key issues which 
can arise when cases are handed on from the SMA to the police 
include whether or not the allowance which migrants receive should 
be reduced or withdrawn altogether, whether or not a person should 
be put under supervision, detained or incarcerated, or whether or not 
there is a need to use force or even violence. For example, if a migrant 
has absconded, and cannot be found, the law is quite clear on this 
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scenario. If, however, a person protests against the negative decision 
on his or her application by stating that return is impossible, or 
claims to have no identity documents, the situation is less clear. The 
different sanctions available to the authorities in order to return the 
individual his or her country of origin is seen by the latter as unjust, 
and sometimes brutal – it is therefore crucial that these sanctions are 
not used arbitrarily. 
•  Our fifth and final conclusion concerns the collaboration (or lack 
of) between the different authorities in the deportation process. It 
is important that cases remain in the hands of the SMA for as long 
as possible and that they are only handed on to the police when 
there is genuinely no other option. 
These issues are especially important since the authorities in question 
– the SMA, the Police Authority and the SPPS – are under strong 
pressure to make their activities more efficient. Efficiency does not 
stand in opposition to human rights and there is no point in leaving 
migrants ‘stuck’ in the system. However, there is always the risk that, 
in order to meet efficiency standards and to have a statistical record 
that looks good, these different authorities try to avoid handling 
more ‘difficult’ cases, preferring to pass them on to another authority. 
In this case efficiency is not achieved – the case is simply moved 
to another part of the system, which makes the process longer and 
more complicated since important information is often lost due to 
issues of confidentiality. These delays are not in the best interests of 
the migrants as they make it more difficult for them to understand 
the processes that they are involved in. Handing cases over from the 
SMA to the police should, in any case, be avoided where possible 
since, under the responsibility of the police, the securisation increases 
and the migrants have fewer options – for example, they lose the 
financial benefits that are granted to voluntary returnees from some 
countries. To have their case handled by the police can also increase 
the deportation stigma and, as discussed further in chapter 6, the 
migrants’ sense of being criminalised.  
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5.  THE ‘STATE OF DEPORTABILITY’ 
– OR BEING ‘IN LIMBO’: 
NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON 
MIGRANTS’ PSYCHOSOCIAL 
WELLBEING
Introduction
Migrants living in a state of deportability, irrespective of their 
background, nationality or legal status, commonly feel that they are 
living ‘in limbo’ – a particularly debilitating state to be in. In our 
interviews with them, the inability to plan their lives and future was 
often mentioned with huge regret, anger and a sense of helplessness 
which clearly contributed to the frustration they felt and the lack of 
control over their own lives. This is often exacerbated by ambiguous 
interactions with the complex asylum and deportation systems, a 
topic which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. Other migrants 
decide to go underground and live ‘undocumented’ lives, adding 
further pressure to an already precarious situation. The migrants 
explained in detail the desperate and helpless nature of their situation, 
which greatly impacts their psychosocial wellbeing.
 
Migrants exhibited several common reactions and behaviours 
which clearly indicated a high level of stress and anxiety. Emotional 
episodes were common but varied widely. At times, migrants vividly 
articulated their feelings and demonstrated, in a controlled fashion, 
equally strong emotions such as anger and frustration by describing, 
in the most minute detail, what they had been facing. Some migrants 
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broke down during the interviews. All imparted a sense that they 
were going through an immensely difficult time. 
Migrant wellbeing is now a key concept in Migration Studies. 
Indeed, the IOM’s 2013 World Migration Report focuses on migrant 
wellbeing (IOM 2013). The approach undertaken is one where 
migrants are encouraged to tell their own stories in order to create 
‘policymaking that is more attuned to human needs’ (IOM 2013: 
176). In a similar vein, Katie Wright (2010), writing about Peruvian 
migrants in London and Madrid, emphasises the importance of 
allowing the migrants themselves to describe their experiences and 
uses wellbeing to ‘reveal the psychosocial elements that international 
migrants consider important for “living well”’ (2010: 368). This was 
a clear departure from initial efforts to assess migrants’ wellbeing, 
such as the Gallup World Poll, using objective indicators such as 
employment, housing and incomes which were only complemented 
by subjective perceptions of life satisfaction (IOM 2013; Wright 
2010). 
In recent years, in a clear move away from the medical model – where 
wellbeing was reduced to the medicalised definitions of psychological 
states – the term ‘psychosocial wellbeing’ is employed to refer to the 
close connection between psychological aspects of human experience 
and the wider social experience. Migration bodies such as the 
International Organization for Migration and the UNHCR refer to 
the importance of migrants’ psychosocial health and wellbeing and 
have built development programmes and services around this concept 
– the understanding that both psychological and social aspects are 
necessary to migrants’ wellbeing.
The definition and usefulness of the concept has also been 
discussed. Authors such as Egan et al. (2008) and Martikainen et 
al. (2002) emphasise the need to separate psychological factors 
from psychosocial factors. For them the concept is useful inasmuch 
as psychosocial factors help to explain the ways in which social 
processes, at both macro and meso levels, affect psychological 
processes at the individual level. Other research has focused on the 
factors that can nurture psychosocial wellbeing – agency, autonomy 
135
and control, participation and involvement, social relationship and 
networks, and safety (Caplan 2002; Correa-Velez et al. 2010; Egan 
et al. 2008; Kohli and Mather 2003; Martikainen et al. 2002). 
This prompted an interesting critique from Frederick Ahearn (2000), 
who finds it problematic that studies focus on the factors that affect 
psychosocial wellbeing rather than delineating a clear definition of 
the concept. Another issue which he brings up is that psychosocial 
wellbeing holds a strong element of cultural specificity. Wellbeing and 
illness are variously defined in the different cultures; however most of 
the variables and frameworks regarding them are based on Western 
values and norms and may not be applicable to other cultures. 
This chapter presents various issues which our migrant interviewees 
brought up as having had a negative impact on their psychosocial 
wellbeing. An effort has been made to be as faithful as possible to 
the migrants’ expressions and descriptions. As previously explained, 
it is clear that the biggest source of fear for the migrants was being 
sent back to the so-called ‘country of origin’, a fear that was all-
consuming and incapacitating. The fear was so great that, despite the 
helplessness, the apathy, the frustration and the blow dealt by their 
‘in limbo’ situation, migrants were often willing to ‘extend’ their ‘in 
limbo’ status if it meant that they could avoid being sent back. This 
brought about what can only be described as a vicious downward 
spiral, where the migrants’ personal physical and mental health was 
severely affected. 
Migrants are not apathetic actors in this situation. They are active, 
making choices, building strategies. This chapter also discusses some 
of these coping and resistance strategies, which are often limited 
by external material and socio-economic factors such as housing, 
social welfare benefits, the loss of rights, and life as undocumented 
migrants. Finally, the chapter ends with a selection of cases which 
exhibit a particular vulnerability for different reasons – those of 
children and stateless people.   
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Living situation – an open or closed cage?
Migrants at risk of deportation live in different types of 
accommodation. This section focuses on both their similarities and 
their differences. The one aspect of their living situation that is shared 
by all the migrants is that they do not feel free, they feel stuck. This 
is part of their ‘in limbo’ state and, of course, negatively affects their 
psychosocial wellbeing. Salim, who lives in an apartment provided 
by the SMA in a small community on the edge of a medium-sized 
Swedish city, says: 
It is like a prison, but an open prison. You are free to move but 
you cannot go anywhere. It is like an open prison. It is like you 
put a bird in a cage and then you open the door.
In 2014, 66 per cent of migrants received by the SMA were living in 
SMA housing – anläggningsboende or ABO); the rest were living in 
their own housing, often with family and friends – eget boende or 
EBO (Swedish Migration Agency 2015a). The SMA prefers to rent 
apartments to asylum-seekers but, when this is not possible, they 
use entrepreneurs who arrange temporary housing for the migrants. 
The agency is unable to control the placement of these housing units 
(due to rules on public procurement), which has meant that they are 
spread across the country, with some located far from an SMA office 
(Swedish Migration Agency 2015a).
The location of the centres, in combination with the migrants’ 
strained financial situation, often makes it hard for them to meet 
other people, join in activities and move around freely. Contact with 
other residents at the centres is often limited, which can also lead to 
deterioration in the quality of migrants’ psychosocial wellbeing. The 
lack of contact may be due to the fact that the other residents are 
only there for a short time or because they do not have a language 
in common. Residents might also be wary of talking to others who 
are burdened with as many problems as themselves. All this leads to 
boredom, a feeling of disconnection from the rest of the world, and 
a poorer state of wellbeing. Wali, who, at the time of interview, lived 
in a transit centre outside a small town, describes the scenario: 
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We do not have any money for the bus to go outside of here it is 
far away from any bigger cities. When you go there [to the bigger 
cities] it is about 150 kronor for one family, just for one way. We 
cannot go outside of this small place… When you are in a small 
town like this you do not have any contact with another person 
and that will be boring for you.
Unlike those who live in housing provided by the SMA, those in 
hiding are trying to conceal their whereabouts from authorities such 
as the SMA and the Police Authority, to which their case will be sent 
as they are officially deemed to have ‘absconded’. Our interviewees 
in this situation were living in different types of housing but all had 
contacts in Sweden who were assisting them. A common source of 
stress for those in hiding is their housing situation, which is often 
temporary. The migrants described in their interviews how they 
were always looking for housing and, at certain moments, had been 
forced to sleep ‘rough’ in parks or railway stations. In addition to the 
pressure of finding housing, those living in hiding are anxious and 
very worried about being detected by the police or other authorities. 
A discussion of this can be found later in this chapter, in the section 
discussing fear. This stress and anxiety has an extremely harmful 
impact on their psychosocial wellbeing.
However, in spite of the challenges brought about by a life in hiding 
and the fear of going outside, the interviewees took pains to explain to 
us why it was still worth remaining in this situation rather than being 
deported. Bahara, an Afghani migrant, puts it thus: ‘We accept living 
with these problems in Sweden but we are not going to Afghanistan. 
Because we know in Afghanistan we don’t have any future’.
Living in hiding can be extremely draining. Emmanuel lived 
underground in Sweden for a couple of years. He became so weary 
and stressed by the situation that he wrote to the Police Authority 
in a desperate attempt to legalise his situation. The police did not 
respond to his request. He was subsequently detained after being 
caught with an invalid bus ticket. He describes how he did not try 
to run away when the bus company called the police, since he was 
so sick of his situation which, he claimed, was no improvement on 
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that in his country of origin. Emmanuel speaks of his weariness and 
despair: ‘…I ran from the time that they wanted to deport me in 2011 
so that was then. Until now I was out there, living a life that is kind 
of no hope, no future, nothing’.
Life in hiding limited our interviewees’ movements but the most 
extreme version of this limitation was described by those interviewees 
in detention centres or other forms of incarceration. Several of our 
interviewees had spent time in a detention centre and a few in remand 
centres (häkte). The situation in detention centres is discussed in 
Chapter 6, which deals more specifically with the ‘criminalisation’ 
of migrants. Detention had a significantly negative impact on the 
migrants – psychologically, it was an immense blow. The interviewees 
showed high levels of stress about what was awaiting them after 
detention and their anger at being locked in, together with clear 
signs of apathy. The negative effects of detention have already been 
presented in earlier studies. A 2010 study by the Jesuit Refugee 
Service (JRS) Europe, with 685 detainees in 23 EU Member States, 
shows similar results – the physical and mental health of refugees 
deteriorates through detention. This decreased level of health is 
often attributed to the living conditions and the psychological stress 
experienced in detention. Being confined and not knowing when 
release will come about also contributes to detainees’ deteriorating 
health and increasing anger. The study also indicated how the health 
of the detainees worsened the longer they spent in detention. Jose 
Puthoopparambil et al.’s (2015) study on the health and wellbeing 
of detainees in Sweden echoes these findings: ‘Threatening behaviour 
from the authorities, substandard living conditions and absence of 
a proper support system to cope with stress created a stressful living 
condition for the detainees’ (2015: 77).
Life without those ‘last four digits’: exclusion from the 
system and society
Persons at risk of deportation are migrants who do not have, or 
are about to lose, their residence permit. They are thus not able 
to participate fully in society. Without a residence permit, it is not 
possible to obtain a ‘personnummer’, a Swedish personal identification 
number without which very few activities are accessible in Swedish 
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society.16 Taking part in leisure activities might seem banal and 
definitely not the greatest of the migrants’ troubles but these things 
add up and make their lives difficult. Omar used to play football in 
a higher league but, without a personal number, he was unable to get 
a licence to play games. In the next quote he describes the frustration 
of not being able to fully participate with his team. 
I don’t have a personal number, I cannot play. If you want to live 
in Sweden you must get those four digits. If you don’t have that 
you cannot do anything here, not even play football on a team. 
You can just practice and I’m sick of it, I don’t want to practice, 
I want to play the game.
The outcome of being unable to participate in society is exclusion 
and discrimination, which negatively affects a migrant’s psychosocial 
wellbeing. Yousef, a Kuwaiti bidoon, compares this to the 
discriminatory situation in his country of origin, where the lack 
of documents serves as a means of discrimination. This difference 
between those who have documents and those who do not becomes 
apparent, for example, when attempting to access one’s rights. 
Without a residence permit a person does not have the right to work 
legally in Sweden and irregular work is but rarely to be found, is 
precarious and often temporary and puts the migrant in a particularly 
vulnerable position with regards to his employer, who often takes 
advantage of this illegality to not pay very well. Mahdi puts it in a 
nutshell: ‘I wanted to work but it was hard to find one. But I have 
also talked to some people who say that you have to work for 20 
SEK per hour17 like that, and you have to work 10–12 hours per day’.
None of our respondents were working at the time of interview; 
instead those who were not in hiding received money from the SMA 
or the Police Authority, while those who were in hiding did not want 
the police or SMA to know about their whereabouts and therefore 
did not claim any funding. Any money received by migrants is cut 
off when the authorities find out that they have absconded. In some 
municipalities, those in hiding are able to get money from the Social 
Services (Socialtjänsten) – some of our interviewees received these 
payments whereas others relied heavily on the financial support of 
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their social networks, both of individuals and of organisations. What 
our interviewees all had in common was that their financial situation 
was dire and they struggled to cover even the basics such as food and 
housing. Ismat stated:
The Social (Social Services) gives us this much money, and we give 
half of it for rent of the house, the other [half] is not enough for 
us because we have the children, it’s very low... The organisation 
that we are a part of they help us sometimes; if they wouldn’t be 
here, we would be hungry by the end of the month.
In addition to having difficulty in feeding themselves without a job, 
not being able to work or study made it hard for the interviewees 
to engage in any meaningful activities. Several interviewees, 
independently of each other, summed up the lack of activities with 
the following phrase: ‘The only thing that you can do is to eat and 
sleep’. Omar explained how having nothing to do made him feel like 
an animal. The interviewees bemoaned the fact that they had nothing 
to fill their days with, nothing that could distract them from their 
problems. As Wali said, ‘If you have work, if your children go to 
day-care, that is also a duty for you, it will be a duty and you don’t 
think so much about your situation’. Having nothing to fill their days 
became an issue as it left them with time on their hands to worry 
and get stressed, which had a negative impact on their psychosocial 
wellbeing. 
The lack of activities made the migrants feel as though they were 
wasting their lives away, doing nothing and learning nothing. In a 
study on post-deportation, Schuster and Majidi highlight how the 
deported feel as though they have lost opportunities and return 
to Afghanistan with ‘no improvement in their education, skills, or 
working experience’ (2013: 228). Our interviewees told us that if, 
one day, they are forced to leave Sweden, they would be leaving 
without having gained any new skills. This is a problem regardless 
of whether they stay in Sweden or are deported – either they did not 
acquire skills that would enable them to find work or, if they had 
an occupation, they were ‘de-skilled’ because they had not worked 
for a long time. Nadir worked with migrants deported to Kabul and 
describes how many of them felt after deportation: 
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They talk about the waste of their lives, because I have met at 
least two people who have been deported after staying 12 years 
in Norway, so just imagine you stay somewhere for 12 years and 
after 12 years you are sent back and you don’t have anything in 
your hands, your whole life is wasted, so this is what they talk 
about, this is what they sometimes regret, sometimes they hate 
those countries.
The physical and mental health of migrants at risk of 
deportation
Many of our interviewees were negatively affected both physically 
and mentally by their situation. They exhibited high levels of stress, 
anxiety and constant worry. During our interviews, some migrants 
were close to tears, many were excessively distressed and angry and 
most showed symptoms of extreme hopelessness – all generally 
associated with episodes of depression.
Several declared that they had aged prematurely in Sweden. Wali put 
it succinctly: ‘…when I came here, I was fresh like a 14-year-old boy 
and now my hair has become white, just [after] three years’. The time 
spent in Sweden has been exhausting for many of the interviewees, 
draining them of both hope and energy, as illustrated in this quote 
by Mahdi:
Before I thought a lot about my future, what I wanted to become 
and things like that. I will study, I will. But now when I lost my 
hope, I don’t think so much [about the future], I don’t have the 
energy right now to study, the feeling is that I’m tired.
Being unable to plan for the future is extremely frustrating and puts 
a lot of strain on many of the interviewees.  Many described their 
future as ‘very dark’. For those in hiding, the prospect of remaining 
in that situation did not seem very appealing. As Pal states: ‘I cannot 
stay in “black” for four years because I’m tired… I can’t wait for so 
long’.18 Fatma, a young Kuwaiti migrant, felt that all of her thinking 
and worrying made her both physically and mentally ill. Mohammad 
also described how his health had deteriorated since he was denied 
asylum and he had visited the doctor several times for different 
conditions. Aamir also had concerns regarding his physical health:
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Aamir:  I have a big ‘push’ over my heart, lots of stress. And I 
think about what if my heart stops, what will happen 
to my future, my daughter’s future? … I talk to my wife 
about my death because I have too much stress. I’m a 
human.
Interviewer:  You’re afraid you’re going to get a heart attack?
Aamir:  I’m not a machine; I’m human, same as you. Six years 
of stress will come to me... I have lived for six years 
with high stress. Two years here. I’m human, I cannot… 
[live with all this stress]
Several of our informants told us how they are constantly thinking 
about what is going to happen and worrying about their future, which 
affects both their sleeping and eating patterns. Wali was informed by 
the police that the deportation of him and his family was only a 
couple of days away and related how this had affected them: ‘The 
police told us that “We will send you on Tuesday to Afghanistan”. 
We do not have appetite for eating anything, I have not slept for three 
nights, and I haven’t relaxed’. 
Many of the interviewees themselves described their mental health 
problems as depression. Some had had thoughts about – or had 
even attempted – to commit suicide. Kader portrays the complete 
desperation he felt after he received his third negative decision (from 
the Migration Court of Appeal) and became homeless – he had left 
the SMA’s housing so that the deporting authorities would not be 
able to find him. He felt completely lost and overwhelmed, as though 
there was no way out of his misery. Sweden did not allow him stay, 
going back to Afghanistan was too dangerous an option, and the 
Dublin Convention made it impossible for him to apply for asylum 
in other European countries. Kader recalls this desperation: ‘The 
only solution you have is to finish yourself. Yeah I tried lots of times 
[to kill myself] but fortunately [I failed]’. This desperation, because 
of which some interviewees had attempted to take their own lives, 
was also described by Kader as ‘burning’: ‘…most of the immigrants 
are coming because they want to live in paradise, but which kind 
of paradise is this which is burning you without fire yeah? You’re 
burning without fire in Sweden’.
143
Part of the difficult situation that Kader describes as ‘burning’ is 
living with a constant fear that deeply and internally erodes a person’s 
psychosocial wellbeing. The fear originates in thoughts about what 
would happen to them if they were deported. Some fear incarceration, 
others what they would have to do to stay alive. For many, the fear is 
that returning to the country of origin would mean the end of their 
life, as Bahara, a female from Afghanistan, explains: ‘If the Talibans 
find my husband they would kill him, me, and after that they would 
cut off my head, cut off the heads of my children’. The police were 
the most commonly cited as the authority of which people were the 
most afraid, but sometimes the SMA was also mentioned. It is to 
be noted that the fear of the Swedish authorities appeared to be a 
projection of the fear of being deported. Fear of the police limited 
migrants’ movements and activities, as Rashid invoked: ‘I was afraid 
that if I go out the police would find me, arrest me. The problem is 
that I couldn’t even go outside so I was confined to my home’.
During the autumn of 2014, the Swedish Police Authority took part 
in a European project – Mos Maiorum – a joint operation between 
EU border police that many saw as involving increased searches for 
migrants living in hiding (Leander 2014). Bahara explained how 
the increased police activity added to their fear of being caught and 
further limited their movements: 
You know for two weeks the police searched [referring to Mos 
Maiorum]. We don’t go outside, and we don’t have any food 
during those two weeks because we cannot buy it. It was a high 
risk to go outside. We were just eating the things we had at home.
The migrants’ fears were not limited to the authorities but included 
other people who could turn them in to the Police Authority. They 
were constantly afraid and never felt secure, not even in their home, 
which further limited their range of movement and access to the 
different services. Interviewee Miranda attended an open day-care 
centre (öppen förskola) occasionally, although she was afraid that 
other participants there might turn her in: ‘…since I don’t speak 
Swedish, quite often I feel afraid that someone is going to call the 
police and say that it is someone here who doesn’t speak Swedish’.
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Mahdi attended school but did not tell anyone there about his 
situation. When he fell ill he was reluctant to visit the hospital, even 
though, as a minor, he had the right to access any parts of the health 
service. In contrast to minors, for adults without residence permits 
access is restricted to ‘care that cannot be postponed’, a concession 
which came into force through a change in the law in 2013 which 
would allow the undocumented the same healthcare access as 
asylum-seekers (Swedish Parliament 2013: 407). This quote by Aamir 
shows the difficulty he experienced, as an adult, in getting care: ‘For 
example during these two years [in Sweden] my tooth broke, I tried 
to go to doctor and the doctor said “No, not now. After you get a 
personal number you can come”. Every night it hurts and it’s bad for 
me, bad for my health’.
Coping strategies 
The previous sections have depicted a daily life and a future filled 
with challenges, over which the interviewees had little control. Here 
Emmanuel describes a sentiment shared by many of our interviewees 
when he said that they lacked power in Sweden: ‘I don’t have power 
in this country that is number one, because I don’t have residence 
permit I don’t have anything so I have nothing to say...’ This lack of 
autonomy was a severe blow to their psychosocial wellbeing. People’s 
lack of control over their lives is seen as deeply problematic, according 
to one study on detainees, since control over life is ‘a prerequisite for 
good health’ (Jose Puthoopparambil et al. 2015: 81). In order to 
cope with or escape from their situation, our interviewees employed 
a number of strategies, which could potentially improve their 
psychosocial wellbeing by allowing them to regain some autonomy 
in their lives. 
Firstly, the interviewees demonstrated the ways in which they dealt 
with the immediate threat of deportation. For example, when Ismat 
and Storai were called to a meeting at the SMA, after they had received 
the decision from the Migration Court of Appeal, they made sure not 
to take their children with them. Ismat clearly told us that he only 
took his wife with him because he knew that the authorities would 
not deport them without their children. Secondly, in spite of their 
sadness over their reduced power and lack of control over their own 
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situation, migrants nonetheless managed, given the circumstances, 
to exhibit an extraordinary degree of resourcefulness and creativity 
in coping with their dire situation. What was certainly common to 
all the interviewees was that they tried to do anything they could in 
order to stay. Kader illustrates this in the following quote:
When I was in [mid-sized Swedish city] I went to the police station. 
I asked them, I told them the Migration [Agency] is behaving like 
this with us… everyone tries his best to save his life. And now it’s 
kind of time, I got three negatives and now I’m sinking. If you’re 
sinking in a river or in a sea you just try to rescue yourself, pull 
[at] everything what you got.
Quite a few of our informants were involved in some form of activism 
– demonstrations, hunger strikes etc. They were using their own 
agency to fight for their rights and their lives. They had exhausted 
all the options open to them in the system and were therefore trying 
to use the media and other outlets to promote their story, provide 
information about their situation and hopefully be offered some help. 
A couple of them took part in an event where a group from their 
country of origin went on hunger strike for several weeks. Many of 
the participants told us that this was their last attempt to try to escape 
their current situation – they had tried everything else but nothing 
had helped. They had no hope of any other solution and seemed 
prepared to seriously jeopardise their health in order to get out of 
their dilemma and regain some control over their lives. One of the 
participants said: ‘We have finished the deep depression and this is 
the last resort’. Other interviewees were involved in an awareness-
raising demonstration. Their activity gave them the opportunity 
to speak publicly and to interact with many different people, and 
especially with journalists from all over Europe. As an outcome of 
this activity, they were invited to travel around Sweden giving lectures 
about their plight at conferences and universities. They received 
support from many people. Their hope was that this would make 
it hard for the SMA to deport them. It also meant that they felt a 
lot more hopeful about the future than they did before they started 
the protest. The support received from organisations and individuals 
gave them hope and more strength to keep on fighting, and even 
had two positive results in that, since the demonstration, two of 
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the participants were able to get their case revisited by the SMA 
(praktiska verkställighetshinder) and were no longer undocumented 
but were waiting for their decision as asylum-seekers. However, 
not all our interviewees protested in this public manner. Tarek, for 
example, was on hunger strike whilst he was in the remand centre 
but the media did not report on this. Those interviewees who were 
successful in gaining the attention of the media in order to broadcast 
their protests generally received supported from different networks 
and organisations in Sweden, which improved their psychosocial 
wellbeing by providing them with more positive relations with others, 
reducing their fear, enabling them to take part in more meaningful 
activities, have greater autonomy and improve their chances of 
staying in Sweden. 
A third point to add to the discussion on coping strategies is that 
migrants at risk of deportation try to find support from friends and 
social networks. Creating a social network is a strategy that our 
interviewees mentioned as a means to receive resources enabling one 
to live in hiding. Social interactions were also used as a distraction 
from their mundane daily lives. Mohammad was living in his mother’s 
apartment but every week they went to visit his uncle, which provided 
him with some distraction from the perpetual waiting. He spoke of it 
as having ‘other things on our mind’, rather than the continual threat 
of deportation and ensuing difficulties. Migrants gain comfort from 
spending time with family and friends, as this also decreased their 
fear. Pal had a network of friends from his church: ‘When we’re in 
church then we don’t feel afraid. When we are with our friends from 
church then we feel a little better, not afraid either’.
For Mahdi it was very important to stay active and to interact with 
other people:
I don’t want to think about the Migration Agency… It is because 
if I think a lot I get headaches and cannot sleep at night. I have 
to make myself not think so much… I have to do things. If I’m 
alone I’m going to think about it that is why I don’t want to be 
alone for very long, instead I talk to someone.
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Sharing one’s worries with others is a well-known way to relieve 
stress and tension. Migrants at risk of deportation try to use this as 
a coping strategy. However, even here they encounter difficulties, 
as the interviewees explained, because it can be difficult to find an 
appropriate person. Some explained that they did not want to burden 
their families or partners. With friends who are in a similar situation 
the relationship can easily become very negative, and the sharing thus 
becomes less helpful, as described in this quote by Aamir: 
Fahim is my best friend and he can be very helpful to me. For 
example if I have any problem or stress, I don’t speak with my 
wife because she has so much stress. Why should I tell her? Instead 
I speak with Fahim and I’m relaxed. But at the same time, I don’t 
feel better because they’re in the same situation as me. Both his 
family and mine have a lot of stress and tension. When I sit with 
Fahim we only speak about the future. – What will happen in the 
future, will they send us to Afghanistan?
This quote shows clearly how isolating this situation can be. Those 
we interviewed were, to a certain extent, isolated from the wider 
society and also sometimes from their own families, either due to the 
fact that they were separated physically or because they did not want 
to burden their loved ones with their worries. 
Particular cases
This section presents three specific cases of atypical groups. The first 
case is that of children within families, who are vulnerable due to 
their developmental stages and dependence on the decisions of their 
parents. The second and third cases are two groups of stateless people 
for whom this ‘in limbo’ situation took on new significance because 
they knew that it was unlikely that they would be deported. 
Parents’ concerns for their children’s wellbeing 
This section discusses the issues about which the parents spoke 
concering their children. However, it does not purport to put forward 
the views or interests of children, since no children were interviewed. 
It does not describe the situation from the childrens’ perspective, 
not because it was deemed unimportant but because it fell outside 
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the scope of this research. Indeed, we were aware that the impact 
of deportability on children was different to that on adults, as was 
the impact of return on the psychosocial wellbeing of children: this 
has been ascertained in earlier studies such as that of Vathi and Duci 
(2015), who looked at children who had returned to Albania from 
the UK. Lundberg’s study of children in the asylum process also 
highlights how the needs of the children might differ from those 
of their parents and that their situation is particularly vulnerable 
(Lundberg 2009: 34). Therefore what are presented here are some 
adult views on certain aspects of how children could be affected by 
their family being in a state of deportability. 
Children were characterised first by their dependence on their parents’ 
decisions and choices, some of which, such as that of absconding 
and hiding, would have had a huge impact on their lives. Secondly, 
the ‘in limbo’ state in which they, together with their families, 
found themselves, must certainly have affected their wellbeing and 
development. Finally, children could be instrumentalised or ‘used’ by 
adults, even family members, in order to stay in the country.  
According to the parents, the housing situation had a big impact 
on the children’s wellbeing. Since they were undocumented, they 
described how they were always on the lookout for housing and 
how, at times, they had been forced to sleep outside in parks or 
stations with their young children. The instability brought about by 
the limited space was often disturbing for small children. Storai lived 
in quite a small studio flat together with her husband and two young 
children. She described their living situation: 
We are living all the time in this small room and the children 
are sometimes crying because it’s not so big that they can walk 
around the room because we have only one small room that we 
need for rest.
Parents in hiding, who were in constant fear of being caught by the 
police, tried to restrict their childrens’ movements. Often, the parents 
did not want them to go outside and run any risks, even though they 
felt that this was an unnecessary hardship for their children. Pal, a 
man from Albania, said:
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The worse thing is that the children cannot go outside. The only 
thing that bothers us and that we have [strong] feelings about is 
that the children should be able to go outside that they should 
not be locked in (instängda)… The worst is with the girl when she 
sits in the window and sees other children outside but she herself 
cannot go outside. 
Parents regret not having had access to day-care services where their 
children could interact with other children and adults. They felt 
that this had a negative impact on their children’s wellbeing. This 
access to day-care services for children whose families were at risk 
of deportation differed between the municipalities (Ismat and Storai, 
Aamir and Bahara were able to send their children to day-care, Wali 
was not). Ismat described how being able to attend day-care had 
improved his children’s, especially his daughter’s, situation:
My daughter also had psychological problems… All the time she 
was asking about the house that we had before that was very 
big…She asked me for that house. ‘Why don’t we go back there 
to our home?’ After she has gone to the ‘dagis’ [day care] she is 
feeling better.
Wali was not able to send his daughter to the day-care centre, and 
just staying at home had a negative effect on her social interactions 
and development. Wali, speaking about this abnormal situation, 
explained his daughter’s distress: ‘My daughter does not have contact 
with any other children; you know she is just crying to see another 
person’.
More shockingly, some parents told us how, in spite of the poor 
conditions in which they were living in Sweden, the situation for their 
children was still an improvement on what they had to contend with 
in their country of origin. A good example of this was the experience 
of Arjana and her family, who were living in hiding in their country of 
origin, Albania. She was threatened and was the potential victim of a 
blood feud. It was not safe for her children to go outdoors. In Sweden 
they were living at the SMA’s transit centre and their activities were 
much less restricted. Arjana said: ‘The children can go outside and 
run, play ball and such things…’ Bahara had a similar experience:
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My children they have friends here, they know Sweden as their 
country. For example there is no day care in Afghanistan. Now 
they’re going to day care, there are other children. They’re very 
happy in Sweden. They’re going swimming. We don’t have stress 
from attacks. It’s relaxed.
Most parents who are not in hiding tended to describe the situation 
for their children as one which was, overall, an improvement when 
compared to their country of origin. However, parents who were 
in hiding were worried about how their current situation would 
affect their children’s development, wellbeing and opportunities. For 
example, Aamir believed that his children’s speech development had 
been delayed:
My children are three years old and they cannot speak. I don’t 
think this situation is good for the children. My stress and tension 
is not good for my sons. We [both my wife and I] are stressed and 
tense all the time. We can’t play with the children now; my babies 
are feeling that we are not happy.
Of great concern is the unintentional projection of parents’ fears onto 
their children. Aamir and Bahahra, parents of three, describe how 
their children fear the police as much as they themselves do: 
aamIr:  We talk about the police, that we don’t want the police to 
see us; we don’t want to go with the police. We often talk 
about the police and my children are scared of the police. 
BaHara:  For example last night our son woke up in the middle of 
the night, at 3 o´clock, and cried. We asked him why; he 
just said ‘Police, police, police’.
aamIr:  I think he was dreaming about the police coming. 
Finally, children were also be used by parents as a means of preventing 
the Swedish authorities from returning them to the country of origin. 
The classic case was that of Ismat and Storai, mentioned earlier, who 
– aware of the risk that they might be deported as a family – went 
alone to a meeting at the SMA. 
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The ‘super limbo’ of stateless bidoons and Palestinians
The number of persons who have received a deportation decision 
but who cannot be deported by the Swedish Police Authority has 
increased by 74 per cent over the past six years – in 2014 there were 
more than 20,000 people in this situation (Sjödell 2014). Around 
10,000 of them were not living in hiding, and their whereabouts were 
known to the police (Adan 2014). Many could not be deported as 
they were stateless. In our study we encountered five such persons. 
A stateless person is internationally defined as ‘a person who is 
not considered as a national by any State under the operation of 
its law’ (UNHCR 2001a: 2004). There are two global conventions 
that aim to legally protect stateless people and prevent and reduce 
statelessness. These are the 1954 Convention relating to the Status 
of Stateless Persons, which deals with the standards of treatment of 
stateless persons and their access to basic rights such as employment, 
public education, and social security, and the 1961 Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness, whereby states have agreed to reduce the 
incidence of statelessness through the recognition of the fundamental 
right to nationality of every person (UNHCR 2001a, 2001b; 2004; 
2015). It is estimated that there are 12 million stateless people in the 
world and yet the problem of statelessness is under-discussed (De 
Chickera and Fitzgerald 2010: 150). Stateless people are ‘politically 
voiceless’ and their struggle places them at the core of the tension 
between national sovereignty and universal human rights. Stateless 
migrants are in a particularly vulnerable situation and can ‘face 
years of uncertainty, destitution and repeated, lengthy immigration 
detention’ (ENS 2014: 1). 
Apart from members of national groups not recognised by states, 
such as some Palestinians, some Kurds, some Bedouins from the 
Western Sahara etc., there is now a growing awareness that, apart 
from these de jure stateless groups, there are also new de facto forms 
of statelessness. A recent edited collection by leading experts Caroline 
Sawyer and Brad Blitz (2011) discusses various issues pertaining to 
new forms of statelessness in Europe, such as undocumented migrants 
in the UK, the sans-papiers in France and stateless Russians in Estonia. 
Their choice of title describes the legal, political and social conditions 
of these stateless populations: ‘displaced, undocumented, unwanted’.
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Our interviewees belonged to two separate stateless groups: bidoons 
(or bedoun/bidoun/bidun, UK Home Office 2014) from Kuwait and 
Palestinians. We describe their situation as being in ‘super limbo’ 
because, although they were not permitted to stay in Sweden, they 
could not, due to different factors pertaining to their statelessness, 
actually be deported. Leerkes and Broeders have called such people 
the ‘undeportable deportables’ (2010: 831). Their plight is unique in 
the sense that their ‘in limbo’ situation can drag on for years without 
either the authorities or the people themselves seeing a way out. 
Kuwaiti bidoons
Writing in 2011, Kohn (2011) estimated that there were between 
93,000 and 180,000 persons in Kuwait belonging to the bidoon 
population. Kuwait considers them to be ‘illegal residents’ (Landinfo 
2012). The group is diverse and their common denominator is that 
they belonged to the third of the Kuwaiti population who, after 
Kuwait gained independence from Great Britain, were not given 
Kuwaiti citizenship (Kohn 2011). The Kuwait authorities issued the 
1959 Nationality Law in order to register all residents of Kuwait but 
many did not learn about this registration or else disregarded it (UK 
Home Office 2014). The bidoons are refused admittance to public 
schools and subsidised health care (Kohn 2011). Migration authorities 
in countries such as the UK and Norway have presented reports 
in which they distinguish between documented and undocumented 
bidoons (Landinfo 2011; UK Home Office 2014). It is argued that 
the former are discriminated against but are not at the same risk of 
persecution as the latter (UK Home Office 2014). The following 
section presents the narratives of three of our bidoon interviewees. 
Yousef used to go to school in Kuwait but was kicked out after 1991. 
His father also lost his job at that time. His two younger siblings, 
Mohammad and Fatma, only had a few years of schooling in Kuwait 
and spent most of their time taking care of their sick father, who was 
unable to get the medicine he needed in Kuwait. They rarely left the 
house and felt as if they were stuck in a cage. When their father’s 
health deteriorated even further, they decided to leave Kuwait. For 
this they needed to obtain false passports. In Sweden, they applied 
for asylum, but their applications were rejected, as is common for 
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many other Kuwaiti bidoons. Nevertheless, many bidoons are still in 
Sweden, since Kuwait does not accept them as citizens and does not 
allow them back into the country. Mohammad and Yousef met with 
the Police Authority in Sweden, and were told that they are unable 
to send bidoons back to Kuwait: 
Interviewer:  Then the police said ‘We cannot send people back to 
Kuwait’?
Mohammad:  Yeah he showed me all the files of all the stateless from 
Kuwait, and said that nobody is going to Kuwait. 
Some people have stayed here for 7–8 years. Oh my 
gosh, 7–8 years without a solution. They have tried 
to send them to Kuwait for 7–8 years, and then they 
[the police] send the files to the Migration [Agency] 
to get them a residence permit but then they don’t 
get it.
In Sweden, bidoons end up in a state of rightlessness. Although 
different from their situation in Kuwait, that in Sweden is similar in 
that they also have fewer rights than other groups in society. They 
are not able to work, study, marry or receive full access to healthcare. 
However, Yousef found that there was one big difference with his life 
in Sweden compared to that in Kuwait:
The difference is that in Sweden we are free, no one is running 
after you, or saying bad things, no forces are beating you. The 
police in Sweden is very very kind… It’s the same story in Kuwait 
and Sweden, in both places we are asking for rights. We do similar 
things in Sweden and in Kuwait, have a website, talk to people. 
But the difference is that here the police doesn’t come and catch 
people.
Yousef also illustrates that the way they are treated by the authorities 
is better in Sweden than in Kuwait: ‘We have some rights in Sweden, 
we are humans here. The Migration [Agency] tells us in the wrong 
way etc. but still they accept that we are humans’.
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In contrast to our other interviewees who exhibit a constant fear of 
the police and of being sent back, the bidoons’ situation is different. 
They do not fear being caught by the Police Authority and they are 
not in hiding. The authorities know where the bidoons live and they 
know that, at the moment they are unable to deport them to Kuwait. 
In spite of the fact that they are not in any immediate danger of being 
deported, they still have to live with the risk of deportation because 
they do not have residence permits. What the bidoons do have to live 
with is the fear of the situation changing to one which would make 
their deportation possible. They are also aware that, as returnees 
who left the country illegally, their treatment in Kuwait will be even 
worse than before they left.
Stateless Palestinians
The Palestinian case is often referred to as a ‘case apart’ (Akram 
2002; Dumper 2008; Shiblak 2006). In Shiblak’s words: ‘Unlike other 
aliens, stateless Palestinians are not admissible in any other country. 
If expelled from a country they are at risk of finding themselves 
in ‘perpetual orbit’ as stateless individuals’ (Shiblak 2006: 9). The 
three characteristics which distinguish this group from other groups 
are, firstly, that the Palestinian case is a long-standing one (since the 
end of the 1948 war). Secondly, the number of Palestinian refugees 
is extremely high – close to three-quarters of the entire Palestinian 
population (Rempel 2006). They make up the largest stateless group 
in the world and many live without citizenship in different parts 
of the Middle East, where they have varying access to basic rights 
depending on the country in question. The United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was 
set up in the aftermath of the Israeli–Palestinian war of 1948 to take 
care of the special needs of the Palestinian refugees. An unintended 
consequence is that Palestinian refugees enjoy fewer protections than 
other refugees because UNRWA only has a mandate to provide the 
former with humanitarian assistance and, unlike UNHCR, does not 
have a specific protection mandate.
Two of our interviewees, Salim and Omar, argued that, in not 
granting residence permits to Palestinian refugees, Sweden was in 
violation of these international laws, to which it was a signatory. 
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Salim claimed that the SMA was not respecting government rules in 
not ‘considering us as humans’. Like the bidoons, the Palestinians’ 
lament is best described as an ‘extreme’ or ‘super” state of limbo. They 
are not allowed to stay in Sweden but they cannot be deported. In 
Salim’s case this was because he did not have any acceptable identity 
documents, just his Palestinian refugee documents. Omar was going 
to be sent back to the West Bank but, after the SMA contacted the 
Israeli Embassy, which stated that he could not be sent back to the 
West Bank, nothing happened to his case for two years. 
IntervIewer:  What do they tell you?
Omar:  Silence, they just stop my case. 
IntervIewer:  You have received three rejections and then...?
Omar:   I just appeal, appeal, and appeal to the court and 
receive the same decision, the same decision. What else 
can one do? I don’t know. What should I do? I don’t 
know. What is happening with my case? I don’t know 
what should I do? I don’t know!
IntervIewer:   If I understand you correctly, you have done everything 
that you can to help the authorities and they cannot do 
anything for you. 
Omar:  Yes. 
Salim was appalled by the way the SMA dealt with his and other 
Palestinians’ situations. His misery stems from the fact that the SMA 
left them in limbo. This was particularly hard on people who had been 
living in Sweden for long periods of time, sometimes even up to eight 
years. In a sentiment which is common with the bidoons and other 
stateless people, he protested against the sheer injustice of this situation.
Concluding remarks
Empirical analysis
Overall the inability of stateless people to plan their lives and their 
future created a sense that they had lost control over the situation 
– which, to a large degree, in practice, they really have. Therefore 
describing a situation brought about by state policies as ‘in limbo’ 
already denotes a situation of injustice. This chapter has shown 
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that this ‘in limbo’ environment is not conducive to a migrant’s 
psychosocial wellbeing. It is worth noting that this ‘in limbo’ situation 
comes at a critical point in peoples’ lives: at a time when they have to 
deal with the news that they cannot remain in the country in which 
they sought asylum, and will therefore be returned to a country from 
which they fled or with which they have few positive connections. 
Finally the ‘in limbo’ state comes at the end of a long migratory and 
asylum process for many people: a process which often started several 
years before, with the difficult decision to leave their country, apply 
for asylum and hopefully settle in another country for some time. 
Migrants who are ‘in limbo’ lack access to the basic conditions for 
achieving psychosocial wellbeing which, earlier in this chapter were 
summarised as: i) agency, autonomy and control; ii) participation 
and involvement; iii) social relationships and networks; iv) safety. 
Firstly, they lack control over their own future even though, as 
discussed in the section on coping strategies, they display levels of 
agency and resistance. When it comes to changing their situation 
they have very little autonomy, since the Swedish authorities and 
European regulations block the only option they can envisage for 
their future – to stay in Europe. Secondly, they do not have access 
to most societal activities, and their participation and involvement 
are therefore low. They have access to very few meaningful activities 
and struggle to satisfy their basic needs since they are unable to work 
and earn an income in the formal sector. Thirdly, their financially 
strained situation and their constrained movement limit their social 
relationships and networks. Their movement is constrained by their 
financial situation, the sometimes rural location of their housing, 
and their fear of being detected. Their social isolation is, at times, 
augmented by their own desire not to burden those they care for with 
their worries. Even when social relationships exist, they can feel alone 
with their worries. Finally, their sense of safety is extremely low; they 
live with a debilitating fear. Contrary to popular belief, this fear is 
not one of being caught by the Swedish authorities, but one which 
stems from their country of origin and from what could happen if 
the deportation decision was executed. 
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As a result, the migrants themselves reported that this situation 
of being ‘in limbo’ diminished their psychosocial wellbeing. The 
problems they displayed, which we were in no position to determine 
whether they were chronic or temporary, were stress, anxiety, 
insomnia and depression. Those interviewed in detention centres 
displayed a high level of frustration, anger and apathy (for example, 
JRS 2010). The migrants told us how their situation has aged them 
and made them feel as if they were ‘wasting their lives’. In addition to 
the mental impact, several of the interviewees suffered from physical 
symptoms that they believed were connected to the stress and tension 
of their situation. 
Nevertheless, the strain on their psychosocial wellbeing was not as 
great as their fear of the situation awaiting them in their country of 
origin. We were in no position to evaluate this fear, but what we do 
know is that they concluded that staying in this state of limbo was 
better than being sent back. However, as mentioned earlier in the 
chapter, there were people who would normally have been deported 
but who were unlikely to ever be so – those considered as stateless. 
This group of ‘non-deportables’ had perhaps even less autonomy 
over their situation than others since they did not have the option of 
being sent back. Some of those who spent years ‘in limbo’ felt that the 
situation was so bad that they would do anything to end it. Being ‘in 
limbo’ created an untenable situation for the migrants and severely 
worsened their psychosocial wellbeing. 
Human rights: Systemic, legal and political
This chapter has highlighted that the right to life, now commonly 
referred to as ‘the right to quality of life and wellbeing’, is restricted 
for people living ‘in limbo’ as a result of the decision taken by the 
Swedish state to deport them. The overall impact of living in this 
situation with restricted rights, without opportunities, without 
control over their future, as has been demonstrated, severely impacted 
their health. 
This leads us to the second human rights issue which needs to be 
further investigated: to what extent did this ‘in limbo’ state also 
limit migrants’ right to health? This chapter has concluded that 
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migrants’ psychosocial wellbeing has been negatively impacted by 
the return decision and the creation of this state of being ‘in limbo’, 
a state of deportability. Any signatory state to the basic human rights 
conventions is also obliged to ensure that everyone has equal access 
to basic health rights. This can require positive intervention by the 
state, particularly, but not only, in cases where there are mental health 
issues. Many migrants at risk of deportation due to: a) their high 
levels of stress, frustration and anxiety, b) their uncertain legal status 
– i.e. they were ‘undocumented’ or irregular; and c) their fear of being 
returned back to their country of origin by the authorities, might 
have refrained from seeking medical attention even when eventually 
accorded these social rights by the state19.
From an ethical and justice perspective, another point of discussion 
which arises out of the findings in this chapter, is certainly the 
fact that this ‘in limbo’ state of deportability is a result of a state 
decision. As such it could be argued that this is a situation socially 
and politically created by the Swedish state. Is the Swedish state 
justified in creating such a situation in which at least two important 
basic human rights – the right to life and the right to health – are 
restricted? Can the Swedish state be held responsible for the creation 
of the ‘state of deportability’? The moral principles on the line here 
– and this is a well-known source of tension – are the human rights 
of the individual and the right of a nation-state to expel people from 
its territory based on the ethical principle of ‘common good’. In this 
regard, the creation of the ‘in limbo’ state of deportability would be 
the ‘lesser evil’, whereby the intention is not the creation of such a 
situation but the implementation of a legitimate decision taken that 
the person be removed from Swedish territory and returned to their 
country of origin. In the latter case, the role assumed by the Swedish 
authorities and the choices they make are based on the principle 
of minimising harm. It would appear that this is the approach 
undertaken by the Swedish state. A common recommendation made 
by well-established human rights institutions such as the Council of 
Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights and the European Court 
of Human Rights, which both recognise the negative effects of ‘in 
limbo’ situations such as this, is to minimise the length of the period 
in which migrants are kept in this state.
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As a result, the situation of some stateless people, the so-called 
‘undeportable deportables’, can be considered as unacceptable. 
Interminable ‘in limbo’ situations which go on for years result in 
acute, ‘super-limbo’ lives whereby people’s human rights and dignity 
is slowly and steadily eroded. This explains the extreme reactions 
of some stateless people in Sweden who are ready to self-harm in 
different ways, the most public generally being through hunger 
strikes.
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6.   ‘I’M TREATED LIKE A CRIMINAL 
BUT I AM NOT’: THE EFFECTS 
OF ‘CRIMMIGRATION’ ON THE 
DEPORTATION PROCESS 
Introduction
Undocumented migrants are not criminals. Detention is not 
prison. Deportation is not punishment. These are truths in the 
legal system of the United States. Undocumented migrants are 
treated like criminals. Detainees feel as if they are in prison. 
Deportees experience their removal as punishment (Golash-Boza 
2010: 81).
This quote from an article written by Tanya Golash-Boza, an expert 
on immigration control and deportation in the US, resonates with 
and sums up the experience of migrants at risk of deportation in 
Sweden. Criminalisation is broadly conceptualised as the process by 
which some behaviours and attitudes, deemed as harmful to society or 
individuals, are sanctioned and lead to the application of criminal law 
and/or the creation of criminals. More pertinently, the criminalisation 
of migration, or ‘crimmigration’ refers to the ‘troubling’ convergence 
of immigration law and criminal law (Stumpf 2006). This includes 
the application to migrants, purportedly for breaking some aspect 
of immigration law, of techniques generally used or associated 
with criminals. Mitsilegas defines the criminalisation of migration 
more comprehensively as ‘the three-fold process whereby migration 
management takes place via the adoption of substantive criminal 
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law, via recourse to traditional criminal law enforcement mechanisms 
including surveillance and detention, as well as via the development 
of mechanisms of prevention and pre-emption’ (Mitsilegas 2015: 2). 
From a longer-term perspective, the policy direction in Sweden when 
it comes to broader immigration issues is that of de-criminalisation. 
Two major examples are the distinction between administrative and 
penal detention in order to avoid giving immigrants the impression 
that detention is a ‘punishment’ and, second, the setting up of the 
Swedish Migration Agency or SMA, a public authority dealing with 
most aspects of immigration, with the exception of some areas which 
have to do with deportation. Migrant detention centres fall under 
the responsibility of the SMA and are regulated under public law 
(Aliens Act Ch. 11.2). This gradual policy development began in 
the 1990s, following serious reports of mistreatment by the Swedish 
Police Authority which, up until then, had been responsible for 
immigration detention (Flynn and Cannon 2009: 12). Therefore, 
while irregular stay in Sweden in the past could incur serious 
penalties, including fines and prison sentences (see Pöyry 2009: 89), 
in recent years, whilst these penalties are still possible, the authorities 
have de-emphasised detention and deportation in the treatment of 
undocumented residents.
Although Sweden has, in general, de-criminalised various aspects 
of the asylum process, the same cannot be said for the deportation 
process, which remains a criminalising one. Sweden has made 
a clear distinction, as described above, between administrative 
migrant detention centres and disciplinary prisons. In addition, 
although, according to the Aliens Act, migrants can be prosecuted 
and penalised for staying in the country in an irregular situation, 
the authorities often choose not to press charges and instead just 
expel the migrant, thereby choosing an administrative measure over 
a criminal one. However forced return can include detention in 
specific cases – a person can be detained in order to enforce a return 
decision if it is feared that the person would otherwise abscond, 
pursue criminal activities or hinder the deportation (Aliens Act Ch. 
10.1). This plays into Khosravi’s (2009) argument that techniques 
used to ‘humanise’ and ‘rationalise’ the detention and removal of 
asylum-seekers, combined with a discourse of ‘caring’ and ‘saving’, 
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actually serve as disciplinary mechanisms whereby asylum-seekers 
are seen as responsible for their own detention and deportation. 
A key point on which Khosravi constructs his argument is his 
observation that, following 11 September, migrants are increasingly 
being subjected to pre-removal detention and removal as a result 
of greater criminalisation. This is certainly true on a global scale. 
We do not have information to support the connection with 11 
September in Sweden; what can be seen, however, is that more 
migrants are ‘experiencing’ detention. As seen in the statistics in 
Chapter 1, although the period of time migrants spend in pre-removal 
detention has decreased considerably, there is an increasing number 
of migrants who have been detained in recent years. Another issue 
which can exacerbate criminalisation is the fact that, in exceptional 
circumstances, children and families may still be detained. Finally, in 
2010, as seen in Chapter 2, Sweden, in accordance with the European 
Return Directive, adopted new provisions concerning the maximum 
detention period for an irregularly resident migrant who is to be 
returned; this period had previously been indefinite. The maximum 
detention period is now six months, which may be extended to 18 
months under certain circumstances, in accordance with Article 15 
of the Directive. According to the Aliens Act, a person should not 
be detained for more than three months; however it is possible to 
detain them for up to 12 months if the person is not cooperating 
or if it takes longer to get the appropriate documents. Detaining 
someone for more than 12 months is only possible if the person is 
being deported because of a criminal offence (Aliens Act Ch. 10.4 
[again, this does not exist in the English translation]).
The field of migrant deportations contrasts heavily with the rest 
of Swedish migration policy, since many deportation practices and 
processes are not decriminalised in practice.  The legal framework 
recommends a criminal penalty for an irregular stay in the form of a 
fine and, in the case of a violation of an re-entry ban, up to one year’s 
imprisonment (Ch. 20.1–2). Deportation, however, is not envisaged 
in the law as a punitive measure for irregular entry or stay, but as 
an administrative measure, inasmuch as it regularises the situation 
through expulsion of the migrant from Sweden and the return to the 
migrant’s country of origin. The SMA and the police can deprive 
migrants of their liberty in migrant detention centres upon arrival 
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and during the investigation of the person’s right to stay in Sweden 
(Ch. 10.1); however the detention centre is mainly used when a return 
decision has been issued – it therefore functions primarily as a pre-
removal centre (Swedish Migration Agency 2015a: 99). Finally, the 
police, particularly, but not exclusively, if the migrant is detained, are 
allowed the use of strategies and tactics which mimic those used with 
criminals posing grave security threats – handcuffing, the use of force 
and surveillance. Although, overall, the migration system has been 
widely decriminalised, this chapter will show that the deportation 
(forced removal) system is still, in reality, infused with criminalisation 
practices. As a result of this, a common narrative by migrants at risk 
of deportation, a narrative imbued with some very harsh emotions, 
is the sentiment that they are being criminalised. 
When it comes to legal safeguards, persons held under the Aliens Act 
should enjoy certain fundamental rights as from the onset of their 
deprivation of liberty. The Committee on the Prevention of Torture, 
in its latest report in 2009, found detained migrants were ‘promptly’ 
allowed to inform a person of their choice of their situation, had 
access to a lawyer if they were subject to an expulsion and had been 
detained for three days, had access to a doctor, were duly informed 
of their rights with the provision of leaflets in different languages 
and interpreters and had ‘excellent’ opportunities for contact with 
the outside world (CPT 2009: 45). These legal and policy decisions 
distinguish Sweden from most other EU countries (EMN 2014).
Despite these mitigating factors and the broader policy of 
decriminalisation in immigration, deportation in Sweden remains a 
criminalising process. This came out very strongly in this research. 
This chapter is an attempt to contextualise these feelings and 
emotions, whilst remaining faithful to the framework which the 
migrants have described to us. The overarching narrative is a sense 
of incomprehension at the gravity of the actions against them, as 
Rashid said: ‘They acted in such a way as if I had committed a grave 
crime such as causing a death or a big crime’.20
Secondly, and unsurprisingly, the detention of migrants is the singular 
most-mentioned issue concerning this aspect of criminalisation. 
Mahdi says:
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I would first close all detention centres. One does not need to have 
detention centres, it is not wrong to go to another country. They 
[the Swedish authorities] send people to detention centres, why? 
They [the migrants] have to be there for several months, they are 
not criminals, they have not done anything wrong, they just came 
here. Why do they have to be detained, why? 
The increasing concern over the use of criminal sanctions – or 
administrative sanctions which mimic criminal ones, such as 
detention, police tactics, etc. – in border and immigration control 
processes, is not unfounded. Nor is the use of certain terminology, 
which justifies repressive measures (Merlino and Parkin 2011: 3). 
Bigo (2002) points out that this also occurs in the EU through 
the framing of the issue of undocumented migration in a security 
terms, or as Merlino and Parkin (2010) describe it as an ‘insecurity 
continuum that ranges between irregular migration and criminality’. 
This criminalisation puts migrants under greater duress and pressure 
and, as a consequence, they take greater risks to avoid being sent 
back (Cholewinski 2007; Guild and Minderhoud 2006; Lee 2005). 
Sweden is no exception. 
This chapter combs through these narratives which, in the interviews 
conducted for this project, are often closely interwoven with the 
feelings of helplessness symptomatic of being ‘in limbo’, as discussed 
in Chapter 5. The aim of this chapter is to try to understand how 
migrants experience criminalisation and the ways in which this 
understanding interweaves with, on the one hand, the law – which 
effectively makes an irregular stay a criminal offence – and, on the 
other, with policy, which prioritises the administrative measure 
of expulsion over that of criminal prosecution. This chapter also 
continues the discussion of the migrants’ reactions to the system by 
shedding light on how their interactions with the system are tainted 
with their experience of criminalisation; it also links to our previous 
analysis of migrants’ psychosocial well-being. The pressing question 
that underlies this, but remains beyond the scope of this chapter, is 
the extent to which this criminalisation is or is not necessary, and 
how it can be avoided.
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Theoretical and conceptual framework
Criminalisation, immigration control and human rights
Criminal law and administrative law are two distinct fields which 
have been woven together in the area of borders, immigration and 
asylum. Criminal law is designed to punish individuals who harm 
other individuals or society at large. In liberal democracies, it is crimes 
against individuals which are considered the most grave, whereas the 
so-called ‘victimless crimes’, such as drug consumption, are more 
subject to contestation. The field of administrative law is composed 
of rules and regulations which are of an administrative nature, 
generally considered less serious and harmful to either individuals 
or the wider society. Discussions generally centre around whether or 
not border-crossing or illegitimate residence, as ‘victimless crimes’, 
ought to be dealt with in the field of criminal law at all. The Council 
of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights, who is against the 
criminalisation of irregular entry into a territory, puts forward the 
following argument:
Leaving aside the issue of trafficking in human beings, an 
individual who irregularly crosses a border or stays on the territory 
of a state beyond his or her permitted period does not harm a 
specific individual. To the extent that harm is done at all, it is to 
the integrity of the state’s border and immigration control laws 
(Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 2010: 8)
Interweaving criminal law and immigration control creates an obvious 
challenge for states which have made a commitment to comply with 
their human rights obligations. The key issue here is the principle 
of non-discrimination. The adoption of criminal laws establishing 
offences which can ‘only’ be committed by foreigners therefore 
clearly violates this sacrosanct principle in international human rights 
law. Border control, however, whilst being accepted as a consequence 
of the organisational principle of state sovereignty in international 
law, is grounded in discrimination on the basis of nationality – that 
is, citizens have the right to enter a territory and non-citizens do not. 
Human rights law and principles sit uncomfortably with the issue of 
border control (Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 
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Commissioner 2010) but deal, nonetheless, with the treatment of 
non-citizens at physical borders and even beyond, where the state’s 
agents are in control of the individual (Guild 2006).
From a human rights perspective, the criminalisation of migration 
is certainly not condoned. The human rights challenges connected 
to this criminalisation have been documented in various reports, 
including two reports by the UN Special Rapporteur on the human 
rights of migrants (2015, 2013) outlining principles and guidelines 
on human rights at external borders, a paper issued by the Council 
of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (2010), and a 2013 
regional report by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human 
Rights of Migrants which was presented to the UN Human Rights 
Council on the management of the external borders of the EU. The 
Fundamental Rights Agency of the EU published two reports, one 
on the fundamental rights of migrants in an irregular situation in 
the European Union (FRA 2011) and another specifically entitled 
Criminalisation of Migrants in an Irregular Situation and Persons 
Engaging With Them (FRA 2014). All these reports draw attention 
to the fact that the criminalisation of migrants, and in particular of 
irregular migrants, is unfair and creates situations which can have a 
severe negative impact on migrants.
Criminalisation from a sociological and psychological 
perspective 
Irregularly staying migrants and those risking deportation are 
criminalised both in law and as a result of stereotyping and 
stigmatising by society. Therefore, whilst it is important to understand 
the triadic relationship between criminal law, administrative law and 
human rights, it is also vital to go back to the roots of the concept of 
criminalisation in studies of deviance. Studies of deviant behaviour 
have demonstrated that the actual labelling of individuals, either 
through the application of a relevant law making an activity unlawful 
or through societal perceptions, can lead to an internalisation of a 
‘deviant’ identity. This, in turn, leads to the creation of ‘deviant’ 
groups for whom it becomes easier to then cross over into other 
forms of ‘deviant’ activity. 
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This argumentation is grounded in the school of thought of 
interactionist sociology which, in essence, viewed deviant behaviour 
not as a self-evident behavioural entity, but as one that could only be 
created through a process of social interaction (Tannenbaum 1938). 
Some people committing deviant acts ‘become deviant’ through the 
imposition of social judgements on their behaviour. In this process, 
they become the essence, the personification, of the problem. As a 
result of this approach, rules and regulations would not be viewed as 
consensual ‘givens’ but as sites of negotiation and dispute. Elaborating 
this argument further, sociologists use Lemert’s (1951) distinction 
between primary and secondary deviation. Primary deviance is often 
a temporary transgression in which perpetrators have no conception 
of themselves as deviant, whereas secondary deviance is created 
through the reaction of others to the initial deviance. This becomes 
a self-fulfilling prophecy: once a deviant identity, through name-
calling, stereotyping and labelling, is created, deviants accept their 
deviant status and reorganise their lives accordingly. Deviance was no 
longer viewed simply as a pathological act that violated consensual 
norms, but as something created through micro-level interactions 
between rule violator and rule enforcer. This process ensures that 
some people who commit deviant acts come to be known as deviants, 
whereas others do not. Looking at deviance and criminality from a 
different perspective, Becker (1963) argued that being considered 
‘outsiders’ in society meant that the group is more likely to epitomise 
what is considered to be criminal. Criminality, then, is continually 
sought only in those identified as criminal, who are likely to be 
‘outsiders’ and therefore social control can, itself, cause deviancy 
(Lemert 1967). The insights gained from this school of thought led to 
a better appreciation of the social causes, and social repercussions, of 
the labelling of an individual’s behaviour. This is the basis for recent 
studies in this area, such as that by Banks (2008), who argues that 
the current policy direction in the UK which is increasingly reflecting 
the trend of punitive crime control is made possible through the 
stereotyping of asylum-seekers as deviant and dangerous.
The inherent dangers of criminalisation, for both the migrant and 
the migrant risking deportation, go beyond the migrants’ personal 
discomfort with the label and the tactics used. First, the criminal label, 
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given by groups in society, can narrow the options of a person to such 
an extent that it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Indeed irregular 
migrants who are committing an offence by not having a legitimate 
permit to stay are often unfairly perceived as criminals, a perception 
which, in turn, makes them more vulnerable to exploitation and 
abuse. In line with the above schools of thought, the use of criminal 
sanctions and treatment could create a vicious – and self-perpetuating 
– circle of negative labelling and stigmatisation by society, during 
which the migrant would be more likely to engage in other unlawful 
or criminal behaviour. Migrants at risk of deportation break away 
from these tendencies, and no evidence has been found to connect 
them to criminal behaviour. It is beyond the scope of this project to 
analyse why this is so, but a tentative hypothesis could be that, in 
contrast to other groups, migrants at risk of deportation are very 
diverse and do not constitute a ‘cohesive’ group. In addition, the 
time–space element is such that these migrants are present at different 
points in time and, except for the short period which some of these 
migrants spend in detention centres, are in different places around 
Sweden. A third addition to this hypothesis is the importance of 
morality and righteousness for these migrants, most of whom are 
appealing to be granted ‘asylum’ by Sweden, an institution founded 
on particularly moral standards.
Migrants at risk of deportation, like other groups exhibiting deviant 
or unlawful behaviour, are labelled in law and policy, and in practice, 
as ‘criminals’. In contrast to these groups, as can be noted in the 
interview extracts presented below, migrants at risk of deportation 
fiercely resist and refuse the label of criminal to such a degree that 
they appear to interpret it as a ‘moral’ offence. This would indicate 
that the level of ‘internalisation’ of a ‘criminal identity’ is minimal. 
This is, indeed, supported by the fact that there is no indication from 
this or any other study that, as a group, they are more likely to take 
part in other forms of criminal behaviour.
Migrant narratives – the main issues
The overarching perception shared by all our interviewees, and 
generally put across rather forcefully, is that they felt that they were 
unfairly treated as criminals. Teka adamantly stated in his interview 
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that this is why detention for him was hard: ‘That is difficult for me 
because I’m not a criminal, I am an asylum-seeker… They didn’t 
treat me like an asylum-seeker, it’s really difficult’. Kader, too, was 
angry: ‘They don’t respect you and they’re like [treating me as 
if] I have killed 100 people and I’m quite a dangerous killer and 
they’re talking with you like that’. Mahdi tried to make sense of 
the situation. The problem, he said, was that ‘the Police Authority 
catches undocumented migrants and not criminals’. He adds:
They do the same as with a criminal with you. When I was there 
[during the asylum case], there were case workers, the interpreter, 
the lawyer. If you cannot tell them like this [in that situation], they 
say that you are lying or so. 
The impression that many of our interviewees had was that the 
authorities were putting pressure on them to give the evidence needed 
in order to deport them. Vlad, who was in detention and claimed not 
have been in possession of a passport, was informed that he would 
be kept in detention for as long as was needed for him to give them 
his passport. He exclaimed that the ‘border police, they just do their 
jobs. But I am frustrated by this Swedish mentality that just thinking 
[a thought] is enough to keep us in here, locked up’. 
The migrant–police relationship
For migrants who remained in Sweden with an irregular status, their 
relationship with the police was often strained to such a degree that 
they would avoid them even after their situation had been regularised. 
This tension was brought about by an array of factors stemming 
from the interactions of the migrants with Swedish institutions and 
border control, the ease with which they were able to be targeted 
and the encounters which migrants had had with police and soldiers 
in other countries. This complicated relationship could also have 
been negatively influenced by the migrants’ own internalisation of the 
‘clandestine’ label or stereotype they were given by society. 
Rashid was one of two interviewees who had already applied for 
asylum in another EU country. He was sent back to Italy. He says:
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When I meet a policeman [on the streets in Sweden] the idea that 
I have, it feels a little like hate in my heart because I believe that 
the police task is to save people and not do what they’ve done 
[to me]. They already knew that I suffered from those problems 
that I have, they should not have done it [deported me] that way. 
Rashid explained how the removal took place, an experience which 
tallied with those of some other migrants. His focus is on the means 
used to restrain him:
And the day after I was still in my room and I was sleeping when 
the police came to the room. There were three or four police 
officers who came. Then when the police came to the room… they 
asked my roommate what my name was, and he said my name… 
without any warning or anything they [the police] attacked, they 
started attacking me and took my hands behind my back and I 
had no clothes on except for a shirt … it was six or seven in the 
morning. Then after this attack, he [the policeman] put handcuffs 
on me and they [the Police Authority] said: ‘We are going to 
deport you’. I said: ‘You can deport me if Italy accepts me again, 
there is no problem. But if Italy will not accept me it is your 
responsibility and you are playing with my life’. Then the police 
phoned someone I do not know who, and after the call the police 
came with a chain, they had the chain it was over my legs and 
entire body. And on this chain there were two handles and one of 
them had a handle and a policeman held it [on my shoulders] and 
I was barefoot without shoes, we walked almost for 20 minutes 
before we arrived at the boat. Before the other passengers got 
on the boat they took me to a corner; they said ‘You should stay 
there and you cannot, you have to be completely silent ... And 
you should be quiet’. They waited until all passengers went on the 
boat and then I could go. Then we came to another small town 
then we went with a small car to Stockholm. Then they took me 
to a remand centre or a prison where the people, there were some 
who were 25–30-year-olds and among those there were some who 
were to be deported too. When they were going to move me to 
this remand centre/prison, and I discovered that the others were 
older 25–30 years old I was wondering why should I be with them 
because I’m under age. I was there for almost 6–7 days.
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Rashid’s articulation of his experience of being caught was quite 
common amongst irregular migrants who, in a similar fashion to 
criminals, were caught, restrained and detained, with the intention 
of removing them from the country. In contrast, criminals were never 
removed from the country unless they were ‘migrant criminals’. Either 
way the police were tasked with the responsibility of finding and 
organising the removal. They acted within their remit, and the tactics 
they used, one could say, constituted a somewhat inevitable course of 
action in the case of non-consenting adults. The migrants, however, 
felt that being treated like criminals was unjust. Mahdi spoke of a 
feeling of injustice, racism and double standards and betrayed his 
uncomfortable relationship with the police:
I know many criminals in Stockholm, we are not friends but we 
greet each other sometimes in my school and out and so. They do 
many stupid things, they steal from shops, they have guns, they 
sell cocaine and marijuana and everything but the police are not 
on them, the police is only on REVA.
As we explained in the introductory chapter to this volume, REVA 
stands for Rättssäkert och effektivt verkställighetsarbete or – literally 
translated – ‘Legal Certainty and Effective Enforcement’. Although 
the aim of the operation was to increase cooperation between the 
different government agencies in order to make the deportation 
process more efficient, in Mahdi’s quote REVA was being used in 
the popular sense (a misconception) to refer to the apprehension and 
identification of irregular migrants. 
Connections to criminal activities
As explained above, the migrants we interviewed took pains to 
explain that they were not criminals and that they were different to 
criminals. Some interviewees, however, did mention that they had 
been prosecuted for committing crimes and, as a result, had spent 
time in prison. These appeared to be what might be referred to as 
‘petty’ crimes, since the sentence was often just a few months in 
prison. Vlad brought up another important point. He argued that, 
as an irregular migrant, you can be driven into poverty and therefore 
have to steal to make ends meet. He explained it thus:
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[When one is in the asylum process] one is forced to do something 
wrong. One cannot [get by]. Look, I smoke and one gets 70 SEK 
per day from the Migration Agency, and that is not enough for 
cigarettes. I cannot work, I cannot study, I am not allowed to take 
care of myself. I just sit there in one camp and eat what they give 
me. But I am also a human, one will do wrong things, it comes, it 
happens that way… It’s not that I like what I did but it happens 
… If I don’t get asylum here [in Sweden], then I get a black job 
[in Germany] so I don’t have to steal.
Vlad was ashamed of having stolen – he knew it was wrong. Of 
particular interest was that he felt an illegal job was less morally 
reprehensible than stealing. From his point of view a black job would 
have meant that he was working for money although, from a Swedish 
or state perspective, both were illegal activities. 
Detention
Pre-removal centres were often described as disciplinary prisons by 
the migrants. What mattered to them was the lack of liberty, which 
is also evident in Jose Puthoopparambil et al.’s study of detainees in 
Sweden (2015: 80). Migrants, especially those who had spent time in 
different prisons around the world, admitted that the conditions in 
Swedish pre-removal centres were ‘OK’. This resonates with reports 
such as Caritas Sweden (2015) and CPT (2009) which state that the 
conditions inside pre-removal centres in Sweden are of a ‘very high 
standard’ or that operations at the detention centres function well 
(Parliamentary Ombudsmen 2011: 314). However, earlier studies 
also highlight issues with Swedish detention centres, the Parlimentary 
Ombudsmen (2011) presents a fairly harsh critique of the detention 
of people in remand centres which will be discussed later in this 
section, and Jose Puthoopparambil et al. are critical of the lack 
of healthcare services, in particular mental-health care services, in 
detention (2015: 81). 
Teka spent time in prisons and migrant detention centres in Ethiopia, 
Libya, Malta and then Sweden. His description tallied with those of 
other interviewees who had spent time in remand centres and prisons 
in Sweden: ‘The differences are like: there is internet here, there is 
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not internet over there. The food is better here. The people will treat 
you better. Here it is not the police, its normal people that makes a 
difference’. It is not surprising that Teka highlighted the fact that the 
detention centre was run by lay members of staff, unlike in some 
other countries where the military, the police or high-security staff 
were employed. Jose Puthoopparambil et al. (2015) conclude that, 
although most of the factors that make detainees feel like prisoners 
– uniformed personnel and detainees, no windows, surveillance 
cameras – are absent in Swedish detention centres, their informants 
still felt that they were imprisoned (2015: 81). The authors also claim 
that ‘Detention systems around the world have similar effects on 
detainees irrespective of the structural and administrative variations 
(2015: 81–2). The CPT reports that staff working in the detention 
centres were ‘sufficient in number, had different cultural backgrounds 
and possessed a range of language skills (e.g. at the Märsta centre, 
37 languages were reportedly spoken amongst the staff)’ (CPT 2009: 
43). In addition, staff members at the centres in Märsta and Gävle 
were employed to organise activities for detainees. Most importantly, 
the CPT adds that:
The delegation did not hear any allegations of ill-treatment of 
detained foreign nationals by staff of the Migration Agency 
detention centres in Märsta and Gävle. On the contrary, many 
detainees interviewed spoke positively about the staff, and the 
delegation observed that staff–detainee relations were generally 
relaxed (2009: 42).
Nevertheless, Vlad spoke quite harshly of his detention. At the time 
of our interview, Vlad was in a detention centre, but he had also 
spent time in a remand centre. He focused on his lack of freedom, 
saying: ‘I am also a human being. I also have feelings…. You feel 
like an animal. You do not get to decide something for yourself they 
[the detention centre staff] are telling you to do things. It’s like you 
know, being a slave’.
The system is not foolproof and mistakes are made which could 
seriously damage a person. One of our interviewees, a young 
Bangladeshi, was erroneously detained in a disciplinary prison 
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(fängelse) for three weeks before being transferred to a migrant 
detention centre (förvar), from where his deportation eventually 
took place. Another interviewee, Akash, stressed that this was an 
abnormal occurrence ‘in Sweden’. It was clearly a source of relief 
and restored his sense of justice when the Court ruled in his favour. 
He was even awarded monetary compensation. 
It was unreal and I was really nervous. I could not understand 
what I had done wrong, then I asked myself just – ‘Why am I 
here? Why did they take me to prison?’ And then when I came 
to the prison and those who are criminals [who were in prison] 
they asked me ‘What have you done?’ I said ‘I have done nothing 
[laughs] they picked me up from the street and then they sent me 
here’. But this was a criminal prison …. And there I was for three 
weeks. After three weeks they decided to send me to the Migration 
Agency [detention centre (förvar)] for I had not done anything 
stupid here in Sweden and it was the police’s fault that they sent 
me to the criminal prison. It was the government’s fault that they 
sent me to the criminal prison and I got money [compensation] for 
that when I got back [to Sweden, post-deportation]. …. After three 
times in the Court they decided that I am not a criminal, I have not 
done anything wrong and it was the police’s fault that they just 
took me like that from the street. This does not usually happen 
in Sweden it is not normal. That is why the Swedish parliament 
must pay for those weeks that I spent in prison, criminal prison. 
This mistake, which is rare, however, rather disturbingly demonstrates 
that the conceptual and legal distances between administrative pre-
removal migrant detention centres and other forms of penal detention 
such as prisons and remand centres, are less than would appear on 
paper. The Aliens Act clearly states that a person’s freedom should 
not be limited more than necessary (Ch. 1.8). The Act allows the 
SMA three alternatives for dealing with detainees who disturb the 
order and security of the detention centre and are dangerous to 
themselves or others: restricted movement (Ch. 11.6), isolation (Ch. 
11.7) and placement within the prison and probation services (Ch. 
10.20). However, an investigation conducted by the Parliamentary 
Ombudsmen shows that the SMA only uses the third alternative 
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and severely critiques this praxis, since being placed in a remand 
centre with people who are suspected of having committed a crime 
is a lot more restricting than being placed in a detention centre 
(Parliamentary Ombudsmen 2011: 315, 366). Particularly harsh 
criticism is addressed to the placement of detainees who are only 
dangerous to themselves and who are mentally ill in remand centres 
where their psychological illness is likely to deterioriate (2011: 315, 
317). The report states that this is a violation of the detainee’s human 
rights (2011: 315). The reason given by the SMA for not using the 
second alternative – isolating people in detention centres – is because 
they do not see that as part of their mission, their staff are not trained 
in dealing with violent or mentally ill persons, and they do not have 
appropriate isolation facilities (2011: 365). 
When asked how the prison and the detention centre compared, 
Akash’s reaction was a repeat of what had previously been highlighted: 
both were places where freedom was restricted:
Yes, it is a prison, it is a prison but they [the detainees] get good 
food there every day, they can eat as much as they want. But it 
does not help. If you have to go to prison, if there is only one room 
not for a month, not for a week, just 24 hours – how would you 
feel about yourself there? 
But when pressed to explain the differences between the prison and 
the detention centre, Akash came up with some factual differences, 
highlighting the overall better atmosphere in the detention centre. 
It was telling, however, that he immediately lapsed back into the 
negative psychological state of migrant detainees who know that they 
will be sent back against their will:
There in the prison one only had one room approximately 14–15 
square metres. It’s just a small bed, a small television, one can only 
lie / sleep there is not extra space… when you go to prison then 
I am very nervous. Even a murderer or a smuggler, it does not 
matter everyone is nervous there in the prison. But the Migration 
Agency [the detention centre] it is also like a prison but it is a little 
more open, there is a lot of room, people could play something, 
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billiards or other stuff you could play something. And the people 
working there they are not so stupid actually. They talk to each 
other and then they talk to those who come to the Migration 
Agency [detention]. They want to hear from them about their lives 
and such. It’s not that bad but what it is bad when one get to the 
Migration Agency [detention centre] for a person then everyone 
knows, one day I’ll go back, everyone knows that. The Police 
sends people to the Migration Agency [detention centre] at the 
end when the person will go back when that person has no right 
to stay here in Sweden then they send to the Migration Agency 
and then the Migration Agency take the responsibility to send 
[the person] back to their country, fixes all the papers and then 
send. And absolutely everyone gets really nervous even if they get 
great food there. But it does not matter, nobody wants to go back, 
nobody. Not if you talk to those who have stayed illegally here 
in Sweden. You can talk to everybody, ask anyone. You cannot 
find a single person.
In spite of the ‘justice’ he received after the government’s mistake in 
placing him in prison, and in spite of his presentation of the detention 
centre as a little ‘better’ than prison, the personal impact on the 
migrants’ wellbeing was significantly negative. Akash himself said:
I was crying all the time. I had not eaten any food in the prison, 
I could not eat. Then after three weeks I could not stand up. I 
was so tired. I was not thinking about whether their food was 
good or not but I could not eat the food they gave me. And I was 
really really nervous then. I could not eat, drink, sleep. I could not 
sleep at all. And when I got a little out into a larger room [at the 
prison]. As I sat there, everyone asked me what had I done, why 
I was there and I could not answer. And I felt really sad. I laugh 
now but I did not laugh then.
Pre-removal centres were places where migrants felt voiceless and 
vulnerable. Kader, a young 21-year-old Afghani man, articulated 
this well. He was clearly projecting previous experiences of being 
detained in other countries, and his fear of the police was based 
on ill-treatment he received in other countries. This did not remove 
anything of his fear and feelings of vulnerability:
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Nobody hears your voice, only the police officer, and they can 
treat you in any way, they can beat you, they can harm you in 
different ways because nobody is there and you don’t have a 
camera. They don’t let you have a camera with you yourself or 
something to at least get something out [of the detention centre].
Tarek referred to his treatment in detention as ‘psychological torture’. 
It was a deliberate and significant use of terminology, arising from his 
incomprehension of the complex system that he found himself in once 
he had emigrated from his country. Tarek fled from a North African 
country following the Arab Spring. He sought asylum in Sweden 
after having been in Italy and Switzerland. During the time that his 
asylum application was being processed in Sweden, he also spent 
periods in Denmark and Norway. He narrated his story, which was 
a complicated one involving several irregularities and some criminal 
activity as a result of which he was sentenced to prison. In Sweden 
he spent time in a remand centre, and in migrant detention centres. 
When we met him, Tarek was rather incomprehensively trying to 
explain his navigation of the ‘European’ system. As an individual 
who had originally applied for asylum in Italy, he thought that, under 
the Dublin Convention, he should have been returned there from 
Sweden. However, Sweden was seeking to remove him out of the EU 
and back to his country of origin. He was unclear as to why he was 
moved to a detention centre when he had not yet served his sentence. 
And whenever he resisted or became aggressive, he ended up in 
isolation, and was sometimes moved to another remand centre. His 
story was that of a person who had been seeking asylum for years, 
whilst unsuccessfully navigating a system which was too legally and 
systemically complex for him to understand. More critically, perhaps, 
it was the story of a person whose punishment and detention, often 
for an ‘irregular stay’, seemed totally disproportionate to the offences 
committed. It was an individual story, but one which reflected a 
pattern amongst our interviewees of failing to grasp the system: 
a system which was often not transparent, and which was reliant 
on various relationships between countries which change over 
time, where, although the countries might use similar terminology, 
European law was applied in different ways by the Member States. 
Understandably, therefore, migrants felt ‘psychologically tortured’ 
and powerless.
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Lawyers and legal representation
Migrants at risk of deportation were assigned one lawyer during the 
asylum process, and another lawyer if they were detained. This ‘detention 
lawyer’ was separate from the ‘asylum’ lawyer. Irregular migrants – 
who were neither in the asylum system nor in detention – were not 
assigned a lawyer. Migrants were clearly dependent on their lawyers to 
represent them, obtain information and get updates about their cases. 
In the composition of the bureaucratic system described in Chapter 3, 
the lawyer was a critically important channel for upholding the rights 
of migrants at risk of deportation. The quality of this relationship can 
be of even greater importance due to the prevalent culture of disbelief 
that is characteristic of asylum systems and which was a source of 
distress amongst many of our interviewees. Their relationship and 
interaction with their lawyers differed greatly. Ironically, the provision 
of legal services and lawyers in itself was enough for some migrants to 
feel criminalised, as Kader emphatically stated: 
They are treating you really bad, especially in the interviews. For 
example what did I do, they gave me a lawyer. Did I commit any 
crime? – No. Did I steal anything? – No. Did I kill anyone? – 
No. They gave me a lawyer, the interviews took hours, they’re 
asking different kinds of questions and then they’re asking you 
one question in a hundred different ways…They [the Migration 
Agency] have this kind of procedure. And they give you negatives 
and they are like telling you, you’re a liar. 
Teka recognised that his government lawyer was a good person, but 
felt that she did not have the power to help him:
She [the lawyer] is just trying to get me out of here. Last time 
when we were meeting with the police, she was with me and she 
told them to let me free, to be outside. Then I don’t know, they 
didn’t hear her…. What I think is that it is for nothing. Many 
times they speak, but she [the lawyer] cannot change anything. 
…. what I feel is that. In my case the lawyer didn’t have an effect. 
She talked but no one heard her. I don’t think they [lawyers] have 
power that’s what I have seen in my experience because I have 
been here for three years or four years [in Sweden]. I always give 
them [the Migration Agency] and they say ‘No’.
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Access to lawyers is extremely important for migrants within such 
a regulated system, but particularly so in cases where a person 
is subjected to restricted freedom or to force, and treated ‘like a 
criminal’. This creates a somewhat circular argument because, on 
the one hand, human rights organisations mention the importance of 
having access to a lawyer but, on the other, migrants need a lawyer 
precisely because they are ‘treated like criminals’. The criminalisation 
of migrants is not condonable from a human rights perspective; that 
of migrants who risk being or have been deported, although popularly 
tolerated more, is also problematic. Two conflicting messages, albeit 
of varying intensity, often emanate from human rights organisations. 
Deportation may be tolerated by the human rights movement, but the 
accompanying criminalisation is not. Yet states will argue that, even 
if unintentional, criminalisation is a corollary effect of any forced 
return action. Speaking to migrants going through this ordeal has 
helped us to simplify the argument: the criminalisation of deportation 
does not allow for humane and dignified treatment.
The tactics used
The use of force and criminal-like tactics – i.e. those generally used 
with criminals – to detain and remove a migrant in lieu of a deportation 
order are staple reminders of the harsh reality underpinning feelings 
of criminalisation. Kader spoke of the psychological pressure that 
he found himself under during the interviews with the authorities 
and in the investigation room. He said the process made him feel 
‘unwanted’ and ‘distressed’. In an articulation which was reminiscent 
of an absurd Orwellian attitude, brilliantly captured by Steve Cohen 
(2006) in his book Deportation is Freedom! The Orwellian World 
of Deportation Controls, Kader went as far as to say that he could 
even find relief in a removal from Sweden. This kind of absurd irony 
is not unheard of. Van Kalmthout et al., writing about foreigners in 
European prisons, argue that the regime of administrative detention 
is aimed at increasing pressure on detainees to leave the country 
and to cooperate with the expulsion procedure, just as prisons are 
intended to pressurise criminals into law-abiding behaviour (2007: 
53). Kader said:
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As much as they can they try to make our situation complicated you 
know. They’re [the authorities] putting you under different kind 
of pressure. They use their own tactics to make sure that… they 
force him [the asylum-seeker] to say something. In our process, 
in our cases they just put us in different kinds of situations, like 
hot water and cold water. And at the end we should be ready to 
say, to tell them ‘Please send me now. If I die I want to die there, 
I don’t want to live anymore in Sweden’. It’s difficult for other 
people to understand, who don’t experience this kind of situation 
[this kind of pressure from the state authorities]. 
Handcuffing was described as particularly distressing by our 
interviewees. In this next quote, Teka agitatedly recounts an incident 
when he needed medical assistance, but was so upset that he refused 
to be seen by the doctor. Following a reform of the law in 2013, all 
irregular migrants in Sweden, including those in detention, have full 
access to primary health rights (that is, healthcare that cannot be 
postponed). However, for Teka, access was limited due to his distress 
at being handcuffed:
But from here [the detention centre] for example last time I had 
a pain in my teeth then when they took me from here then I was 
with [handcuffs] like the police has, like a criminal. They put me 
like that and even when I was at the hospital with the doctor I was 
like that and then I asked them to release me, they said ‘No’. Then 
I was really sad and then I had a lot of pain but I was not happy to 
stay with the doctors like that and then there were three persons 
[accompanying me] and then the doctor was seeing me. After 
that, I didn’t get anything and I came back because I told them 
‘I’m not a criminal, and why you did that [handcuffing]?After 
that I didn’t cooperate with the doctors. And then they take me 
back here again. Now I’m waiting for another appointment. …
If I go with that [handcuffs] when I’m with the doctor they have 
to release me at least. I told them [that last time] but they didn’t.
Tactics used to effectively carry out the removal of a migrant from 
the country can be even more serious. Mahdi spoke about a close 
friend of his who was sedated before being taken on a flight back to 
Afghanistan. 
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I have a friend who was going to be deported, he screamed when 
they were taking him to the aircraft, all the people on the plane 
asked why he screamed so much and then the police could not 
deport him. Then they took him back to the detention centre. 
After a week a doctor comes, he gives him medicine to make him 
calmer. When he [my friend] woke up he was in Afghanistan (…). 
It is absolutely wrong and nobody knows about it. They treat 
people like animals. They talk about human rights but they are 
lying. There are human rights but they do not follow them. 
 
Sedation during deportations is not an unknown or undiscussed 
practice. It has been the subject of public discussion in Sweden both 
in the past and more recently. In 2014, a radio programme called 
Kaliber investigated 33 reports about deportation which took place 
between 2010 and 2014. They found seven instances in which the 
migrants were given sedative injections, because they were described 
in the reports as ‘aggressive’ or at risk of harming themselves or 
others. Four of the injections were given against the migrants’ will, 
and two instances took place just before the plane took off. The 
injection of this sedating narcotic, according to Lars-Håkan Nilsson, 
a medical adviser for the Prison and Probation Service, clearly 
broke the national rules (Radio Sweden 2014). The SPPS deny these 
allegations. They claim that they do not use any forced medication 
during transportation. If there is a need for medical care, a doctor or 
nurse (usually both) are commissioned to accompany the migrant. 
In our correspondence with the National Transportation Service on 
17 June 2015, they reiterated that, according to Swedish law, it is 
not permitted to use forced medication, and that they must ensure 
that the migrants return to their countries of origin in a humane and 
dignified manner. Sedation without consent is not condoned by the 
human rights community. The UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights categorically states that, to ensure that the human rights of 
people are respected at the border, the use of non-medically justified 
measures or treatment, such as the use of tranquillisers, sedatives 
or other medication to facilitate deportation, should be prohibited. 
Medication should only be administered to persons during their 
removal on the basis of their informed consent and a medical decision 
taken in respect of each individual being returned, and only where 
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there is a medical need on the part of the migrant which is unrelated 
to the state’s interest in his or her removal (OHCHR 2015: 40).
These tactics, in mimicking those used with criminals, conveyed a 
deep sense of criminalisation to migrants. The question to ask here 
is whether they were really necessary. If such practices were not 
necessary, then the resulting outcome – which is often an unjust sense 
of punishment and subjugation – was also an unnecessary part of the 
procedure, and should have been avoided. 
The return journey 
The criminalisation approach would appear to continue on the return 
journey. This is not altogether surprising given that, particularly 
accompanied deportees (DEPA), are accompanied on the return flight 
because they might not collaborate or might constitute a security 
threat. The situation might be different for unaccompanied deportees 
(DEPU). Nadir gave us a reality check of what could constitute a 
forced return from the migrants’ point of view. He assists people who 
have just been deported back to Kabul, including deportees from 
Sweden. The main characteristic which he repeated and exemplified 
several times was humiliation:
The deportation journey is one of the worst journeys I can say. 
That’s because you are a human being and they treat you like 
a criminal for example if there is one person there is at least 
two police man who’s guarding [that person]. If you want to, 
for example go to the wash room, they do not let you to close 
the washroom door even, you know? Which is very humiliating, 
according to humility, according to human rights or whatever 
you call it. It is really humiliating if someone goes to washroom 
and you won’t let him close the door and take the door open like 
you know.
Upon being asked whether there was any respect shown for prayer 
time or personal activity that might have made the journey more 
bearable, Nadir continued with his previous emphasis on how 
humiliating the whole journey was:
183
I don’t think so, I don’t think so. Because if you ask them anything 
like, if you tell them – OK I want something or if you kind of 
restrict or stand against your deportation then they just handcuff 
you, they tie your hands, they tie your legs, they put a helmet on 
your head and everything so that you avoid resistance. They use 
whatever force they can to bring you back. They’ll use whatever 
force they have and they can. 
In the home country
Sadly, there are strong indications that for some deportees 
criminalisation does not stop with the departure from Sweden, or 
with the end of the journey back to the migrants’ country of origin. 
Akash, who was deported to Bangladesh, and returned back to 
Sweden in a regularised way, explained:
It doesn’t matter if you are a citizen of that country. The police will 
take you directly to prison and then they want money. The same 
thing happened to my friend [also from Bangladesh] that I met [at 
the detention centre in Sweden]… When he went back, he got an 
injection…he did not want to go back that’s why he needed a little 
injection so he wouldn’t do anything on the plane… He became a 
little calm and so and then they sent him back. And when he came 
to the airport in the country [of origin] then the police took him 
straight to prison and demanded money from him.
The fate of stateless migrants is often more difficult. They are rendered 
vulnerable in the states they originally resided in, but their nationality 
does not carry currency with the state. Mohammad, a bidoon from 
Kuwait, was certain that, if returned, he would be put in prison. The 
stateless migrants we interviewed did not speak of criminalisation 
with the same intensity as others did, but they did fear criminalisation 
back home. Stateless bidoons were not supposed to leave Kuwait 
(they travelled on fake documents). It is a crime punishable with a 
prison sentence.
The fear of being sent back to the country of origin is a common 
theme. Teka, a member of a minority group in Ethiopia, articulated 
this fear. He introduced this by explaining what he went through to 
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arrive to Sweden, even spending time in prisons and migrant centres 
in Ethiopia, Libya and Malta. He was certain that he would be put 
in prison by the Ethiopian authorities:
Right now if I go back to my country it is hard. That means it’s 
really hard because the situation in our country it’s very bad now. 
Because even now if I go there, even if they didn’t kill me they 
will put me in prison. I can’t [handle] that prison now. If before I 
managed a little bit but now I don’t have the morale, I have lost 
my morale [ability to cope with prison].
The stigma of deportation is one of the problems that those who have 
been deported face when they return to the country of origin. Schuster 
and Majidi (2015) have written about the stigma of ‘failure’ and 
‘contamination’ as a serious post-deportation outcome for Afghans, 
as a common explanation for the re-migration of people out of the 
country of origin to which they are deported. Miller describes how 
persons deported from the US to Jamaica, who arrive back in Jamaica, 
are shunned by their family and friends and treated as criminals 
(2012: 145). For Nadir, who was himself based in Afghanistan, this 
was one of the main problems.  This was worse still, he explained, if 
they were originally from towns and villages outside Kabul, where 
they were often judged negatively by their communities.  When asked 
if this was really societal or whether it was just a perception, or fear, 
exhibited by the migrants, Nadir replied: 
It is a stigma of the society. …  In Afghanistan not many people 
know about returnees even do not know how many people are 
returned back to Afghanistan. When I tell them for example there 
are every month more than 100 or 150 people returned back, they 
kind of tell me ‘Are you kidding me?’ I say, ‘No I am not kidding 
I know about it’. This is the situation here. What people know is 
for example if, let’s say there is a boy named Ahmed, for example, 
so what people know is, or what Ahmed’s family know is. They 
say if Ahmed’s cousin has gone for example to the UK and he got 
a permanent protection visa or he got refugee status then Ahmed 
also if he goes there, he will get it. They don’t even know what the 
protection is, you know. They don’t even know. They don’t even 
know the word protection. That’s why when they [the returnees] 
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come back they [the family, people in Afghanistan] will ask us ‘OK 
what have you done wrong? Have you done a crime? Because your 
cousin got a status and you didn’t, what have you done wrong?’
Concluding remarks
Finally, a few reflections on the most critical points that arise from the 
presentation and analysis in this chapter. The Police Authority’s policy 
of prioritising an administrative measure of expulsion, rather than 
a criminal prosecution of a migrant irregularly staying in Sweden, 
does not diminish the effects of criminalisation. The convergence of 
criminal law and immigration law, or the de facto criminalisation of 
aspects of immigration, only serves to produce a complex situation 
whereby migrants are viewed as threats, akin to grave criminal 
threats, and therefore treated accordingly. As a result, migrants live 
through the deportation process with a great sense of injustice and 
unfair subjugation. They feel that their actions do not constitute 
morally grave actions which would warrant criminalisation. This is 
interesting considering that criminalisation does not appear to be the 
intention behind the active policies or what the authorities set out to 
achieve. Evidence of this is the small number of prosecutions carried 
out by the police. This can be situated in and confirmed by Sweden’s 
overarching policy of decriminalising the field of immigration with 
concrete choices of administrative measures rather than criminal ones. 
Migrants, however, feel that they are unjustly treated like criminals.
Another issue which came out very clearly from the migrants’ 
narratives is that, in spite of the separation between administrative 
and criminal proceedings and detention in Swedish law and policy, 
migrants perceive deportation to be a punishment. Deportation is 
clearly, both in the law and in policy, an administrative measure and 
is considered a preferable option by the human rights community. 
For migrants who have refused to return voluntarily, deportation 
is the punishment. Similarly, detention, even if it is for removal 
purposes in low-security detention centres run by the SMA, is seen 
as a punishment. The deprivation of freedom, for the migrant, is 
always a punishment – the concept of either a rehabilitating space 
(such as a prison) or an administrative detention is not present. It is 
crucial that the authorities understand this perception. 
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The deportation process involves various elements of active resistance. 
As such, force and/or restraint often need to be used by the police 
and involve criminal-like tactics which serve to label migrants in a 
state of deportability as ‘criminals’. Migrants at risk of deportation 
resist and refuse the label of ‘criminal’. Any mention of them taking 
part in other criminal activities was shrouded in shame and usually 
justified as a measure unwillingly taken as a result of poverty. This 
is in contrast to certain other groups who internalise, identify and 
rally around the criminal label in such a way that they start exhibiting 
other forms of criminal behaviour, leading sociologists to declare the 
social creation of criminal groups. For migrants at risk of deportation, 
this label of ‘criminal’, which denotes morally deplorable behaviour, 
is a source of great personal distress. 
Migrants’ psychosocial wellbeing is severely and negatively impacted 
on when they are admitted to a migrant detention centre. This builds 
on the analysis found in Chapter 5 which showed how, overall, 
migrants’ psychosocial wellbeing nosedived once they received the 
return decision. This is taken to another level when a migrant is 
admitted into a detention centre. 
Finally some concluding remarks on the system: 
Detention
Detention, if arbitrary, is a clear violation of international human 
rights standards. The detention of asylum-seekers is not condoned, 
but detention for the purposes of managing migration, particularly 
if migrants are not asylum-seekers or have failed in their asylum 
application, is tolerated by respectable organisations within the 
human rights movement such as the United Nations and the Council 
of Europe. This notwithstanding, states are encouraged to find 
alternatives to detention. Sweden, in this, generally fares better than 
its peer EU Member States and is commended for this. For example, 
the comparative report by the European Migration Network, Use 
of Detention and Alternatives to Detention EU 2014 (EMN 2014), 
mentions Sweden in this regard. Sweden, however, has also been 
criticised for not exhausting all other options before detaining 
people. Such criticism appears to be more internal – for example, 
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in the report entitled Förvar under Lupp (literal translation: Focus 
on Detention) by the Swedish Red Cross (2012), which looks into 
various aspects of the detention of asylum-seekers and non-citizens in 
Sweden.  At present, the decision as to whether or not a non-citizen 
will be detained is discretionary and made by an SMA officer or the 
police. This is a critical juncture in the procedure that needs to be 
monitored carefully. Migrants can have recourse to a judicial review 
and are assigned a lawyer by the state, which is separate from their 
asylum lawyer. To sum up, whilst the conditions in migrant detention 
centres in Sweden are good, and migrants have access to a judicial 
review, the issue to be investigated further is the extent to which 
detention is being used as a last resort.
Tactics used
The Return Directive clearly states that ‘Third-country nationals in 
detention should be treated in a humane and dignified way’. The 
use of restraint tactics, such as handcuffing, need to be cautiously 
approached, and only used when it is absolutely necessary. Clearly 
these are decisions subject to the officers’ discretion. The administrative 
detention of migrants is authorised inasmuch as migrants are deemed 
to be at risk of absconding, or going underground, when they are 
living in the community. As such, the aim of detention is to ensure 
that the removal can take place once the paperwork has been 
processed. The risk that this initial judgement for admission in a 
detention centre precludes continuous re-evaluation will always be 
present. Therefore, the most pressing question here would be: Are 
the tactics being used really necessary? And, in view of the fact that 
they have such a negative impact on the migrants, to what extent can 
they be avoided?
The return journey
This research study does not have sufficient data to report on the 
forced return journey. However it is worth noting that Sweden 
has not yet set up the monitoring system on the return flights of 
migrants which the Return Directive obliges Member States to do. 
The monitoring system would observe the process and ensure that 
removals are conducted according to the standards set out in the 
Directive – that is, in a humane and dignified way. This applies to 
flights organised jointly and those managed by the Member State. 
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A report by the European Fundamental Rights Agency comes down 
rather heavily on Sweden for this, particularly in view of the fact that 
Sweden, apart from organising return flights itself, has also operated 
joint return flights for other Member States, too (FRA 2013: 56). 
Sweden needs to implement an independent monitoring system on 
return flights.
The stateless: a concluding point
Finally, what stood out in this analysis of the experiences of 
criminalisation amongst migrants at risk of deportation was that 
this did not seem to apply to stateless migrants. This possibly derives 
from the fact that the situation for stateless people in Sweden is 
characterised predominantly by problems of being ‘in limbo’, whereby 
the threat of deportation is felt less. Our case study of stateless people 
demonstrates that feelings of criminalisation are essentially tied to 
the actual threat of deportation, whereas the previous ‘stages’ of 
deportability do not necessarily inflict criminalisation. Stateless 
migrants at risk of deportation feel predominantly ‘helpless’, as 
so clearly described in Chapter 5. This ‘in limbo’ characterisation 
of stateless migrants resonates with other writings on the subject 
of forced return. For example, Leerkes and Broeders (2010) and 
Broeders (2010), looking into forced return from the Netherlands 
and Germany, have commented on how the detention system, for 
‘undeportable deportable immigrants’, often risks becoming a 
‘revolving door’. An edited collection by Sawyer and Blitz (2011) 
deals with different perspectives of the ‘in limbo’ situation, such as 
the legal, the philosophical and the empirical.
In Sweden, the fact that feelings of criminalisation do not appear in 
stateless migrants’ interview narratives, when they are so forcefully 
presented by all other migrants, demonstrates that criminalisation 
is primarily tied to a ‘real’ or ‘actual’ threat of deportation, and not 
to the general state of deportability. In this way, therefore, stateless 
people act as a ‘control group’ in our project. The glaring omission 
of criminalisation from their experiences confirms that the experience 
chiefly comes with the actual threat of the implementation of 
deportation – of forced return to the country of origin. Experiences of 
criminalisation in Sweden are therefore closely tied to the possibility 
of actual return and not to the state of being ‘in limbo’.
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7.  CONCLUSIONS
Consistencies and variations 
The aim of this study has been to look at the deportation process from 
Sweden from the perspective of those who are experiencing it and 
who might have few opportunities to bring forth their concerns – the 
migrants themselves. The project has used a human rights approach 
and a person-centred methodology inspired by anthropological 
methods. Our point of departure is that a full understanding of 
the workings of a system is incomplete without the perspectives of 
those individuals who are on the receiving end. As such, the project 
has aimed to start a conversation on the issue of human rights and 
deportation and the challenges and possibilities involved in making 
the process ‘humane and dignified’. 
The 26 migrants who we interviewed for this study were a very 
diverse group in terms of gender, age, family situation, nationality, 
time spent in Sweden and social situation. Furthermore, some were 
detained at the time of our interview with them, while others were 
living in hiding and yet others in asylum centres or with friends. In 
order to gain an understanding of the deportation process and to 
be able to contextualise and understand the migrants’ experiences, 
the researchers also spent time in the early stages of the project 
mapping the field of study and meeting and interacting with the 
different gate-keepers and actors – such as the heads of detention 
centres, police officers, workers at detention centres, NGOs and 
fellow researchers.   
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As is always the case, there are some limitations to this study. The 
research was, from the outset, designed to follow the migrants 
through the process, from the point where the decision was given 
to them to the reception of the migrant in the country of origin. For 
different reasons, this turned out not to be possible. Instead, the 
project focuses on the migrants’ experiences of living in a state of 
deportability in Sweden. It is also important to note that, although 
different aspects of the migrants’ interactions with the deportation 
system in Sweden are discussed, this study is not and does not aim 
to be, an evaluation of this system. Rather, different aspects of the 
workings of the system are reflected through the experiences of those 
who go through the process. 
Our interviews with migrants give a complex and multifaceted picture 
of their experiences of the deportation process. However, through 
a close reading of the interview transcripts, a number of common 
themes arose that came up in all the interviews. The first of those 
themes was the feelings of frustration, anger and injustice that the 
migrants were left with after having interacted with the authorities 
in the ‘deportation system’. The migrants go through complicated 
processes and, very often, they have a hard time understanding why 
these processes unfold in a certain way. The migrants’ experiences of 
the return process are also tinged by their experiences of how they 
have been treated and if they feel that their voices have been heard by 
lawyers and SMA workers in the asylum process and early stages of 
the return process. Later, in the forced return process, the migrants’ 
interactions with the authorities in the deportation system are 
conditioned by their various forms of resistance to the return decision 
and the repercussions by the authorities in enforcing the deportation. 
These repercussions, resulting from discretionary decisions such as 
reducing migrants’ freedom of movement or cutting down their daily 
allowance, restricts the migrants lives in different ways. Since the 
migrants contest the return decision in the first place, and sense that 
it is deeply unfair, they find themselves in opposition to the system, 
with strong feelings that they have been the victims of an injustice. 
The second of these common themes is migrants’ experience of being 
in an ‘in limbo’ situation. With no legal options to remain in Sweden, 
and with strong negative feelings about returning to the country of 
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origin, migrants are under the impression that they have lost control 
over their lives, are wasting their lives away, and are ageing at a faster 
pace than they should. This difficult ‘in limbo’ situation often comes 
at the end of a long migratory process in which the migrants find 
themselves constrained by their lack of energy and resources. They 
display symptoms of stress, insomnia, depression, suicide attempts, 
frustration, anger and apathy and they, themselves, report that it is 
connected to their situation. Significant for living in this ‘in limbo’ 
situation is the lack of freedom of movement, of resources and of 
meaningful activities and a low sense of participation in society. To 
sum up in the migrants’ own words: ‘The only thing you can do is to 
eat and sleep’. Thus, living in a ‘state of deportability’ has negative 
consequences for migrants’ psychosocial wellbeing. However, despite 
living in a difficult circumstances, most migrants use coping strategies 
to regain some sense of control over their lives – finding support in 
friends or becoming involved in some form of activism. 
The third of these common themes is that the migrants feel that they 
are unjustly treated as criminals, despite the fact that the Swedish 
state has aimed to use administrative measures of expulsion and to 
separate return operations from police activities as far as possible – 
for example, by letting a civil authority run detention centres. The 
different measures taken by the authorities to enforce the deportation 
–detention and the use of control such as hand-cuffing – are, in spite 
of the separation between administrative and criminal proceedings, 
perceived by the migrants as a punishment. 
 
As stated before in this section, there was considerable diversity 
among our interviewees and their access to resources and social 
support varied greatly. Depending on the cases and the situation 
in the country of origin, these deportation processes can look very 
different. Consequently, the experiences of migrants who are in the 
deportation process also tend to vary. A case apart is the situation 
of stateless persons and other ‘undeportable deportables’, who have 
exhausted their legal rights to stay in Sweden but who cannot be 
deported either. Since their ‘in limbo’ situation can drag on for years 
without a solution, they are a particularly vulnerable group. The 
living conditions also have a major impact on migrants who are living 
in a state of deportability. Obviously, persons who are incarcerated 
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or who are living in hiding suffer from their restricted ability to move 
freely in different ways to those who live in asylum centres or with 
friends. These groups have, for different reasons, a more strained 
relationship with the authorities. Their feelings of anxiety, fear, anger 
and resignation are often more clearly articulated. The situation of 
living ‘in a state of deportability’ is also very different for families 
with children, since their economic situation and restricted freedom 
of movement severely affect the children’s psychosocial wellbeing. 
Systemic considerations and human rights
This study is based on 26 in-depth interviews with migrants who 
live, or have experienced being in a state of deportability. As such, 
the conclusions that can be drawn from the study have to be seen as 
tentative and as starting points for further studies and discussions. 
However, our interviews with migrants highlight areas that could be 
considered further by those responsible for the ‘deportation system’ 
in order to improve the process for the migrants.  
The first of these considerations is that it is important to remember 
that the migrants and the authorities enter the process from very 
different points of departure and with opposing agendas. The 
deportation system is also very complex, which makes it hard for 
the migrants to understand why certain things happen at certain 
points in time. Furthermore, at this stage of the migratory process, 
many migrants have a low level of psychosocial wellbeing and may 
not be in the best mindset to understand complicated processes. It 
is important that case workers bear this in mind and remain patient 
when interacting with migrants. It might take the migrants some 
time to understand/accept the return decision and they need clear 
explanations of why certain decisions have been made, why they 
are being asked to sign certain documents, how the authorities will 
proceed and factual information on what happens when the case is 
handed over to another authority. Such information could, to some 
extent, prevent the dissemination of myths and misperceptions about 
the workings of the authorities. It is important that concerns for 
efficiency do not stand in opposition to giving the migrants the time 
that is needed to understand why decisions are made and what will 
happen next. 
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The second of these considerations is that migrants’ perceptions and 
experiences of the return process are, to some extent, conditioned by 
their experiences of the asylum process and early stages of the return 
process. If they feel that lawyers and SMA workers have treated them 
in an unprofessional or unsympathetic manner it can be difficult for 
the authorities to gain migrants’ trust and cooperation in the later 
stages of the return process. Needless to say, it is important that the 
migrants have the opportunity for a fair hearing in the asylum process 
– a ‘humane and dignified’ return process is greatly dependant on 
this factor.  
The third of these considerations is that the authorities in question 
(The Swedish Migration Agency, the Police Authority and the Swedish 
Prison and Probation Service) have the power to put restrictions on 
the individual migrants’ lives if, and when, the migrant does not 
cooperate in the return process. These restrictions are regulated by 
different laws such as the Aliens Act, but are decided upon as a part 
of the discretionary space available to the authorities working within 
the deportation system. The latter may reduce the daily allowance to 
which asylum-seekers and returnees are entitled, can detain them and 
use control such as handcuffing and even force. These restrictions and 
repercussions have a big impact on the migrants’ lives and wellbeing 
(they are already in a very stressful situation) and the use of detention 
and control makes the migrants feel unjustly treated as criminals. 
Because of this, we can only agree with other researchers that this 
discretionary space should be used in a very careful and transparent 
manner in order to avoid arbitrariness in the decision-making process 
and to protect the human rights of migrants in the forced-return 
process. 
The fourth consideration is that there are critical junctures in the 
collaboration between the authorities. As is the intention with the 
division of responsibilities between the Swedish Migration Agency 
and the police in the forced-return process, we conclude that the case 
should be in the hands of the SMA – until they are no longer able 
to enforce the decision – in order to respect the best interests of the 
migrant. This is not grounded in observations that the treatment is 
different between these authorities but rather that the more actors are 
involved, the more difficult it becomes for the migrant to understand 
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the process. Furthermore, when the case is handed over to the police 
the security increases, the migrants have fewer options and they are 
more at risk of the stigma of deportation on return to their country 
or region of origin. 
The fifth and final consideration is the ‘in limbo’ state in which 
migrants in the forced-return process find themselves. Given the 
strain that this situation puts on the individual, and the effects that 
it has on an individual’s psychosocial wellbeing, greater efforts 
should be made to limit this situation. This can be done in different 
ways, one of which would be to ensure that migrants are making 
an informed response when refusing their return decision. A more 
transparent return dialogue could include information about what 
life without a permit in Sweden might look like. Nevertheless, all of 
the people we have met are still, even with all the difficulties they 
face, convinced that it is better for them to remain in Sweden in this 
state of ‘limbo’ than to return to their country of origin. For their 
situation to improve, they would need access to societal rights that, 
in Sweden, are connected to a residence permit. If Sweden wanted to 
better the migrants’ situation, they could provide residence permits or 
extend more rights to those without them. Having more of their rights 
respected is particularly crucial for those who have not chosen to 
remain ‘in limbo’ but are forced to because they cannot be deported, 
a situation which we have chosen to call ‘super-limbo’. Having 
control of one’s life is crucial for a person’s psychosocial wellbeing, to 
which being ‘in limbo’ is not conducive  – which is one of the reasons 
why the Swedish authorities should avoid migrants being stuck in 
that situation without any means of extracting themselves. Raising 
awareness of the difficulties migrants face when ‘in limbo’ might 
be useful for the Swedish authorities when meeting both those who 
have chosen to remain ‘in limbo’ and those who have ended up in it. 
 
‘Humane and dignified’? 
The overarching discussion that this study contributes to can be 
summed up in two crucial questions: 
• What should a humane and dignified deportation look like?
• Is a humane and dignified deportation possible, in practice? 
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This study, by focusing on how the migrants’ themselves experience 
the deportation process, provides a unique perspective. Our findings 
indicate that it is quite difficult to conceptualise a ‘human and 
dignified’ deportation, firstly because any deportation is characterised 
by an asymmetrical power relationship between the state and the 
individual migrant and, secondly, because, very clearly, the interests 
and wishes of the migrant and of the state in the deportation process 
are diametrically opposed. Indeed what we can conclude from our 
study is that the deportation process is not perceived by the migrants 
to be ‘humane and dignified’. 
There are, however, important variations which, in the experiences 
of the migrants, can either aggravate or alleviate the impact of 
deportation. Sweden’s efforts have cemented some important 
achievements which have led to the alleviation of the procedure 
for migrants, of which the civil staffing and running of detention 
centres and deportations, combined with the absence of outsourcing 
to private profit-making companies, the financial benefits and the 
right to primary health care for irregular migrants, and the high rate 
of voluntary returns are just a few. Migrants also need to be reassured 
that they will be accorded a fair hearing, with respect for the principle 
of non-refoulement, transparency in how decisions are made, 
respectful services by lawyers and civil servants, and the avoidance 
of unwarranted control and force. We therefore understand clearly 
that the discussion cannot be conducted in absolute terms but rather 
should be discussed in terms of ‘more or less’ or of the lowest level 
acceptable from a human rights perspective. If this were so, efforts to 
balance the rights of the state with those of the migrants throughout 
the asylum and the forced-return process could lead to a relatively 
more ‘humane and dignified’ deportation process, even though such 
a standard (however minimal and basic) may appear hard to achieve.
Complacency in the establishment of a ‘good-enough’ system will not 
get us anywhere. Nor will helplessness brought about by the apparent 
futility of the authorities’ efforts to make the process easier for the 
migrants to cope with. An appreciation of the positive differences 
that a system can make, even in this distressing process, needs to be 
reaffirmed. Deportations, however tragic the nature of the activity, 
can be conducted in a better or a worse manner.
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8.  AFTERWORD: THE COURAGE TO 
LISTEN
Katrine Camilleri 
Director Jesuit Refugee Service Malta, human rights lawyer and 
receiver of the 2007 UNHCR Nansen Award and the 2015 Roland 
Human Dignity Award.
I am honoured to contribute to this invaluable work which provides 
some insight into how migrants experience deportation and helps 
us to understand what it is like to be in their shoes. Listening to 
the experiences of asylum seekers in such different countries as 
Sweden and Malta underscores several common themes, including 
criminalisation, limited rights, and lives in abeyance. While their 
perspectives are subjective, I believe that it is essential that we listen 
to these narratives if we want to move towards developing more 
humane and dignified processes. The following section is a reflection 
on the findings of the research study presented in this book, both 
in the light of my experience working in Malta with Jesuit Refugee 
Service (JRS) as well as within the broader European context. 
Malta: Opposite case, similar outcome
Malta is diametrically opposed to Sweden in several respects, and not 
just because the two countries are geographically located at opposite 
ends of the European Union. They are different in terms of size and 
population density and, possibly more importantly, in terms of other 
more relevant issues relating to the treatment of migrants and asylum 
seekers. 
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Unfortunately, over the years, my country has been consistently 
criticized for failing to respect the rights of asylum seekers and 
migrants arriving on our shores. In Aden Ahmed v. Malta Application 
no. 55352/12 [ECtHR, 9 December 2013] we have been criticised 
for subjecting asylum seekers arriving irregularly by boat to long 
term detention in extremely difficult conditions, which European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found to be in breach of Article 
3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). We have 
also been criticised for implementing a policy of detention that 
raises serious human rights concerns and fails to provide adequate 
guarantees against arbitrariness, in violation of Article 5 of the 
same Convention (Aden Ahmed v. Malta; Louled Massoud v. Malta 
Application no. 24340/08 [ECtHR 27 October 2010]; Suzo Musa 
v. Malta Application no. 42337/12 [ECtHR 09 December 2013]). 
When it comes to return, the situation is more or less the same — 
suffice it to say that, for all its shortcomings, the Return Directive 
was a significant improvement on what we had before, in terms of 
procedural and other guarantees against arbitrariness.
What never fails to strike me, however, is that in spite of the 
differences in context, migrants’ experience of the more punitive 
aspects of the system — e.g., the deportation process or detention — 
is all too often strikingly similar. I first noted this when JRS Malta 
participated in a research study, DEVAS, on detention of vulnerable 
asylum seekers coordinated by JRS Europe (JRS 2010). As part of 
that study, project partners interviewed 685 migrants and asylum 
seekers detained in 23 Member States of the European Union (ibid.). 
Given the diversity of the legal rules regulating detention, the different 
conditions in which migrants are detained — ranging from purpose 
built detention centres in Sweden, to warehouses and army barracks 
in Malta, to prisons in Ireland and police station cells in Cyprus 
— and the varying lengths of time for which detainees are held — 
ranging from a few days to several months in some cases — we were 
surprised to note not only how similarly the migrants experienced 
detention, but also how similar the impact of detention, particularly 
prolonged detention, was on detainees’ physical and psychological 
well-being.
As I was reading the book I was struck once again by the similarity 
between the outcomes of this research and the outcomes of a project 
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implemented by JRS Malta, between April and October 2014, with a 
group of Somali women (JRS Malta 2015). The project started while 
the women were in detention and continued in the initial months 
following their release from detention. Although the situation of 
these women was not identical to that of the interviewees in this 
project, primarily because none of them were at imminent or even 
real risk of removal, they share a number of common characteristics. 
All of the women in the project had their initial asylum application 
rejected – some were awaiting the outcome of the appeal and a couple 
had also received a final negative decision from the appeals board. 
All spent at least 12 months in detention; those whose application 
was finally rejected were detained for 18 months. In the latter case, in 
theory at least, detention was for the purposes of removal — although 
few, if any, rejected asylum seekers are removed from Malta (ibid.). 
This is mostly because of the difficulties obtaining the necessary 
documentation to implement return. Although most of the women 
involved in this project were asylum seekers and therefore still had 
hope of obtaining protection, all of them perceived themselves as 
‘rejected’. During our discussions, they would refer to themselves 
as ‘rejected women’ and they said that others did the same: ‘They 
say of us, “this group are rejected, they were in detention for a long 
time”. They forgot our names, we are called the “rejected ones”’ 
(JRS Malta 2015: 30).
 That they assumed this label could in part be due to the fact that 
they know that their chances of getting a reversal of the decision 
at appeal stage are slim, as the rate of success at appeal stage is 
quite low. But it also largely due to the way in which they were 
treated, deprived of their liberty in miserable conditions for months 
on end with very limited access to rights, not only while they were 
in detention but also following their release, all of which heightened 
their sense of exclusion.
During the sessions organised as part of the project, the women 
discussed human rights and what protection means to them. They 
also talked about their needs and concerns and identified the messages 
that they wanted to convey to the authorities and to the outside 
world. Some of the messages they identified are:
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• ‘We believe our dignity has been destroyed’ – in this context 
they referred specifically to the fact that they were treated 
like criminals, deprived of their liberty and made to wear 
handcuffs, although they committed no crime (JRS Malta 
2015: 14–17).
• ‘Detention is harmful’ (JRS Malta 2015: 18–21).
• ‘We feel the asylum procedure has failed us’ (JRS Malta 2015: 
22–27).
• ‘We urgently need a document’ — referring to their need for 
a status that affords them more rights and greater security, 
because all without exception believe that they need protection 
(JRS Malta 2015: 30).
I heard all of these themes echoing in the narratives of migrants 
awaiting deportation in Sweden, which we have just seen in the 
previous chapters.  When it comes to detention and the resulting 
criminalisation, the findings of the Swedish study are also very similar 
to those of  the DEVAS project, where the focus is not exclusively 
on migrants awaiting return but also asylum seekers. For me this is 
particularly significant; as, in my view, the fact that the findings of the 
Swedish study are echoed by migrants and asylum seekers subjected to 
administrative sanctions for breaches of immigration law in other EU 
Member States further validates them. It also makes it more difficult 
to dismiss them as them as the cynical ramblings of individuals who 
are disappointed about the fact that their asylum application was 
rejected and are therefore, as it were, taking it out on the system. 
More than this however, it helps us to see these findings as part of a 
bigger picture: as part of a European trend to implement policies of 
criminalisation and exclusion to deal with irregular migrants. 
Perhaps the clearest example of this trend is the pervasive use 
of detention across the Member States of the EU, supposedly to 
manage migration more effectively and to implement removal more 
efficiently. Another is the tendency to severely limit the rights of those 
who have no right to stay within the territory of the state, even if 
they cannot be removed, the so-called ‘undeportable deportables’, 
which happens not only in Sweden, but in many other Member States 
of the EU, including Malta. This trend is causing untold and, in my 
view, largely unnecessary hardship to hundreds of migrants, as this 
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study makes clear. And it is precisely for this reason that it needs to 
be addressed. I will therefore take each of the themes in turn and 
make some observations.
Immigration Detention: Imprisonment without crime 
It is clear from the study that the migrants experience detention as 
a prison, and that ‘what mattered to them was the lack of liberty’ 
(pg 172). The lack of freedom they complain of is not just a lack of 
freedom of movement, but also a lack of freedom to choose what to 
do – lack of control over one’s life and the inability to take decisions 
or plan for one’s future. As quoted earlier in Chapter 5, ‘You feel 
like an animal. You do not get to decide something for yourself they 
[the detention centre staff] are telling you to do things. It’s like, you 
know, being a slave.’ (pg 173)
Migrants in detention feel ‘voiceless and vulnerable’, isolated and 
largely powerless to do anything about their situation or to stop the 
inevitable from happening (pg 176). These sentiments are echoed by 
the women who participated in the Malta project, who also described 
themselves as ‘prisoners, isolated people in a cage… with no freedom 
at all’ (JRS Malta 2015: 19). They also talk of living with constant 
fear and uncertainty and describe their shock at finding themselves 
locked up as soon as they arrived in Malta.
In detention, we live in fear. Every time we hear the gate clang 
open, we are afraid someone else has been rejected. We have nothing 
to do, too much time to think; we feel anxious, that we are going 
mad. We feel ashamed, humiliated, that we have done something 
wrong, being treated like criminals. (JRS Malta 2015: 19)
When I arrived in detention, I was really very shocked; I never 
thought I would imprisoned in a country like this. To me, detention 
is a place where you have no access to your life, you have no control, 
someone opens the door, someone feeds you food you may not even 
want. Being here, I think a lot, of the past, of the future, I always 
fear about getting a second rejection. Whenever the guards open the 
door and I hear the sound of the gate slamming, I get a shock. If I 
am asleep, that noise wakes me up immediately. I always think: is 
this bad news for me or for someone sleeping near me? I always fear 
something bad. (JRS Malta 2015: 21)
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Human rights law and the deprivation of liberty
Human rights law makes clear that liberty is a fundamental right; 
deprivation of liberty is an extreme measure and it should therefore 
be the exception, not the rule (see Article 5 of the ECHR [Council 
of Europe 1950]; Article 9 of International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights [UN General Assembly 1966]; and Article 6 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [European 
Union 2012]). It is clear that, both in terms of national and EU 
law and in terms of human rights law, States are allowed to deprive 
migrants of their liberty for immigration-related reasons. However, 
the Convention makes clear that freedom to detain is not unlimited 
and States are bound to ensure that their laws contain adequate and 
effective safeguards against arbitrary detention. Even the Returns 
Directive, contains a number of basic, though limited, safeguards 
against arbitrary detention.
Article 5(1)(f) of the European Convention states that detention is 
justified only ‘to prevent … unauthorised entry into the country, or 
where action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition’ 
of a particular individual (Council of Europe 1950). The European 
Court of Human Rights has repeatedly stressed that: ‘the list of 
exceptions to the right to liberty is an exhaustive one and only a 
narrow interpretation of those exceptions is consistent with the aim 
of that provision’ (Giulia Manzoni v. Italy Application no. 19218/91 
[EctHR 1 July 1997] at paragraph 25). Detention under the second 
limb of article 5(1)(f) is justified only where there is  a realistic 
prospect of removal and where proceedings are in progress and are 
being conducted with due diligence (Chahal v. The United Kingdom 
Application no. 22414/93 [EctHR 15 November 1996] at paragraph 
113). These requirements are echoed by Article 15(1) of the Return 
Directive, which allows detention ‘in particular when: there is a risk 
of absconding or the third country national concerned avoids or 
hampers the preparation of return or the removal process… for as 
short a period as possible and… as long as removal arrangements are 
in progress and executed with due diligence.’
Lawfulness
Where detention is resorted to, it must be ‘on grounds prescribed 
by law and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law’ 
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(see Articles 5(1) and 9(1) of the ECHR [Council of Europe 1950]). 
According to the ECtHR, this implies not only that the detention 
‘must have a legal basis in domestic law’, but also to the quality of 
the law authorising deprivation of liberty, which ‘must be sufficiently 
accessible and precise, in order to avoid all risk of arbitrariness’ 
(Amuur v. France Application no. 19776/92 [ECtHR 25 June 1996] 
at paragraph 50).
Protection from arbitrariness
It is a fundamental principle of human rights law that detention 
should not be arbitrary.  According to established jurisprudence, 
‘the notion of “arbitrariness” in Article 5(1) extends beyond a lack 
of conformity with national law, so that a deprivation of liberty 
may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still arbitrary and 
thus contrary to the Convention’ and ‘[t]o avoid being branded 
as arbitrary, therefore, such detention must be carried out in good 
faith; it must be closely connected to the purpose…; the place and 
conditions of detention should be appropriate…; and the length of 
the detention should not exceed that reasonably required for the 
purpose pursued’ (Saadi v. The United Kingdom Application no. 
13229/03 [ECtHR 29 January 2008] at paragraphs 67 and 74).
Necessity, proportionality and alternatives to detention
The Return Directive (Council of the European Union 2008b) 
provides that detention must be used only where ‘other sufficient 
but less coercive measures can be applied in a specific case’ (Article 
15[1]), and ‘where it is necessary to ensure successful removal’ 
(Article 15[5]). This clearly implies that an assessment should be 
conducted in each case to determine whether detention is necessary 
and whether alternative measures could be applied effectively. This 
is also evident from the decision of the Human Rights Committee 
in A v. Australia Communication No. 560/1993, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (1997), where the Committee stated that 
detention ‘could be considered arbitrary if it is not necessary in all the 
circumstances of the case… the element of proportionality becomes 
relevant in this context.’ The ECHR does not require detention to 
achieve the stated aim (Chahal v. The United Kingdom at paragraphs 
112–113), nor does it make any specific reference to the need to 
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use alternative measures. In practice, the Court looks at whether 
other less draconian measures could have been applied in determining 
the lawfulness or otherwise of an applicant’s detention (Mikolenko 
v. Estonia Application no. 10664/05 [ECtHR 8 January 2010] at 
paragraph 67; Louled Massoud v. Malta at paragraph 68).
Procedural safeguards
In order to provide protection against arbitrariness, the law regulating 
detention should contain a number of procedural safeguards. These 
include the right to be given reasons for the decision to detain (see 
Article 15(2) of the Return Directive [Council of the European Union 
2008b]; Article 5(2) of the ECHR [Council of Europe 1950]; and 
Article 9(2) of the ICCPR [UN General Assembly 1966]) and the 
possibility to obtain a review of one’s detention (see Articles 5(4), 
9(4) and 15(2) of the ECHR [Council of Europe 1950]. In terms of 
article 5(4) of the ECHR ‘everyone deprived of his liberty… shall be 
entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention 
shall be decided.’ In terms of the case law of the ECtHR, in order to 
qualify as such, the said remedy must fulfil the following criteria: it 
must be sufficiently certain, accessible and effective; the reviewing 
court or judicial authority must have the power to decide whether 
detention is lawful in terms of article 5 and to order release if it is 
not; and the review must be conducted speedily. It is worth noting 
that while there is no fixed time limit within which the case must be 
concluded, the Court has judged remedies taking 23 and 17 days 
respectively to be excessive.
Detention is harmful: The impact of detention on people
Over and above the human rights concerns detention raises, there is 
the harm that detention causes. As the DEVAS study shows, there 
significant evidence that:
In almost every case… detention has a distinctively deteriorative 
effect upon the individual person… The vast majority of detainees 
describe a scenario in which the environment of detention 
weakens their personal condition… The biggest implication from 
the DEVAS research is the way in which detention – frequently 
implemented as a tool of asylum and immigration policymaking for 
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the EU and its Member States – leads to high rates of vulnerability 
in people. It calls into question the proportionality and necessity 
of detention in relation to the ends it seeks to achieve: that is, to 
systematically manage migration flows so that States may enforce 
their asylum and immigration policies. (JRS 2010: 13)
Yet detention continues to be used by States as a migration 
management tool. It is true that the number of legal safeguards are 
in place creates a frame of reference – a standard to which states can 
be held accountable. However, in spite of the safeguards contained 
in law, ensuring that detention is not resorted to unless it is really 
necessary to effect removal, and that it is only used where other less 
coercive measures cannot be applied in the individual case, continues 
to be a challenge. 
Life ‘in limbo’: living in a state of deportability
The same cannot be said about another consequence of being ‘in a 
state of deportability’, which this study describes so well as life ‘in 
limbo’ — i.e., the restriction of basic rights that comes with the final 
rejection of one’s asylum application and receiving a deportation 
order – where legal safeguards are far more limited.
The study describes the migrants in this situation as being stuck: 
‘they do not feel free, they feel stuck’ (pg 136). They are unable to 
participate fully in society since they do not have a residence permit 
and the outcome of this is exclusion and discrimination, as they 
cannot work legally, they have only very limited financial resources, 
and ‘the only thing you can do is eat and sleep’ (pg 191). One migrant 
is quoted as saying: ‘It is like a prison, but an open prison. You are 
free to move but you cannot go anywhere’ (pg 136).
The Somali women, too, described their situation in very similar 
terms: ‘When we were in detention, we thought life would be better 
outside. But after we got our freedom, we discovered that life in 
detention and outside is the same except that now we have freedom 
of movement’ (JRS Malta 2015: 27).  They explain that: ‘Without a 
document, we are stuck in the containers and we cannot make any 
plans: right now, our future is zero. We have nothing, we cannot do 
anything, we cannot go anywhere’ (JRS Malta 2015: 30).  Living in 
this situation puts them in a state of dependence, unable to rebuild 
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their lives: ‘I will give you a document and you will know how to 
improve your life by yourself. Or I will give you food drink and 
clothes. This is the difference between those who have protection and 
those who don’t’ (JRS Malta 2015: 31).
The situation is possibly worse for those who are stateless and 
for whom there is no realistic prospect of removal – those who have 
no way out of this situation unless their situation is regularised. I 
have particular sympathy for the predicament of stateless people, 
which was brought home to be very vividly by my first ever client 
in detention – a stateless Palestinian man who had spent 6 years in 
detention. The authorities had made several attempts to remove him 
but no country wanted to accept him so he stayed in detention. He 
used to tell me: “I didn’t fall off a cloud. I was born on earth like 
everyone else. So how is it that there is no place for me?”
Eventually we managed to obtain his release. I will never forget 
the day he was released from detention – I picked him up, piled all of 
the possessions he had accumulated throughout 6 years of detention 
into my little car, and drove him to a flat that the local Imam found 
for him, feeling very pleased with myself for having satisfactorily 
concluded the case.  
Just days later he turned up at my office and told me, “You need 
to help me. I cannot stay here, this is just a bigger prison. I cannot 
work. I cannot travel. I have no money. I can’t do anything.” So 
started a new phase in his lifelong battle to be accorded what I like 
to call ‘recognition as a person’ and access to the basic rights that go 
with it, in spite of the fact that he was stateless – a battle that sadly 
ended only when he died.
Limiting rights: applicable human rights standards
With measures like these – i.e. the reduction of all support and 
entitlements except the most basic – the applicable legal standards 
are far less clear than those relating to detention and considerations 
such as proportionality and necessity in the individual case do not 
automatically come into play. 
It is clear that where the situation in which the individual finds 
him/herself as a result of these measures is sufficiently severe as to 
constitute cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment 
in terms of article 3 of the ECHR, then the State is obliged to rectify 
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the situation. However, it is also true that it is very difficult to 
reach the threshold set by the said article, which requires that the 
treatment attains a minimum level of severity in order to engage the 
responsibility of the State. On several occasions, the Court has held 
that to satisfy the criteria it is necessary that the treatment:
attains a minimum level of severity and involves actual bodily 
injury or intense physical or mental suffering. Where treatment 
humiliates or debases an individual showing a lack of respect for, 
or diminishing, his or her human dignity or arouses feelings of fear, 
anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual’s moral 
and physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and 
also fall within the prohibition of article 3. The suffering which 
flows from naturally occurring illness, physical or mental, may 
be covered by article 3, where it is, or risks being, exacerbated 
by treatment, whether flowing from conditions of detention, 
expulsion or other measures, for which the authorities can be 
held responsible. (Pretty v. The United Kingdom Application no. 
2346/02 [ECtHR 29 July 2002])
In all cases the Court stresses that the assessment of this minimum 
is relative, as it depends on all the circumstances of the case such 
as the nature and context of the treatment or punishment that is 
in issue. In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p 
Adam, Limbuela and Tesema [2005] the House of Lords dismissed 
the notion that: 
the test is more exacting where the treatment or punishment 
which would otherwise be found to be inhuman or degrading 
is the result of … legitimate government policy. That would be 
to introduce into the absolute prohibition, by the backdoor, 
considerations of proportionality… proportionality, which gives a 
margin of appreciation to states, has no part to play when conduct 
for which it is directly responsible results in inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. The obligation to refrain from such 
conduct is absolute.
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I would argue that the impact of life in limbo – which implies living 
with severely limited rights while being neither permitted to be present 
nor expelled – raises serious human rights concerns. Whether or not 
it reaches the threshold required by article 3 is an assessment that 
would need to be made in each individual case. But I would argue 
that, because of the severe hardship it usually causes, particularly in 
the case of people who cannot be returned, such as stateless people, 
living ‘in limbo’ for a prolonged period could qualify as inhuman 
and degrading treatment, whether or not it is intentionally imposed 
or the result of ‘legitimate government policy’.
Lost in the system: migrants’ experience of asylum  
and return procedures
The interviewees’ accounts of their interaction with the refugee status 
determination procedure and later with the deportation procedure 
sounded depressingly familiar. Their accounts speak not only of 
disappointment and frustration, which is probably inevitable where 
people feel the system has failed them, but also, and possibly more 
worryingly, of complete confusion and disorientation. Migrants 
and asylum seekers have to make their way through extremely 
bureaucratic and complex procedures, often with very little support. 
The women involved in the project in Malta pointed out that, with 
hindsight they realised: 
We were not well prepared. We did not understand what was 
expected of us nor did we understand how the whole procedure 
works, although we had been provided with some information 
about it we were still confused because we heard so many different 
things from different people. (JRS Malta 2015: 22)
All countries effecting returns presume that if there were any 
protection needs the asylum procedure would have picked them up. 
However, in my experience this is not necessarily the case. There are 
many factors that might lead to a failure to recognise an individual’s 
need for protection. I will mention a few that I have encountered in 
my work. Although it is true that I work in an asylum procedure that 
is probably far less sophisticated and which possibly offers fewer 
procedural and other guarantees than the Swedish system, I am sure 
that some of these apply even here:
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• if the procedure used is accelerated, the procedural guarantees 
are weak and the possibilities of review extremely limited;
• even where the ‘normal procedure’ is used, the credibility 
assessment conducted could be extremely stringent, to the 
point of being completely unrealistic;
• the assessment of the merits could be insufficiently thorough or 
based on a very superficial evaluation of the evidence 
available;
• the standard of proof required could be ridiculously high; 
• the legal interpretation of terms like ‘persecution’ and ‘serious 
harm’ set an extremely high standard - as the does the ECHR 
when it comes to the application of Art 3 to cases of forced 
return, so some grounds could be deemed to be insufficiently 
serious, or to fall outside the relatively narrow confines of the 
respective definitions (take serious illness and availability of 
treatment in country of origin for example);
• the asylum seeker may not have had access to proper 
information or decent legal assistance – particularly to take 
his/her case further and challenge a negative administrative 
decision at a judicial level. In Malta (and I imagine 
everywhere) this would particularly impact the ‘poor’ (the 
poor being not only those who have no financial means but 
also those with no social capital) as these would often have to 
rely on a legal aid system which is riddled with shortcomings. 
Also, in Malta, with legal aid there is always the luck of the 
draw, because the quality of legal assistance will depend on the 
lawyer you get;
• there are also factors related to the individual that affect 
not only how they perform in an interview, but also how 
much they trust and understand the system (e.g., age, gender, 
educational background, past experiences) — all of which will 
inevitably impinge on how much they can effectively benefit 
from the system designed to protect them.
One of the women involved in the project in Malta explained that:
I said the truth about many things in my interview but I also hid a 
lot of things from my life —  intentionally. I was new and I didn’t 
know that what happened to me could make a difference to my 
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future. When I arrived, I meant to say everything but people inside 
[in detention] told me not to say certain things because I will get 
a ‘reject’. There was a lot of fear around me and I was terrified. 
The interpreter was a Somali man and I was not brave enough to 
tell him everything. (JRS Malta 2015: 24)
Information which is divulged at later stages of the asylum procedure 
inevitably raises questions regarding credibility. However, from my 
experience there are so many reasons why an individual might not 
divulge certain facts at the outset. These include:
• The impact of past experiences such as trauma or torture, 
which could lead to PTSD or other psychological problems
• Misinformation from trusted sources — e.g., other detainees or 
friends and relatives who may mean well but are as lost as the 
asylum seeker himself
• Lack of trust or fear
I have met so many people whose protection needs were identified 
years after their arrival in Malta. I will mention just one such case to 
illustrate my point: Blessing was 17 years old and 2 months pregnant 
when she arrived in Malta with a number of other, mostly Nigerian, 
migrants. They had spent four days at sea before they were rescued; 
many of those on board died during the rescue when the boat they 
were travelling on capsized because of the rough sea, so when I met 
them in detention some days after their arrival they were visibly 
traumatised. They were also mistrustful, guarded, almost hostile, 
and very upset that, having risked everything to reach Europe, they 
found themselves locked up facing an uncertain future. Things got 
worse with time, especially after all of their asylum applications were 
rejected.
What I remember most clearly about Blessing from those early 
days is how angry she was. During the time she was in detention we 
didn’t really manage to communicate, which is not surprising — for 
all our good intentions, to her we too were part of a system that 
rejected and imprisoned her. Some months after she came to Malta, 
Blessing was released and placed in a shelter. There she found people 
who really cared for her. Over time they built a relationship of trust, 
so she could finally divulge the horror of all that she had endured. 
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She had left home at the age of 15, lured by promises of a better 
life and a job in Europe, but instead she found herself enslaved by 
those she trusted and forced to prostitute herself. She endured horrific 
physical and sexual abuse while in Libya, and would probably have 
faced more of the same wherever she was headed for, had she not met 
people who helped her find a way out.
She explained that while in detention she could not speak out 
about what happened to her because she did not know who she could 
trust — neither the people travelling with her, who provided some 
support but also told her what to say and do, nor the people who 
came to visit from the outside who she did not know anyway. Also, 
in her own words: “It’s very difficult to trust, because it’s trusting 
that got you into this mess in the first place”. Only in a place where 
she felt safe with people she could trust could she start the process of 
healing and rebuild her life. Thankfully her asylum application was 
reviewed and she was granted protection in Malta, but whenever I 
think of her I cannot help wondering how many others, including 
those who arrived with her, all of whom were deported back to their 
countries — had protection needs we failed to recognise.
Criminalisation: a violation of human dignity
The research highlights the criminalisation of the deportation 
process in Sweden and the impact that this has on the people directly 
affected by these measures. This in spite of a broad commitment 
to decriminalise immigration offences and to apply administrative 
sanctions rather than criminal ones in most cases involving breaches 
of immigration law, even where the actions concerned constitute 
criminal offences in terms of law.
The bigger picture: Sweden as part of a broader  
regional trend
As you are no doubt aware, Sweden is far from unique in this regard, 
and it is probably fair to say that among Member States of the EU it 
is not the worst offender. In Malta, for example, asylum seekers who 
lodge an application after they have been apprehended for irregular 
entry or stay remain in detention – until recently they remained 
there until their application was decided, which could take months. 
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Included in the category are asylum seekers who are rescued from 
vessels in distress and brought to Malta.
In 2008, the Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner 
expressed his concern about the increasing trend among Member States 
of the Council of Europe using criminal sanctions or administrative 
sanctions which mimic criminal ones (such as detention) to 
‘manage’ migration. He stressed that: ‘such a method of controlling 
international movement corrodes established international law 
principles; it also causes many human tragedies without achieving 
its purpose of genuine control’ (Council of Europe Commissioner 
for Human Rights 2010).
Although at face value administrative sanctions might appear to be 
less harsh or less invasive than criminal sanctions, in actual fact they 
are very similar both in impact and in implementation. Moreover 
they take place within a context which is far less regulated than 
the criminal justice system, which imposes strict controls on police 
powers and affords the individuals affected a number of procedural 
guarantees. As a result, the use of measures such as detention could, 
and in fact often do, raise serious human rights concerns.
In addition to use of such sanctions, the Commissioner notes ‘a 
steady advance of the discourse of ‘illegality’ in migration law and 
policy’ and highlights the fact that ‘while the early EU legislation 
refrains from using the terminology, after about 2003, it becomes 
common currency appearing again and again throughout documents, 
legislation and decisions’ (Council of Europe Commissioner for 
Human Rights 2010).
This increased focus on ‘illegality’ reflected a growing preoccupation 
with irregular immigration among Member States of the EU, which 
during the past decade has been consistently identified as a major 
concern. 
In this context, States have resorted to the use of increasingly 
punitive measures within the context of migration management, with 
some states criminalising not only irregular entry or stay and the 
use of false documents, but also the exercise of economic activities 
by individuals with irregular migration status, the employment of 
individuals with irregular or uncertain status and, in some cases, 
even the provision of assistance or shelter to irregularly staying third 
country nationals.
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Impact on people
The research indicates that these measures have a significant 
negative impact on the migrants directly affected, who ‘live through 
the deportation process with a great sense of injustice and unfair 
subjugation’ as ‘they feel that their actions do not constitute morally 
grave actions which would warrant criminalisation’ (pg 185). They 
categorically refute the label of ‘criminal’ and feel ashamed and 
distressed by the negative connotations/implications of the treatment 
to which they are subjected. 
The women who worked on the publication of No Giving Up also 
vividly highlighted the humiliation they felt because they were treated 
as criminals, when they did nothing wrong (JRS Malta 2015).  They 
state unequivocally that they feel that this treatment has violated their 
dignity as human beings.
In the words of one Somali woman: ‘When I came to Malta, I 
thought now you are in Europe and your life will be better. When I 
found myself in detention, I started to think “What have you done 
to deserve being put in prison like a criminal? What did you do?”’ 
(JRS Malta 2015: 17). One other woman described the shame she 
felt when she was taken to hospital in handcuffs: 
I am handcuffed to go to Mater Dei and everyone looks at me 
and I think they are saying, ‘are they those immigrants who came 
to our country?’ And I feel really ashamed. First when I came for 
asylum in this country, they didn’t believe me, so they make me 
a liar, then they handcuff me, so even if I did nothing, people see 
me as a criminal — first they see me a liar, then cuffs, so I felt 
ashamed, like I did something wrong. (JRS Malta 2015: 21)
Impact on societal perception of migrants and migration
It is clear that both the language used and the way in which migrants 
are treated feed into public perception of migrants and immigration 
generally. As the woman quoted earlier pointed out, because she is 
taken to hospital escorted by a guard with her hands in cuffs, ‘even 
if I did nothing, people see me as a criminal’ (JRS Malta 2015: 21). 
The Malta Migrants Association stressed that:
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We believe that this negative way of perceiving migrants is even 
due to the language used to discuss immigration. When you 
talk of ‘burden sharing’, you are telling the Maltese people that 
immigrants are a burden, a problem for Malta, and it discourages 
society from accepting migrants. Another side effect of this 
language is that it tells immigrants that they are a burden and 
contributes to the philosophy that makes some people superior 
and others inferior. 
This perception of migrants as inferior also affects the way 
we are treated by our employers and colleagues at work, by the 
people behind the desk in government offices or at the bank, on 
public transport, and in every other place where we meet Maltese 
people. (Malta Migrants Association n.d.: 7)
This is very much in line with what the CoE Human Rights 
Commissioner states regarding the use of language. He states that: 
the choice of language is very important to the image which the 
authorities project to their population and the world. Being an 
immigrant becomes associated, through the use of language, with 
illegal acts under the criminal law. All immigrants become tainted 
by suspicion. Illegal immigration as a concept has the effect of 
rendering suspicious in the eyes of the population (including 
public officials) the movement of persons across international 
borders. The suspicion is linked to criminal law – the measure of 
legality as opposed to illegality… conjuring up images of police 
and the criminal justice system. (Council of Europe Commissioner 
for Human Rights 2010)
Perhaps more worrying is the fact that the use of the terminology of 
illegality somehow justifies the use of measures such as the deprivation 
of liberty or the use of coercion or force in the context of deportation, 
making them more acceptable, more legitimate.
In conclusion: the courage to listen
Unfortunately the migrants’ voices are often unheard and, when 
they are, they are easy to dismiss as one-sided or naïve. Where those 
speaking out have no right to stay their very right to speak is often 
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questioned, and the fact that they have no right to stay is seen as 
undermining the legitimacy and importance of their message. This is 
a pity because, though no doubt subjective, their experience shows us 
how our laws, policies and practices impact the lives of those directly 
affected by them. Listening to their voices is the only way for us to 
understand this, because we enter the system from completely different 
points of departure, and have completely different perspectives, so 
it is really very difficult for us to begin to imagine what it must be 
like to be in their place. Listening also makes us better equipped to 
address the challenge of creating a deportation system that is humane 
and dignified.
Of course it’s not always easy to listen, especially if what is being 
said explicitly or implicitly criticises our services, the services we set 
up and which we have invested so much in. At JRS Malta we had 
this experience when we were working on the women’s project. As an 
organization which dedicates so much time and energy to providing 
information to asylum seekers arriving in Malta, their description of 
the fear and confusion of their early days in Malta and their lack of 
preparation for their asylum interview, was clear evidence that our 
message is not getting across; our information programmes were 
failing to have the desired effect. Painful as it was, we chose to take it 
as an invitation to review the manner in which we provide information 
and the content of the information we provide. It’s probably still not 
perfect, but that we have the courage to continuously review our 
practice is important.
Having listened to the migrants’ experiences, you are invited 
to do the same — to look at the laws and practice regulating the 
implementation of forced return and to ask: 
• Does this study highlight areas of practice that need to be 
reviewed?
• Are there practices that can be avoided?
• Is detention really being used only where it is really necessary 
to effect removal, and where other less coercive measures 
cannot be applied in the individual case?
• Could a grave fear or return be the result of a failure to 
identify protection needs?
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9. NOTES
1. ‘Living in…’ means ‘at the time of the interview’ and not that the whole 
time in Sweden has been spent in that living situation. 
2. The statistics were received by e-mail from Anna Garphult of the Border 
Police Section, The National Operative Department, 10 March 2015.
3. REVA (Rättsäkert och Effektivt Verkställighetsarbete/Legally Secure and 
Efficient Forced Return Management).  According to this system, errands 
are labelled as Category 1, 2 or 3 depending on the complexity of the case. 
4. The statistics on absconding were received in an e-mail correspondence 
with Kristina Rännar, process leader, The Quality Department, Swedish 
Migration Agency on 18 June 2015.
5. ‘Placering på säkert ställe med hänsyn till vad som kan drabba objektet’. 
6. Denmark opted out. ‘In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol 
on the position of Denmark, annexed to the Treaty on European Union 
and the Treaty establishing the European Community, Denmark does 
not take part in the adoption of this Decision and is not bound by it or 
subject to its application’. Decision No 575/2007/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 May 2007 establishing the European 
Return Fund O.J. L 144/45 of 6.6.2007 44 (EP/CEU 2007; see also 
updated opt-out: ‘Agreement between the European Community and 
the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters’, O.J. L251/1 
of 21.9.2013).
7. Although this was an obligation for the other funds which were reported 
in this same Communication: the External Borders Fund and the 
European Fund for the Integration for Third-Country Nationals.
8. ECRE is a pan-European alliance of 85 NGOs protecting and advancing 
the rights of refugees, asylum-seekers and displaced persons. ECRE’s 
mission ‘is to promote the establishment of fair and humane European 
asylum policies and practices in accordance with international human 
rights law’ (ECRE, ‘About Us’, http://www.ecre.org/about/this-is-ecre/
about-us.html, accessed 28 June 2015).
9. As per three Nordic Council agreements: 1) ‘Protocol concerning the 
exemption of nationals of the Nordic countries from the obligation to 
have a passport or residence permit while resident in a Nordic country
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other than their own’, originally signed May 1954, effective December 
1955; 2) ‘The Nordic Passport Convention’, signed 1957, amended and 
supplemented by agreements in 1973, 1979 and 2000; 3) ‘Agreement 
Concerning a Common Nordic Labour Market’, signed 1982, effective 
1983 (replaced previous agreement from 1954).
10. European Commission, Visa Information System (VIS) Regulation (EC) 
No. 767/2008, Article 2(e), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
ALL/?uri=CELEX:32008R0767, accessed 15 June 2015.
11. Lean Production is an organisational model developed by Toyota, the 
aim of which is to streamline a process so that work that has no value for 
the end user is eliminated. 
12. In some cases it is deemed that no legal representative is needed; however, 
this is only when the deportation is imminent and there are no reasons to 
believe that there will be obstacles.
13. What these special circumstances might be is not specified in FAP 638-1 
but the regulations state that, if police officers attend the deportation, the 
reasons must be documented.
14. This option is not available for all voluntary returnees and, at this point 
in time, returnees to the following countries are the only ones eligible 
for financial aid upon return – Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Eritrea, Iraq, 
Yemen, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Sierra Leone, Somalia – together with 
stateless persons from Gaza and the West Bank, Sudan, South Sudan, 
Syria and Chad (Swedish Migration Agency 2015).
15. In 2014, according to Olle Kylensjö, a statistician at the Swedish 
Migration Agency, 85 per cent of those migrants who were given a 
negative decision on their asylum application appealed. Of these 10,920 
cases that were determined by the Migration Court, 7 per cent managed, 
on appeal, to have their decisions overturned. In the last instance, in the 
Migration Court of Appeal, 2.2 per cent of the decisions were changed 
(information received by e-mail correspondence, 25 and 29 June 2015). 
16. This refers to the last four digits of the Swedish personal number that is 
given to all citizens and documented residents.
17. This is less than a regular hourly wage in Sweden for low-skilled jobs.
18. A deportation decision is valid for only four years after it has gained legal 
effect (Aliens Act, Ch. 12.22).
19. As mentioned earlier, the access to healthcare for adults without 
residence permits is restricted to care that cannot be postponed (Swedish 
Parliament 2013: 407).
20. De agerade på det viset jag har begått ett stort brott som dödsfall eller ja 
något stort brott.
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